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Abstract 
This study examines the twin themes of risk governance and anticipatory governance to 
establish whether European Union (EU) risk governance instruments and others such as 
Responsible Research and Innovation( RRI ) are delivering on their promises for the safe and 
responsible development of nanomaterials(NM). This is an empirical study that conducts 
semi-structured interviews with cross-sectoral experts working within nanotechnologies to 
examine these issues. The main findings identify critical flaws in the principal chemical safety  
regulations(REACH) due to the  lack of specificity for NM safety testing,  and the scientifically 
contested EU definition for NM. Both of which undermine legal authority for enforcing 
regulatory compliance. Secondly, critical scientific gaps are evident that prevent 
comprehensive nano-risk analysis of the Environmental, Health and Safety (EHS) 
implications of NM production. Thirdly, there are indications that the nano industry is 
seeking to avoid engaging with either product regulation (REACH) or the social-ethical 
appraisal of NM production. Finally, compounding these deficiencies, the EU does not 
provide a bespoke overarching EU risk governance framework to scrutinise either the EHS 
effects or the wider social implications of current and future nano-innovation pathways. In 
this study, I proposes a novel solution for such a framework centred on a ‘Safety by Social 
Design’ approach. Its purpose is to facilitate responsible innovation by the societal alignment 
of nano innovation within an adaptive and integrative risk governance framework. This will 
serve the purpose of progressing the EU towards a more anticipatory governance approach 
for nano innovation.   
Key Words: Nanomaterials, Risk Governance, Anticipatory Governance, Responsible 
Research and Innovation, Safety by Social Design  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Introduction 
In 2004, the European Commission (EC) published its strategy ‘Towards a European Strategy 
for Nanotechnology’ [COM(2004)338]. I designate this policy document with its  subsequent 
Action Plans collectively as the EC NanoStrategy, as it sets out how the EC wished the 
development of nanomaterials(NM) to proceed within the European Union(EU). The 
principal focus of this NanoStrategy is for the rapid economic development of NM, but it 
also clearly stated the aim for NM to be developed in a safe and responsible manner within 
an integrative process. The key question I consider in this study is whether this EC 
NanoStrategy, and subsequent iterations, are delivering on those promises. If not, then what 
approaches need to be adopted to fill any policy/scientific/regulatory/deliberative lacuna to 
achieve that policy goal. To assist me in this process, I examine  the twin themes of risk 
governance and anticipatory governance. They are utilized  to determine in what way the 
EU risk governance instruments, and its Responsible Research and Innovation(RRI) policy, 
have contributed towards achieving this policy goal. But before I set out how I intend to 
undertake this study, I provide background information as to NM biophysicochemical 
properties, their commercial applications, their growing politico-economic importance, and 
current concerns regarding potential human and environmental risks.  
 Background  
NM are defined by the European Union as particles between 1 and 100 nanometres(nm) in 
size [COM (2011)275]. They can exhibit unique biophysicochemical phenomena which 
enable the exploitation of novel scientific and technological applications into new 
commercial products. There is considerable national and international support for their 
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development and their application within commercial products [COM (2004) 338]; EC 
NanoCode 2008; UK Nanotechnology Strategy 2010; HM Treasury 2014; USA National 
Nanotechnology Initiative 2014, 2016 & 2019;German Nanotechnology Strategy 2020, EU 
Horizon 2020 https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020]. Some of these 
novel applications will bring incremental technology benefits, but others are predicted to be 
nothing short of being scientifically revolutionary (Gordon 2003), which may be substantial 
engines for economic growth (Maynard 2014, Nano-safety in Europe 2015-2025). NM are, 
therefore, regarded as having the potential to contribute to driving the technological and 
economic progress of nation states. Inshakova and Inshakova (2018) published conservative 
estimates that the global nanomaterials market, was valued at about USD 4.1 billion in 2015, 
and is expected to be worth USD 11.3 billion by 2020. Whilst the European NM   market 
generated revenue of more than USD 2.5 billion in 2015, with projections to reach USD 9.1 
billion by 2022, supported by a compound annual growth rate of 20.0% during the period 
2016-2022.   
The predicted influence of nanotechnologies on science and technological advancement can 
be summarised as two-fold. First is their capability to enhance the current range of uses of 
technoscientific applications, including novel physical, chemical and biological 
functionalities (Parandian and Rip 2012).  Secondly, it is envisaged that NM technologies will 
converge with other emerging sciences to create brand new scientific platforms and 
products, such as nanobiotechnology, as foreseen in discussions on the ‘fourth industrial 
revolution’ (Schwab 2015; World Economic Forum 2016). The intention of this study is to 
consider the prospects for a balance between maximising the potential socio-economic 
benefits from NM, whilst mitigating or eliminating risks by the societal alignment of the nano 
innovation process.    
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Figure 1.1 below illustrates the breadth of scientific, technical and socio-economic 
applications of current nanotechnology platforms. These range from catalysts to 
composites, coating materials to medical devices, and aerospace to targeted drug delivery. 
An important  feature is that NM offer the prospect of developing ‘molecular machines’ with 
future potential  to undertake programmed tasks (Stoddart et al, Nobel Prize for Chemistry 
2016), and enable data storage at vastly smaller scales than are possible currently (Sessoli 
2017).This prospective plurality of future technoscientific applications is why the Royal 
Society and Royal Academy of Engineering jointly proposed the term ‘nanotechnologies’ 
rather than ‘nanotechnology’ as the accepted overarching term (Royal Society and Royal 
Academy of Engineering 2004).   
 
 
Figure 1.1: Overview of nanotechnologies applications. Source: Hankin (2012) 
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What Figure 1.1 indicates is the breadth of the potential for NM to offer a new era of 
technoscientific discovery and product applications which, in some cases, may have a 
profound impact on our world. In the next section I briefly discuss the biophysicochemical 
properties that differentiate NM from other chemical substances, and why this makes them 
so important for our futures. 
 Nanomaterials : Why are they different? 
NM can exhibit unique chemical, physical and biological properties not demonstrated by 
their own macro versions.  A good example is the chemical element gold,  which at a macro 
level is relatively inert, but at 30 nanometres scale (30nm), can be highly chemically reactive 
and an effective catalyst. Separately, it also offers the potential for novel pharmaceutical 
applications such as acting as a drug carrier (Mahapatra 2016). The scientific explanation for 
these unique biophysicochemical properties has now been established. Within the 1-100nm 
range, unpredictable quantum effects can be endowed on the nanoparticles (see Figure 1.2) 
which is briefly explained here. 
As the particle size reduces on the nanoscale, it exhibits a higher surface to mass ratio with 
more atoms at surface. The number of surface atoms increase as the nanoparticle size falls 
below the 100-nm level and generates greater particle reactivity (Oberdoster et al 2005).  
Lynch (2018) explains this concisely as the result of the consequent increase in nanoparticle 
surface curvature, which enhances its potential for external reactivity, as the fundamental 
foundation for its quantum properties. The uniqueness of this feature provides for a 
disproportionate number of atoms at the surface which are available for biophysicochemical 
interactions. This leads to dominance of the surface area over the biophysicochemical 
properties exhibited in its traditional macro version. Maynard (2007) believes that these 
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startling biophysicochemical characteristics of NM takes us into a post-chemistry era. This is 
when the established scientific rules, developed and adopted over centuries, can no longer 
be applied with any degree of certainty. This includes utilizing our historical understanding 
of the risks posed by individual chemical substances. 
 
Figure 1.2: Novel physico-chemical functionality from quantum effects. Source: Oberdoster et al. 
(2005) 
These nano quantum properties include enhanced chemical, optical, magnetic, and 
electrical conductivity, which cannot be readily predicted from the known physico-chemical 
properties of its macro-version. Not only is there the possibility of new products that are 
lighter, stronger, with enhanced optical, magnetic and conductivity properties (e.g. 
graphene), but some have the potential to be engineered to have important therapeutic 
capabilities.  An example is the targeted pharmaceutical carriers that can be transported via 
the bloodstream to major organs, and to cross critical biological membranes such as the 
brain and placenta (Mahapatra 2016).  Clearly, such penetrative capability, into the most 
vital organs, must be viewed with a certain level of caution and concern until any 
unaccounted risks have been fully examined and documented.  What is clear, however, is 
the need for effective policy regulation of this rapidly developing area of physical science. 
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Consequently, in the next section I discuss the current debates, principally within the 
European Union (EU), on potential risks to human and environmental health and safety (EHS) 
posed by this new generation of NM. I will then briefly consider the EU risk governance 
considerations and implications for the control of those risks.  
 Potential Risks to Human and Environmental Health  
At the same time as the EC was formulating its own NanoStrategy in 2004, the Royal Society 
and Royal Academy of Engineering jointly expressed their unease regarding the safe use of  
NM in commercial applications. This was in terms of the acknowledged scientific 
uncertainties surrounding the long-term exposure to NM, their potential adverse EHS 
effects, and the questionable level of public acceptance for this novel technology.  Today, 
that unease is still evident within global scientific and policy communities. An example is 
found in the recently constituted European Union Observatory for Nanomaterials (EUON) 
report published in 2018 (ECHA /PR 18/13).  It  concluded that there are still substantial gaps 
in our understanding of the hazards and risks from nano-sized particles. More specifically, 
these gaps relate to the physico-chemical characterization of NM, our lack of understanding 
of  their environmental fate and behaviours (e.g. bio-accumulative effects), their long-term 
EHS toxicity potential, and their risk characterizations for specific endpoints of human and 
environmental health e.g. carcinogenic, mutagenic, reprotoxic (Nano-safety in Europe 2015-
2025). On this basis, Fadeel et al (2018) advises that there is still much experimental work to 
be done for the development of new scientific methods, tools and protocols, if these hazard 
and risk uncertainties are to be fully resolved. Fiorina (2010) describes this situation as 
reflective of the complexity now to be found in 21st century science and technology driven 
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problem-solving; rather than was previously found in the high-volume commodity chemicals 
from the mid-20th century onwards. 
With traditional scientific problem-solving strategies seemingly failing to provide answers to 
these pressing questions, Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) have argued for a post-normal 
scientific approach. This novel conception for the management of complex science-related 
problems, recommends that established policy decision-making processes are 
supplemented by extensive peer and lay community reviews to address risk uncertainties. 
By this means, post-normal science provides a new pathway to move beyond the triple helix 
of government, industry and researchers in innovation (Wiek et al 2016). The purpose is to 
progress towards a greater democratization of science which can assist in providing new 
perspectives and insights for the risk problem solving.  
One stand out example of the need for post-normal scientific approaches is the major EU 
policy failure to engage with civil society in respect of the debacle for the introduction of 
genetically modified foods (GMO) in the 1990s. That public outcry and strength of opposition 
against GMO crops resulted in an EU moratorium in year 2000 that continues to this day.  
For the EU biotechnology industry, the consequences can only be described as catastrophic. 
This outcome from a highly orchestrated protest across the EU nations, still resonates within 
policy, legal, regulatory and industry circles (Von Schomberg 2013). What has emerged for  
EU policy makers, following this harsh experience, is the recognition that public opinion is  a  
pivotal policy factor in the process of acceptance and diffusion of new technologies into 
main- stream consumer products (Bauer and Bonafadell 2002). It is better appreciated by 
EU policymakers that public opinion now needs to be actively engaged if new product 
technologies are to gain widespread acceptance. Bauer and Gaskell (2002) make the point 
that, following this humbling experience, EU policy makers realised that simply achieving 
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regulatory compliance is no longer enough. It now has to satisfy the court of public opinion 
on ethical as well as safety issues, and the publics need to participate actively within the 
governance processes.  
How these experiences are reflected in the development of EU strategies for the risk 
governance of nanotechnologies, and how that manifests in the decisions to control risks 
from NM, is discussed next. 
 EU Strategy for the Risk Governance1 of Nanomaterials     
The European Commission published its governance strategy for nanotechnologies in the 
document, “Towards a European Strategy for Nanotechnology” [COM(2004)338]. This 
governance strategy sets out the EC policy, regulatory and economic framework for 
supporting and investing in the development of nanotechnologies platforms, product 
applications, and consumer products within the EU. It opened the discourse for the 
governance of NM at the international institutional level across its Member States. Further 
supporting Action Plans were published [COM(2005)283], European Parliament 28th 
September(2006),[COM(2007)505],[COM(2009)607Final] with a voluntary industry 
NanoCode published in 2008 [EC NanoCode 2008].  
These documents are reflective of the GMO lessons, by emphasising that a narrow policy 
framing of nano risk solely predicated on EHS is no longer the way forward. Instead, what 
should become accepted practice is not simply the traditional scientific risk assessments for 
EHS, but also the identification and management of the ethical, legal, and socio-economic 
implications of nano innovation. This process to be instigated by timely and meaningful 
 
1 Following Klinke and Renn (2012, p.277), I define risk governance as ‘the institutional structures and policy 
process that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group, or society to regulate, reduce or control risk 
problem’. 
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engagement with a broad range of relevant stakeholders within the research and 
development processes (R&D). This approach is reflective of Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993), 
and fitted well with contemporary thinking for a matrix framing of ‘Risk Governance’ by Renn 
(2005 p.6) who describes it as follows: 
‘Risk Governance sits on the confluence of all analyses and actions relative to the 
development of a given technology including its framing, with its technological context, 
assessment of the benefits and risks, evaluating specific socio-politico-economic interests, 
and identifying risk management and risk communication options‘. 
This matrix thinking is reflected in the EC NanoStrategy document as it sets out how it is to 
achieve its principal risk governance aim that ‘nanomaterials are developed in a safe and 
responsible manner’ [COM(2004)338p.3]. This aim is to be achieved through the fulfilment 
of three key supporting risk governance objectives, which are summarised as follows:    
EC Objective 1-Maximum use would be made of existing regulation though adjustments may 
be necessary.  
EC Objective 2  - Existing parameters for EHS chemical safety testing may not be appropriate 
for the unique properties of nanoparticles, requiring new methods and tools for risk 
assessment, and refinement of nano scale metrology and standardisation activities. 
EC Objective 3- The Risk Management paradigm to be expanded to incorporate socio-ethical 
considerations into the R&D process with the creation of a culture of responsibility which is 
participatory and inclusive. 
I will discuss briefly the intentions of the three risk governance objectives and what they 
were expected to achieve. For the  first objective, the application (retro-fitting) of existing 
chemical safety legislation was intended to avoid the need for the approval of nano-specific 
legislation. It was recognised that nano-specific regulation was likely to be a very public, 
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highly complex and contested political process (e.g. remembering that the GMO crops 
debacle was recent). Moreover, in the early 2000s,  new  major EU chemical safety legislation 
was in draft and  very close to completion. These regulations are titled the Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorisation of Chemical Substances Regulations [(EC) No 1907/2006]. These 
regulations will be known from now on by their widely accepted acronym ‘REACH’. But as 
Bowman (2017) points out, when REACH was finally enacted in 2008, it was entirely silent 
on any risk issues from NM. It treated them no differently to their macro versions. 
By this critical omission, the regulations lacked any nano specificity in the published risk 
assessment protocols for potential hazards/risks emanating from the unique NM properties.  
This omission has haunted the EC ever since, and is an issue raised time and again within the 
literatures and in respondents interviews. The first concerns were raised by the European 
Parliament in 2006 (2006/200/ 187) but set aside by the EC at that time. In its first review of 
its NanoStrategy in 2008, the Commission restated its support for REACH to control, in 
principle, the potential health and safety and environmental risks in relation to NM (EC [SEC 
(2008)2036]/[COM(2008)0366]. This decision to ‘retrofit’ REACH to NM was subsequently 
endorsed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation Development (2013), as well as 
international chemical industry bodies and other authoritative voices (European Chemical 
Industry Association 2011, EC COM (2012)572, Nanotechnology Industry Association 2013).  
Yet as Bowman (2017) and Hanani and Dayanne (2015) point out, in their detailed reviews 
on EU nano risk governance, these endorsements seem perverse. This is because the capture 
of NM by an unadapted REACH does not give the publics the necessary assurances for the 
safe use of NM. Neither did it represent a joined-up approach with other relevant EU 
initiatives currently being developed for nano regulatory control, such as the foresight driven 
‘Regulatory Preparedness’ policy ’(Katalgariniakis 2018; NanoReG2 
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http://www.nanoreg.eu/; Gottardo et al 2017) and the new ‘Sustainable Innovation 
Approach’ (Noorlander2019; Katalagariniakis 2018; NanoReG2 http://www.nanoreg.eu/). 
Another significant outcome is the widespread criticism, in the literatures and from the 
interviews, of an over-dependency on the EU Precautionary Principle to address unresolved 
hazards and risks from NM. As will be seen, the Precautionary Principle has an important 
part to play in this study.  
The second risk governance objective recognises that to underpin the EU regulatory control 
of NM, new scientific knowledge, methods and tools for undertaking risk analysis for NM   
will be crucial. Such tools and protocols are essential for regulatory sciences to be able to 
provide accurate risk assessments and public assurances on the safe use of NM. These 
deficits received formal recognition by the Commission in the EC Second Review of the 
Regulatory aspects of Nanotechnology in 2012 [ COM (2012) 572 Final].  In this review, the 
EC accepted that the lack of specific tests for some nano risk assessments was now 
recognised as a significant problem. The EC promised and delivered significant research 
funding to develop new testing protocols which would be formally adopted as amendments 
to the existing REACH Annexes (with the Projects listing on the NanoSafetyCluster  website 
https://www.nano-safetycluster.eu/). 
However, current academic debates emphasise that the traditional single probalistic 
toxicological tests for regulatory purposes, using vertebrates or lower level organisms, can 
be flawed by false positives/negatives (Stirling 2016a, Jahnel 2015b). In its place, are 
emerging Systems Biology discoveries as a move towards  scientific and regulatory 
preferences for novel toxicological paradigms. These offer the prospect for utilizing multi- 
cellular testing protocols, in combination with other multiple primary and secondary data 
sources, with animal testing as a  last resort (ECHA 2017;  Stone et al 2017;  Hjorth et al 2016; 
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Jahnel 2015a, 2015b; Oomen 2013;  Stone et al 2013;  Nel et al 2013).  These scientific 
initiatives have support at the highest policy, regulatory and scientific levels and are very 
relevant to the discussions later in this  study. They offer a future which could progress 
regulatory sciences from single probabilistic testing to a multi- data sources ‘weight of 
evidence’ approach for nano risk characterization (Linkov et al 2018;  Stone et al 2018;  
Gottardo et al 2017;  Jahnel 2015b;  Hristozov et al 2014;  SCHENIR 2012).  These techniques 
are in receipt of substantial EC research funding and are being extensively developed for 
future predictive toxicological profiling for tiered hazard and risk ranking of NM   
(NanoSafetyClusterhttps://www.nano-safetycluster.eu/). The major drawback is their lack 
of proof of concept at this time.  
The current state of EU regulatory approaches to NM could thus be described as  one where 
techno-scientific complexity and risk uncertainties for NM are currently unresolved by 
nanosciences knowledge and regulatory actions. Consequently, Funtowicz and Ravetz 
(1993) would recognise the remedy as post-normal scientific approaches to urgently address 
the shortcomings of  traditional scientific methodologies. By this means, a new pathway may 
be constructed, beyond the limitations of the triple helix establishment previously 
mentioned, with progression to a democratization of innovation for a more anticipatory role 
in risk prevention. 
This brings us to the third EC risk governance objective which is reflective of the Funtowicz 
and Ravetz viewpoint. It does so through the EC’s tacit recognition that risk assessments 
alone are no longer sufficient to make sound risk management decisions, and other 
legitimate factors need to be taken into consideration [EC (2003) para 32 preamble].  In EC 
Objective 3, the critical consideration is that socio-ethical considerations must now be taken 
into account when making risk management decisions. There will be detailed discussions in 
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later Chapters as to the role that RRI might play in supporting a deliberative mechanism for 
delivering on this objective. 
In conclusion, the construction of these objectives within the EC NanoStrategy  offers a 
matrix approach, as suggested by Renn ( 2005) above, for achieving its key aim for the safe 
and responsible development of NM. It sets EU nano risk governance outside of the 
traditional state-centric regulatory boundaries and offers the prospect of deliberatively 
driven multi-level governance systems to promote a culture of responsible innovation. This 
was a major initiative for promoting a novel anticipatory approach, for the responsible 
innovation of an emerging technology, to be generated by stakeholder collaborations. 
However, the strategy  lacked a critical policy component which is a detailed mechanism for 
how this deliberative2 activity was to be undertaken, and how the outcomes could  be 
incorporated within the risk governance decision-making.   
In addition, since the NanoStrategy  publication in 2004,  a wide array of academic and policy 
proposals for embedding socio-ethical concerns within the nano innovation space have been 
published. These include well publicized concepts such as ‘Responsible Innovation’(RI) 
(Owen et al 2013; Stilgoe et al 2013) and its EU policy equivalent ‘Responsible Research and 
Innovation’ (RRI) (Rome Declaration 2014; Horizon 2020; Von Schomberg 2013).  The formal 
adoption of the RRI concept as a policy instrument  for  EU Member States is  given authority 
by the Rome Declaration (2014).  There are a number of extant definitions for RRI in the 
literatures, with the Declaration defining  RRI ‘as an on-going process of aligning research 
and innovation to the values, needs and expectations of society’ ( Rome Declaration 
 
2 In this study, ‘Deliberative’ is defined as the social process wherein deliberators are amenable to changing 
their judgements, preferences, and views during the course of their interaction, which involve persuasion not 
coercion, manipulation or deceit (Dryzek 2002p.15) 
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2014.p.1). This is the primary definition of RRI for use in this study.  It requires all 
stakeholders, including civil society, to take a shared responsibility for co-production of the 
outcomes of the R&D process. Nonetheless, whilst these debates provide more shape and 
form for the development of a culture of responsible innovation by industry, crucially, they 
still do not provide a mechanism by which it can be operationalized. 
The current representations for RRI have it acting in an anticipatory manner to determine 
the positive and negative impacts of emerging technologies such as nanotechnologies. This 
is achieved by reflecting on the socio-ethical dimensions of nanotechnological development, 
with the participation of diverse actors contributing to setting the agendas for nano 
innovation processes (Ribeiro et al 2018; Owen 2014). Yet, many nano businesses and 
entrepreneurs are still largely unaware as to what specifically the concept of RRI entails  (van 
de Poel et al 2017;Auer and Jarmai 2017). This continues to be the significant deficiency for 
the development of an industry led responsible innovation culture, which has not been given 
the attention within research funded projects that it deserves. In particular, the important 
issue of linking industry best practice to contemporary thinking on RRI, in respect of the 
potential for mutually beneficial outcomes from precautionary and anticipatory processes. 
It is an important element of this study to consider a deliberatively based mechanism, by 
which RRI can facilitate the bridging of socio-ethical concerns into the nano innovation 
process. This to be achieved by a timely and meaningful dialogue with civil and other 
relevant actors and, by this approach, to enable EC Objective 3 to be fulfilled.  
 Research Context  
This study directly addresses the pressing theoretical and policy challenges framed by the 
EC risk governance strategy for the safe and responsible development of NM. It does so by 
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focussing upon the three-risk governance objectives and  considering how far they offer an 
opportunity to break from the current, ineffectual traditional EHS risk governance 
framework.  In the next sections, I will provide a brief overview of my research purpose, 
proposed methodology, supporting research objectives, and how they can make a 
contribution to these ongoing debates.  
 Research Purpose 
The intention for my research is to obtain a better understanding of the continuing policy, 
scientific and regulatory complexities, uncertainties and ambiguities surrounding nano 
innovation within the EU. In particular, what has been the EU progress in developing good 
risk governance for NM, so as to embed an R&D culture for safe and responsible nano 
innovation? By gathering interview data from a variety of expert nano sectoral respondents, 
I hoped to build a measure for that progress. Then, from the identified policy, scientific and 
regulatory gaps, to also build a novel framework for delivering on the key NanoStrategy aim 
and objectives. Next, I will illustrate how these strategy objectives have been transformed 
into the research objectives which will underpin this study.  
 Research Objectives  
For the purposes of this study, the Research Objectives set out below are explicit statements 
on what I need to know to be able to generate new insights for the issues previously 
discussed (Bryman 2012;  Saunders et al 2012;  Jankowicz 2005).  By utilizing these Research 
Objectives, I shall then be able to operationalize my enquiries into the effectiveness of the 
individual EC NanoStrategy risk governance objectives (Saunders et al 2012; Jankowicz 
2005).   
Research Objective 1 
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To critically review whether the current EU chemical safety regulations (REACH) provide 
acceptable public environmental health assurances for nano-safety 
Research Objective 2 
To determine to what extent can existing and emerging scientific methods, tools and models 
provide for future competent risk analysis of nanomaterials 
Research Objective 3 
To consider the development of a deliberative model to facilitate socio-ethical 
considerations for safe design  into nano risk management  
These research objectives will be the basis for the three testable propositions that will be 
applied to the primary data gathered from respondents (see table 4.2, Chapter 4).  In brief, 
they will test whether (a) the current EU regulation (REACH) can provide necessary 
assurances for public environmental health safety (b) that the new and developing scientific 
methods and tools for risk analysis will provide for future public confidence in industry and 
regulatory safety decision-making, (c) finally, consider the role of RRI for embedding socio-
ethical values for safe design into nano innovation. 
 Organisation and the Structure of this study 
The structure of the thesis is designed to research the key themes of Risk Governance and 
Anticipatory Governance, both of whose role in the contemporary management of risks 
from NM will emerge from the debates in forthcoming Chapters.  
The Introductory Chapter (Chapter 1) has provided a broad outline as to the global socio-
economic importance of nanotechnologies, together with a brief review of the rapid 
technoscientific development of NM and their applications. It discusses the continuing 
policy, scientific, regulatory and practice deficits/gaps for the implementation of an effective  
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EC strategy for the risk governance for NM. The research objectives are developed for the 
purpose of operationalizing my enquiries into the effectiveness of the EC NanoStrategy for 
delivering on its goal for the safe and responsible development of NM .  
In Chapter 2, I review the EU risk policy for NM, with particular attention to the role of the 
precautionary principle for addressing hazards and risks. I critically examine its regulatory 
responses, and the continuing implications of identified deficiencies for nano-safety 
decisions. I review and evaluate the prospects for novel scientific methods, tools, and 
toxicological paradigms for nano risk assessment rapidly evolving from experimental 
systems biology. I consider their future significance for regulatory sciences and to the EU risk 
governance of NM .  
In Chapter 3, I will identify the key concepts which will be applied in the process of analysis 
for this study such PP, RRI and SbD. The concepts are constructs that assist in the analysis of 
data, processes, variables and their relationships. The concepts will enable my reasoning 
within frameworks to facilitate logical outcomes. Though not lineal in application, they do 
provide for a progression in the data analysis to infer implications and conclusions that are 
supportive of the other concepts being applied. Not only do they allow me to infer the 
implications from the study findings as to theory and practice (Gallagher 2010), but they 
have challenged me to develop a new refined conceptual framework for EU risk governance 
from the gathered empirical data. (Grix 2010). 
In Chapter 4, I set out the justification for the methodology for the selected exploratory 
research theory and design process. It will explain the reasons why semi-structured 
interviews of expert actors are considered the most appropriate format for the collection of 
data for this study. Along with the structure and selection of the sampling frame and the 
criteria used to select the interviewees. The data management and analysis in terms of 
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coding and query using Nvivo software is explained as well as any identified confounding 
factors.  
In Chapter 5, a key purpose is to analyse the interviewee responses regarding the efficacy of 
the current EU risk governance instruments such as REACH. In addition, to identify and 
evaluate the novel scientific methods, tools and practices which are emerging for application 
within regulatory sciences. Then to consider the benefits that might accrue by replacing the 
current traditional scientific tools and paradigms for toxicological animal  testing with  assays 
of multi-cellular testing contributing to generate a ‘weight of evidence‘ approach.  Finally, to 
consider a framework for delivering their promise for future competent risk analysis for NM  
In Chapter 6, the discussion will centre of how a mechanism can be developed for the 
embedding of socio-ethical concerns within the nano innovation process. The analysis will 
consider how the Precautionary Principle (PP), Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) 
and Safety by Design (SbD) concepts can be applied in tandem to generate the novel concept 
of Safety by Social Design (SbSD). An adaptive and integrative risk governance framework is 
devised as the setting for SbSD, in which risk analytical data and socio-ethical concerns can 
be processed together. The decision outcomes of this process can then influence regulatory 
compliance,  identify  the social utility of the nanoproducts , and their commercial  viability 
and marketability. 
In Chapter 7, (Conclusions and recommendations) will provide an overview of the discussions 
of the study, the key learning points from the research, and the explanation and application 
of the proposed Adaptive and Integrative Risk Governance framework for NM. 
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Chapter 2:  Current EU public policy on 
nanotechnologies, existing scientific and future 
debates  
 Introduction 
Following on from Chapter 1, this Chapter presents a contextual examination of European 
Union (EU) public policies for nanotechnologies. As set out in its 2004 Strategy, the policy 
intention is the translation of NM into commercially viable processes and products [COM 
(2004) 338]. This intention underscores the EU’s promotion of a competitive market for 
nanotechnologies, particularly for small and medium size enterprises (SMEs), across 
disparate manufacturing areas [COM (2004) 338]. As discussed in Chapter 1, the importance 
of NM derives from their unique biophysicochemical functionalities that, if successfully 
scaled up and applied to manufacturing and industrial processes, could potentially deliver 
significant socio-economic benefits (German Action on Nanotechnology Strategy 2016 & 
2020; USA National Nanotechnology Initiative 2014, 2016; UK Nanotechnology 2010).  
In this context, the EC 2004 NanoStrategy [COM(2004)338] can be described as a mechanism 
to catalyse discussion on the politico-economic significance of nanotechnologies amongst 
its member states. This is in the classic EC manner to begin to build a policy consensus and 
a shared sense of purpose as to how EU policy might proceed. There is also a clear 
recognition in the NanoStrategy that while it is a policy drive for nanoproducts in the 
marketplace that NM need to be developed safely and responsibly [COM(2004)338]. 
Consequently, this document recognises that industry stakeholders, traditionally engaged 
within the  innovation process, need to consider projected societal impacts and product 
social utility as much as scientific and economic benefits. The NanoStrategy, therefore, 
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advocates positive engagement with a wide range of other industry, regulatory and civil 
society actors in a collaborative and deliberative manner. The purpose of which is to socially 
align the innovation process by identifying societal-ethical aspirations beyond the 
consequentialism of market-driven innovation [COM(2004)338], EC(NanoCode)2008; 
Horizon2020). The Commission’s aim here seems to have been to build as wide a consensus 
among stakeholders as possible, to foresight unexpected problems and anticipate future 
developments, as a means of strategic policy planning. This was considered especially 
important due the disruptive nature of nanotechnologies, and their continuing scientific 
ambiguities, technological complexities, and risk uncertainties [COM (2004) 338].  
To examine the issues arising from the Strategy, I discuss where policy responsibilities might 
lie for its delivery and for implementing the supporting risk governance objectives foreseen 
in this document. The first part of this Chapter leads with discussions on the current 
understandings for nano risks, how EU risk policy is currently applied through regulatory 
controls, and recent substantive progress made in the applied sciences. The second part 
considers how these policies might change and the proposed scientific changes that may 
accompany and support them, including anticipatory approaches. This includes discussion 
regarding the potential role of ‘safe design’ and ‘responsible innovation’ within new 
regulatory and risk governance framings for this policy area. The Chapter also addresses the 
pragmatic  issue of where responsibilities lie for the delivery of the 2004 strategy. It does so 
by  considering the role of key sectoral actors, and where changes might usefully be made 
in current arrangements to achieve the delivery of the strategy goal and objectives. Taken 
together, these lines of enquiry help inform the development of three research propositions 
that provide the framework for qualitative empirical  data analysis in subsequent Chapters 
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of the thesis. In the next section I start the discussion with a review of the current 
understanding of the risks currently posed by NM .  
  What are the risks from nanomaterials? 
Nanoparticle (NP) size is fundamentally important to its properties and hence its 
technological applications. It is within the metrical range of 1-100 nanometres (nm) that 
most unique physical, chemical and biological characteristics occur that enable novel 
nanoproduct applications.  A cause of concern for some experimental nanoscientists is that 
this size range coincides with fundamental biochemical processes at human and ecological 
scales (Lynch 2014). By this I mean that these are the scales at which cellular metabolic 
processing and pathways naturally function. NPs have been proven to breach cellular 
protective mechanisms and cross critical biological membranes (e.g. placenta, brain) 
whether beneficial or not. Once inside cells, NPs may engage in cellular in- vivo circulation, 
with the potential to cause negative and harmful interference with essential cellular 
metabolic activity and pathways (Kobayashi et al. 2014, Lynch 2014, Nel 2014).  
There is also evidence that NPs with high-energy surface areas (Figure 1.2, Chapter 1) are 
more likely to bind to other substances within the biological media in which they are 
situated. Within these bio-media, the NPs may absorb proteins/ lipids to form coatings 
known as bio-nano ‘coronas’ (Mahmoud et al. 2016; Nel 2014; Lynch 2014; Nel et al. 2009). 
This bio-nano interface may confer a novel biological identity on the NP that can cause it to 
interact in a very different way to that predicted from its known chemistry (Lynch 2018). The 
corona may significantly disguise and transform the NP from its original chemical-biological 
form, and unexpectedly alter its predicted life cycle (Lynch et al. 2014). This could mean that 
with its outer layer protein/lipid corona, the NP is disguised as a new bio-nano entity. By this 
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means, it could enable a ‘Trojan Horse’ effect, by mis-directing cell wall sensors into 
accepting it as suitable for importation into the cellular matrix. Thus, by evading the natural 
cellular gate-keeping defences, it gains the prospect of causing adverse interference of 
critical metabolic processes. (Lynch 2014, Lynch et al. 2014; Nel 2014; Lowry et al. 2012).  
Once internalized by the cell, the corona may then dissolve and deliver a toxic NP to interfere 
with normal cellular activity  (Valsami-Jones and Lynch 2015). 
Experimentation for investigating these new biochemical modes of action (MoA) has 
developed new scientific whole system concepts such as Adverse Outcome Pathways (AoP). 
They identify the interaction of toxicants, within a biochemical system, and any adverse 
outcome relevant to risk assessment at the biological organisational level (OECD 2012c). This 
concept has been proven to be equally applicable to describing toxicological processes 
underpinning human-relevant adverse effects (Vinken et al. 2014). These emerging  
concepts can act as a bridge to identify new ways of describing toxicological hazards based 
on mechanistic cellular profiling. These processes utilize hundreds of NP inoculated cell lines 
rather than an association with animal testing for pathological endpoints. This ground-
breaking science could potentially provide the foundation for implementing mechanistic 
reasoning into nano regulatory safety decision-making which is discussed later in this thesis 
(NanoReG2 http://www.nanoreg.eu/; Whelan 2014; see Chapter 5:). 
The above discussion shows that there has been substantive progress since 2004 in scientific 
understanding of the potential modes of action of NPs once they enter a cell. Yet, there 
continues to be lack of evidence to support the view that all NPs are intrinsically hazardous 
(German Action Plan for Nanotechnology 2020; NanoReG2 http://www.nanoreg.eu/; COM 
(2012) 572 Final). In fact, Donaldson and Poland (2013) successfully challenge the myth that 
all NPs exhibit nano-specific toxicity per se. Neither has a nano specific human illness, 
23 
 
disease, or pathology been identified (Nel et al.2015; Nel 2014). Though, of course,  this does 
not mean that individual NPs cannot be toxic at appropriate dose levels and  exposures, as 
would be the case with other non- nano chemical substances.  
In conclusion, there continues to be outstanding a  definitive answer as to the potential risks 
posed by NM, now and in the future. The reasons are the very significant and unresolved 
gaps in our scientific understanding of the chemistry of NPs, their modes of cellular action 
(MoA)  and their potential for adverse EHS effects (Fadeel et al. 2018). These include particle 
physico-chemical characterization (e.g. their size, shape, morphology); their intracellular 
adverse MoA; their environment fate, behaviours and exposures (e.g. bioaccumulation); 
their long term EHS toxicological impacts; and the summation of these factors into realistic 
nano risk characterization profiles. Fadeel et al (2018) make another important point that 
the resolution of these problems will not occur in the short term, and much experimental 
nanoscience still needs to be done. Having briefly discussed the most recent advances in 
nanosciences , in the next section I consider how EU risk governance policy has responded 
to risk uncertainties based on our current understandings of NM.   
 EU Risk Governance policy for nanomaterials 
2.3.1 The Current EC Policy Position 
Beck (1992) recognises that science and innovation co-produce risks to society. The 
relatively straightforward risks can be dealt with technocratically but, with the globalisation 
of discovery and product manufacturing, more complex anthropogenic risks requiring new 
approaches are evident (Bennet 2016). Risk governance seeks to translate the core 
principles of governance into the context of risk related policy making. In simple terms, risk 
governance is a systematic approach to risk decision-making (Tinkle 2014).   
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The International Risk Governance Council  (2008) believes risk always accompanies change, 
and in Jasanoff’ s (2016) view risk assessment begins with the tacit presumption in favour of 
that change. This can be translated as a strategic willingness and capacity to accept risks, 
because they are crucial for achieving the development of new technologies, innovative 
products and economic advancement. The fundamental challenge for effective risk 
governance lies here, which is to enable societies to benefit from change while minimising 
the negative consequences. As Bowman and Hodges (2008.p484) point out, the principal 
governmental risk governance approach to achieve this aim is by enacting relevant 
regulation. Yet they argue that nano-specific state regulation is likely to play only a small 
part in an evolving governance web for an emerging technology with indeterminant futures.   
Thus, when considering NM, with their risk uncertainties, technological complexities and 
scientific ambiguities, it is not surprising that there continues to be calls for nano-specific EU 
regulation (Centre for International Environmental Law 2017). There seems to be no EU 
political appetite to replace REACH, as the principal chemical safety framework for nano 
regulatory decisions, particularly with its institutional and industry endorsements (OECD 
2013; Nanotechnology Industry Association 2013; NANOFORCE 2012; European Chemical 
Industry Association 2011). Instead, there has been substantial EU research investment in 
developing supporting concepts such as ‘Safety by Design’ (SbD) processes and, the more 
recent, ‘Regulatory Preparedness’ and ‘Sustainable innovation Assessments’ initiatives 
(Katalagariniakis 2018). The purpose of these initiatives is to provide predictive tools for 
anticipating future problems and eliminating them at the discovery/early innovation stages. 
I discuss the prospects for these concepts to be incorporated within an adaptive and 
integrative framework for nano risk governance in later Chapters (Stone et al. 2018; Linkov 
et al. 2018).  
25 
 
 I have discussed briefly, in Chapter 1, that there are critical flaws in applying REACH to NM, 
in its underpinning regulatory sciences, which I will discuss in more detail later in this 
Chapter. I shall also discuss the recent policy/regulatory initiatives still under development 
and their implications. But, before I do so, I must briefly mention a fundamental unresolved 
additional problem in relation to EU nano risk governance. This is the continuing dissonance 
between the EC, nanoscientists, regulators and industry regarding an acceptable definition 
of what actually constitutes a NP; for if a NP cannot be legally defined, it becomes impossible 
to govern or regulate. 
2.3.2  EU Nanoparticle definition- Why is it still contentious? 
It is the exploitation of the unique NP functionalities which occur mainly within the 1-100nm 
metrical range that offer significant socio-economic-environmental benefits beyond those 
currently existing (German Action Plan for Nanotechnology 2020, 2016; USA National 
Nanotechnology Initiative 2016,2014; Maynard 2014, NERC 2014).  Nevertheless, there are  
within EU governance institutions (ECHA and EFSA), distinctive scientific differences of 
opinion as to how a NP should be defined and measured. Therefore, this is not just an 
abstract governance and jurisprudence problem but has significant impacts for other key 
stakeholders such as the nano industry.  
The EC decided that the only way to differentiate between NPs and other homologous 
chemicals, at a macro level, was by adopting the nanoscale of 1-100nm. It published its 
recommendation on the definition of NPs on 18th October 2011 (2011/696/EU). The 
definition is based on size alone and is designed to be neutral in that it does not related to 
potential hazard or risk in anyway. This definition is as follows:  
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European Definition of Nanoparticles, 18th October 2011  
‘A natural, incidental or manufactured material containing particles, in an unbounded state, 
or as an aggregate or as an agglomerate and where, for 50% or more of the particles in 
number and size distribution, one or more external dimensions is in the size range 1-100nm. 
In specific cases and where warranted by the concerns for environment, health, safety or 
competiveness the number and size of the distribution threshold of 50% may be replaced by 
a threshold between 1-50%’.   
This  definition remains contested due to its lack of measurability and the narrowness of its 
size range (Krug and Wick 2011). The Arcadis Report (2011) argued that there should be a 
broader size scale as quantum effects can be exhibited by larger particle sizes i.e. > 100nm 
scale. Surprisingly, there is continued dissent from the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA) for this EC draft definition. For example, when it received approval from the European 
Parliament for the EU Food Information for Consumers (FIC) Regulations 2011 [(EU) No 
1169/2011], it contained its own NP definition variant without the EC minimum particle 
counts.  At the behest of EFSA, the European Parliament more recently amended the Novel 
Foods Regulation[ (EU) No 2015/2283], which provides for a further variation on that draft 
EC definition. In contrast, the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) explicitly refers to the 
definition in EC Recommendation [2011/696/EU] above, in its guidance for the registration 
dossiers for NM for REACH purposes (ECHA 2016).  
Hence, the dissonance as to the exact definition for a NP continues to be unresolved within 
the EU governing institutions, legislative assemblies, enforcement agencies, and statutory 
risk governance instruments. This is no small matter, with differing definitions within 
different regulations, leading to a confusion for research scientists and industry 
technologists. An example is when a NP may have multiple commercial uses in differing 
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industry contexts subject to  separate regulatory regimes and enforcement agencies e.g. 
titanium dioxide for food colouring, sunscreens or household paints. Though much 
researched (NanoDEFINE http://www.nanodefine.eu/), there is as yet no formal adopted 
standardized scientific methods to differentiate NP threshold values/particle counts to 
comply with these differing statutory definitions (Stone et al. 2017).  The EC Joint Research 
Centre (JRC) has repeatedly defended the EC 2011 definition in three subsequent reports 
(JRC 2013, 2014, 2015). Consequently, because of this robust defence, there appears little 
likelihood of a drastic EC revision of the draft definition. Yet this fundamental scientific and 
legal  issue  remains unresolved, with the EC proposing a further public consultation which 
may take place in 2019 (EUR 27240 EN) but with no confirmed timetable as yet.  
In conclusion, this critical governance issue for  an authoritative scientific descriptor for a NP 
has still not been settled. Consequently, there are important implications both for 
nanoscientists, technologists, safety testing methods, industry submissions of REACH 
registration dossiers, and regulatory decisions and their enforcement.  I will discuss next the 
regulatory framework (REACH) for controlling NM within the EU. In particular, the benefits 
and disbenefits of this adopted approach that have emerged in its application for that 
purpose. 
2.3.3 REACH and Nanomaterials – The critical issues 
As previously mentioned, the EC’s continued reluctance to implement a nano specific risk 
governance framework is still being criticized by civil society groups within the EU (Centre 
for International Environmental Law 2017). They urged the need for a harmonized 
framework of legislation supported by a basket of mandatory public information 
requirements. These include NP identification and particle characterisation, hazard 
exposure, risk characterization and management measures, and specific market data for 
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consumer information. Despite such proposals, the EU principal statutory horizontal 
chemical safety framework for the EU remains REACH [Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006]. It is 
regarded as the most comprehensive chemical safety regulation in the world with other 
national models being based upon it e.g. South Korea (AsiaHub newsletter 30.10.2016). Its 
fundamental goal is to ‘protect human health and the environment’ by applying the 
Precautionary Principle [Article 1(3)]. The key mode of action is found in Article 5: ‘No Data, 
No Market’ (Article 5, Chapter 1, Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006). 
If a registration dossier providing the required data is not submitted to ECHA, then this 
fundamental sanction is applied. Compliance with the registration requirement is a powerful 
incentive for industry compliance with REACH by those wanting to manufacture or trade 
within the EU single market. Thus, REACH also captures chemical substances manufactured 
outside of the EU but traded within its boundaries. The key task of REACH is to act as a single 
portal for the safety testing of chemicals within the EU single market. A Registration dossier 
must be submitted to ECHA for any chemical substance, with an annual production greater 
than 1 tonne, with details of its intrinsic physico-chemical properties and their potential to 
impact on EHS e.g. carcinogenic, mutagenic, reprotoxic (CMR).  In addition, there must be 
included an assessment of EHS exposure and risk levels [REACH Article 14(1)].  
 In respect of NM, the criticism for REACH is its lack of a separate particle chemistry 
distinction within its regulations or chemical safety testing procedures i.e. separately 
identifying the nanoform(nf) from its macro versions. So, REACH allows different forms of 
the same substance (both macro and  nanoforms) to be incorporated within a single 
registration proposal for authorisation by ECHA (Vaughan 2015). There are no discrete 
scientific fields for separating out the nanoform of a chemical substance from its bulk or 
macro form within the registration process. For example, the macro version of gold is 
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virtually inert, yet its nano version can be a highly reactive catalyst (e.g.@30nm) for drug 
delivery in the pharmaceutical sector (Mahapatra 2016). However, the EC (2013a) believes 
that, overall, the harmonisation of the chemical safety testing within a single set of 
regulations (REACH) has contributed significantly to EU innovation and competiveness [COM 
(2013) 49 Final]. Yet, in contrast to the EC First Regulatory Review conclusions [COM (2008) 
0366], the Second Regulatory Review of Nanomaterials published in 2012 [COM (2012)572)], 
accepted that REACH testing protocols were inadequate for some forms of NM and 
promised revisions. These conclusions followed reports received from its Scientific 
Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR 2009; 2007). Yet, the 
EC’s continued dilatory response to these recommendations has been much criticized by 
some Member States (Vienna Declaration 2017), and the nano specific testing protocols 
revisions will not now be enacted within the REACH Annexes until 1st January 2020 (EC DO/ 
56122/02).  
This meant that at the expiration of the REACH registration dossiers deadline (31st May 
2018), NM were only represented in 29 of the 88,318 dossiers submitted (ECHA 2019) i.e. 
0.035% of the total. These numbers for NM seem exceptionally low, and a possible 
unexpected explanation for this will emerge from the industry respondents interviews in 
later Chapters. These figures must be considered in the context of the adoption of the EC 
strategy for nanotechnologies back in 2004, and now questions whether the decision to 
retrofit existing legislation ( i.e. EC Objective 1) to NM was the right one. These concerns 
have contributed to the development of the first Proposition for this study, which is to test 
respondents opinions as to whether REACH has achieved the high levels of public and 
environmental health safety required by EU legislation. The situation has provoked debate 
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and comment as to whether REACH should be the focus for nano regulation, and this will be 
a focus in the questionnaire. 
In conclusion it is easy to understand the criticism from the European Parliament and NGOs 
for the EC continued insistence in using REACH for nano regulatory decision-making. 
Questions continue to be posed as to just how effective REACH has been in guaranteeing 
safe use of nanoproducts for the publics. It cannot be said with confidence that REACH has 
yet delivered on the normative target of a ‘high levels of human and environmental 
protection’ required by the EU Maastricht Treaty 1992, (Articles 152, 153, 174), the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the EU 2012, [Article 191(2)], and Article 3(3) of The Treaty of the 
European Community (2002).  This is the legislative requirement that has generated the EU 
adoption of the Precautionary Principle (COM 2000) within REACH [Article 1(3)]. I will now 
discuss the role and application of PP within the EU as it has important implications for this 
study.  
2.3.4  The Precautionary Principle and its role in nano-safety.  
The Precautionary Principle (PP) is a ‘First Order’ principle central to EHS policy, protection 
and regulation within the EU. Its importance is emphasised within the three EU Member 
States Treaties above, all of which require high levels of EHS protection. In essence, PP is 
activated when a chemical, process or activity raises a threat of harm to human health or 
the environment. It triggers the need for precautionary measures to be taken even if some 
of the cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically (UN Environment 
Protection Assembly 1982, UN Environment Protection Conference ‘Rio Declaration’ 1992). 
The specific EU guidance  from the EC is found in the EC Communication on the Precautionary 
Principle (COM 2000), which requires that there must be, at minimum, a preliminary 
scientific evaluation that demonstrates there are ‘reasonable grounds for concern’ (COM 
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2000 p.3). The EU Maastricht Treaty 1992 (Article 174) also links PP to the ‘Polluter Pays 
principle’,  when requiring that a high level of protection shall be based on the precautionary 
principle, and that any environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source, and 
at the polluters cost.  
The EC Communication (COM 2000) does not provide a working definition for PP, but there  
are several academic definitions for the Precautionary Principle which include the 
formulation adopted at the Wingspread Conference (Hileman 1998): 
‘When an activity raises threats to the environment or human health 
,precautionary measures should be taken, even if some cause and effect 
relationships are not fully established scientifically ‘  
With Per Sandin (1999) providing  a succinct version : 
‘If there is a threat which is uncertain them some kind of action is mandatory ‘ 
 However, for the purposes of this study into EU precautionary policy, I provide the  policy 
definition offered by von Schomberg ( 2006 p. 47): 
‘ Where, following an assessment of available scientific information, there are 
reasonable grounds for concern for the possibility of adverse effects but scientific 
uncertainty persists, provisional risk management measures based on a broad 
cost/benefit analysis whereby priority will be given to human health and the 
environment, necessary to ensure the chosen high level of protection in the 
Community and proportionate to this level of protection, may be adopted, 
pending further scientific information for a more comprehensive risk assessment, 
without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those adverse effects 
become fully apparent’.    
EC Communication (COM2000.p15) and the above  definition identify that the necessity for 
any action triggering the PP must be based on scientific risk- based evidence (rather than 
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vague non-probability hazard assessments). Stirling (2016b) implies that PP requires a more 
scientifically rigorous attention to the implications of our incomplete scientific 
understanding than might be found within routine regulatory risk assessments. Less 
prominent is the PP requirement to include ‘deliberative’ consultation with relevant 
stakeholders in identifying options for problem resolution (COM 2000 p.21). Von Schomberg 
(2006 p.33)  describes PP as a ‘deliberative principle’ in that its application involves the 
deliberation on a range of normative dimensions, which need to be taken into account when 
making the principle operational in both a policy and regulatory context. 
Yet, as Stirling ( 2016b) points out, few issues of EU technology governance are more vexed  
than PP, with  continually evolving debates within the literatures( cf.  Sandin 1999, Sandin et 
al 2002; Von Schomberg 2006,2013, 2014; Tosun 2013; Britt -Holbrook and Briggle 2014; 
Spruit 2016; Reber 2018; Sandin and Peterson 2019). There continues to be  criticisms, from 
a wide range of commentators, regarding current misuse/misapplication of PP. This is 
because of its application in a broad (sometimes indeterminate) hazard- based approach (in 
contravention of EC guidance), and not applied  for evidence -based risk management (Boyd 
2015; Hansen 2015; European Risk Forum 2015; De Mauley 2013; Lofstedt 2013; Willetts 
2012). Yet its virtues are the avoidance of technocratic capture by narrow sectoral interests 
and enabling more democratic engagement and choices through its deliberative action ( 
Stirling 2016b; Von Schomberg 2006).   
The prevailing critical perspective for PP in some sectoral groups implies that the way it is 
being applied in practice is a constraint on nano innovation. Though civil society groups do 
dispute the view that the application of PP impacts negatively on EU competiveness and job 
creation (Centre for International Environmental Law 2017). Nevertheless, the 
precautionary approach, when hazard scenarios are developed but their probability of 
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occurrence is unknown, continues to be a typical response to current scientific uncertainty 
(van de Poel 2016). But Ashford (2015) strongly supports the view that regulation driven 
precaution can be part of the process of driving new innovation and not blocking it by 
requiring alternative options to be considered or developed. Thus, by utilizing it positively, 
and as a reason and incentive to open new scientific lines of enquiry, PP can influence the 
generation of novel alternative R&D trajectories and product creation (Stirling 2016b, von 
Schomberg 2013).  
The role of PP is to identify the reasons for intervening, but not the actual interventions 
themselves. The fact is that where there is scientific uncertainty, legal uncertainty will 
follow, with a greater dependency on the application of the PP and precaution-based 
regulation (David Azoulay quoted in Jantunen et al. 2018 p.26). Stirling (2016b) argues that 
these criticisms are exacerbated by the asymmetrical power tensions of vested interests 
involved in the innovation and regulatory systems. In that the intrinsic features of this 
precautionary approach rests on the normative pillars of preventing serious or irreversible 
harms (United Nations Rio Declaration 1992). Further, Stirling (2016b) contends that it is the 
values driven by these pillars that should be the basis for setting of regulatory standards for 
emissions and exposure to NM. 
This thinking may have been an influence for some Member States to set up their own 
separate National Registers for NM, echoing REACH with a ‘No registration, No market’ 
approach. The first was France (Decret No 2012-232 du fevrier 2012) with 14,000 NM 
declarations posted between 2012-2016 (Ministère de l'Environnement, de l'Énergie et de 
la Mer, November 2016).  With these 14,000 NM declarations being in marked contrast to 
the 29 nanoform dossiers submitted for REACH registration between 2008-18 (see Section 
1.4, Chapter1). Now this unilateral national state intervention has been followed by Belgium 
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(2013), Norway (2013), Denmark (2014) and Sweden (2018). It seems to me that these 
initiatives imply a lack of confidence in the current EU regulatory process for NM (see the 
Vienna Declaration 2017). The European Commission  responded by setting up a European 
Union Observatory for Nanomaterials (EU-ON), facilitated by ECHA in June 2017, but the 
national registers have not been withdrawn in response to that policy initiative.  
So, with the ongoing, and well-publicized problems identified for REACH in its application for 
NM, it is unsurprising that national state unilateral action has occurred citing nano-safety a 
key factor. These factors can be taken as part indicator that the EC strategy objective 1, for 
the retrofitting of EC legislation to NM, has not yet been successful and flawed in its 
implementation.  Nevertheless, not all the problems for nano-safety relate solely to these 
deficiencies in EU risk policy and regulatory instruments. Indeed, there are  many continuing 
negative factors relating to the underpinning regulatory sciences, their current development 
and future status which I want to examine next. 
 Evaluating the current and future status of regulatory 
sciences for nano-safety 
2.4.1 The importance of the intrinsic and extrinsic physico-chemical 
characteristics for nanoparticles.  
There is no specific EU risk paradigm for testing existing and emerging engineered NM 
(SCENIHR 2009). Neither is there an adopted definition of ‘acceptable risk’ (SCHER 2013), or 
an EU risk framework for the management of any emerging sciences (Mazri 2017). Within 
REACH, the current testing protocols may be reliant on incomplete sets of scientific 
knowledge and assumptions which can conceal other underlying hazards (Stirling 2016a). 
The complexity and uncertainty regarding the risk assessment of NPs is confounded by the 
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differing physico-chemical variables that influence the nanoform intrinsic and extrinsic 
characteristics. These can differ for the same NP if its variable characteristics differ. For 
example, the solubility of the macro form of a known chemical substance (e.g. titanium 
dioxide) can be considered an unambiguous characteristic. However, as a well-used NP, it 
can show a different dissolution factor for each of its nano variants, depending on the 
intrinsic properties such as size, shape, coating etc (Stone et al. 2017).  Consequently, their 
only common characteristic as NPs is their nanosize (Jahnel 2015b). These molecular 
variables include their chemistry, size, shape, surface properties, crystalline structure, 
solubility species, dose, exposure, stability, bio-persistence and endpoints  
In 2006, the EC Scientific Committee for Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks 
(SCENIHR) reported that there were three important problems regarding the risk assessment 
of NPs (which continue to this day!). First, is that there is insufficient data concerning 
nanoparticle physico-chemical characterisation. Second, there is a lack of detection and 
measurement capability for their environmental fate, behaviour and toxicity (with our  
understandings of bio-persistence, bioaccumulation and (eco) toxicity still being major 
outstanding problems). Finally, there is a lack of Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) 
to generate reproducible experimental data on human and (eco)toxicology. Fadeel et al. 
(2018) recently made the point that these multi-faceted problems for regulatory sciences 
are still unresolved, and likely remain so in the foreseeable future. The critical question is by 
what means can science, policy, and regulation provide resolutions for these significant and 
outstanding problems. 
2.4.2 New paradigms for nanomaterial risk analysis 
Upward of 200 million euros have been invested by the EC into nano research funding to 
resolve the critical scientific data gaps for the regulatory sciences supporting REACH 
36 
 
(NanoSafetyCluster2018). With a particular emphasis on progressing from traditional animal 
based toxicological testing to predictive profiling of nanotoxicity utilizing multi-cellular high 
throughput screening (HTS) techniques (JRC 2014; Whelan 2014). The purpose of which is to 
meet the European Union 3Rs policy for replacing animal testing which is to be found in both 
Directive (2010/63/EC) and endorsed by REACH (Regulation 33). Jahnel (2015b) reports that 
there are strengthening scientific views that high-dose animal toxicological studies are 
unrealistic and unjustifiable, with minor-overdosing leading to erroneous conclusions (i.e. 
false positives/false negatives). Stirling (2016a) believes there is too high a level of 
incertitude to be found within the current toxicological testing regime for it to remain the 
long-term practice for regulatory decision-making for complex emerging technologies (e.g. 
nanotechnologies, nanobiotechnology). 
To resolve this situation, there are two possibilities for exploration. On the one hand, further 
investment could be made in overcoming existing animal based toxicological testing 
limitations and knowledge gaps; alternatively, design and implement alternative conceptual 
models to recast the whole process for NM risk management (Jahnel 2015b). The model 
given in Figure 2.1 below is an example of  proposed new paradigms for toxicological testing 
for NM. Its key feature is that it introduces a tiered based approach for risk analysis, 
supported by in-vitro mechanistic HTS cellular testing, with in-silico modelling to minimise 
animal testing. The reason for the prospective adoption of this novel approach (apart from 
deontological grounds)  is the potential for a  significant number of variations of engineered 
NM coming to market  in the future. This factor, taken with all their possible toxicological 
endpoints, means that the current case by case approach for animal-based testing regime 
would be impossible. It would require a high case by case volume of testing, beyond any 
37 
 
rational level of resources, and an unethical abuse of animal experiments (GRACIOUS 
https://www.h2020gracious.eu/; Stone et al. 2014).  
The model in Figure 2.1 below has been selected as it is illustrative of the contemporary 
thinking  for novel conceptual approaches for risk analysis for NM. The foundation for this 
new predictive approach for toxicology stems from USA National Academy of Sciences 
seminal report, ‘Toxicity Testing in 21st Century’ (2007). It proposed that an Integrated 
Alternative Toxicity System (IATS) could dramatically transform testing protocols. By 
progressing from traditional animal testing methods,  to the utilizing of  in-vitro HTS  cellular 
testing methodologies using human or other cell lines (Oomen et al. 2014). Based on the 
identification of key biological processes, called Adverse Outcome Pathways (AOP), that 
drive negative cellular effects (Stone et al. 2017).  The science foundation for these proposals 
are found in the significant advances achieved in toxicogenomics, bioinformatics, systems 
biology, epigenetics, and computational toxicology (EURL ECVAM 2015). The outputs of the 
new sciences, with their conceptual models, are currently being developed and published. 
Their remit is in developing predictive relationships to be identified between the physico- 
chemical structure of the NP, and its expected biophysicochemical activity in the presence 
of a biological entity. These are known as (Quantitative) Structured Activity Relationships 
(Q)SAR) [OECD (Q)SAR Toolbox 2019;ECHA 2017, 2013; Oomen et al.2015; Nel et al.2009, 
2013a; 2013b; Nel 2014]. The OECD (2019) published an updated QSAR Toolbox (version 4.3) 
for regulators and industry on 18th February 2019. Its purpose is to encourage the regulatory 
acceptance of (Q)SAR by making the technology more transparent, accessible and less 
resource intensive.  
This model introduces a tiered approach to risk decision-making, with the first tier (tier 1) a 
desk-top type evaluation based on curated nanoinformatics (Robinson et al.2016; Hendren 
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et al.2015; Klaessig 2014). The data from the curated NM libraries may be sufficient to 
confirm that there is no prospective risk from the NP, and further testing is unnecessary. If 
that reassurance is not forthcoming , then the model moves to tier 2 testing which utilizes a 
process of dosing multiple cells lines with differing NP concentrations using HTS techniques 
to produce large data sets (Colin et al.2016). These raw data sets are then processed in-silico, 
incorporating Grouping (into specific chemical categories) and READ across techniques, for 
detailed analysis by the computational modelling to identify (Q)SARs. (OECD2019;GRACIOUS 
https://www.h2020gracious.eu/). The results from tier 2 can be used for hazard ranking  i.e. 
high-medium -low. If the hazard ranking indicates a need for further in- vitro testing at tier 
3 level, then lower level invertebrate sentinel species such as Daphnia or Zebra fish can be 
studied first. Finally, tier 4 in-vivo testing will only be contemplated if the tier 3 test results 
indicate such a necessity. So, vertebrate/mammalian testing will become that last option to 
be studied for NM regulatory risk assessments rather than currently, the first option.   
39 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Implementation of toxicological profiling using a tiered approach for risk identification 
and characterization (Source: Nel et al. 2013) 
These processes can eventually lead to an accurate and efficient estimation of the biological 
responses to differing  nano exposures (Stone et al.2017). This is to be achieved by 
undertaking many thousands of cellular micro-assays which can detect cellular 
perturbations and identify AOPs. By reaching and interacting with a biological target, the 
toxicant precipitates a cascade of events leading to identifiable AOPs which may lead to 
measurable antagonistic outcomes at the cellular, organism and up to population level 
(OECD 2013, JRC 2014). The ambition is to  identify the MoA of the chemical perturbation 
within the cellular pathways. The MoA can then be intimately linked to the perturbations 
due to the physico-chemical characteristics of the NP. Consequently, the MoA identifies and 
describes key cytological and biochemical events which are observable and measurable (JRC 
2014; WHO 2009). The ambition here is to then develop the scientific capability to 
extrapolate the data to determine EHS risks (Rovida et al.2014; SCHER 2013). These scientific 
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developments are not only aimed at the laboratory but for future practical application within 
nano industry and regulatory settings. The intention is to move from the perceived slow and 
expensive current case by case animal-based testing, with its doubtful single probalistic 
results, to a ‘weight of evidence’ approach (Jahnel 2015a&b; NIA 2013, SEURAT 2013; 
SCENHIR 2012).  ‘Weight of evidence’ is defined by Gottardo et al.(2017 p.40) as ‘when 
evidence from several independent sources lead to a certain conclusion on a property for a 
nanomaterial’. As can be seen from Figure 2.1, there may be multiple sources of data on 
which researchers, technologists  and regulators can make safety decisions.  
The multi-national regulatory focused EU FP7 funded NanoReG2 and ProSAFE projects 
(NanoReG2 http://www.nanoreg.eu/; ProSAFE http://www.h202-prosafe.eu/) support this 
scientific approach to reduce toxicity testing time whilst increasing the amount of data 
capture. These REACH focused research projects have  produced a toolbox for industry and 
regulators, with scientific instruments for particle characterisation, risk assessment, toxicity 
testing and exposure measurements of NM. This toolbox also incorporates a Safety by 
Design conceptual approach for underpinning regulatory (REACH) decision-making 
(Gottardo et al.2017). This is an important conceptual approach for this study, which I 
discuss briefly in the next section. 
2.4.3 Safety by Design to facilitate  upstream design modification 
to nanoparticles. 
Safety by Design (SbD) is a long-standing engineering process extensively applied across 
disparate technological platforms such as pharmaceuticals, computers, and aerospace 
industries (Kraegeloh et al.2018). Its purpose is to safely develop new products from 
discovery to market launch (Gottardo et al.2017). In the EU regulatory context, SbD is 
already established as an important concept, within high profile EU funded nanotechnology 
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research projects, to promote ‘regulatory preparedness’. This is when regulators are given 
early awareness/foresight by industry of forthcoming nano innovations, and the opportunity 
to check whether present legislation serves the safety aspects or may need revisions (JRC 
2018; Katalgariniakis 2018; NanoReG2 http://www.nanoreg.eu/; ProSAFE 
http://www.h202-prosafe.eu/; GRACIOUS https://www.h2020gracious.eu/). The purpose of 
which is to contribute to a ‘Safe Innovation Approach’ by the nano industry (Katalagariniakis 
2018; NanoReG2  http://www.nanoreg.eu/). However, SbD is to be applied in a limited 
manner, by its use for  analytical risk assessment, as a  new pillar for  supporting  REACH, by 
its focus for NP functionality and potential toxicity (Gottardo et al. 2017). In this context, 
Gottardo et al.(2017p.102) define SbD as ‘a process that considers and incorporates safety 
considerations into product design and development, by addressing the functionality of a 
material and its toxicity in an integrated way’. 
In summary, these important new conceptual and scientific advances discussed above, have 
the possibilities of re-designing the futures for NP characterization, toxicological testing, and 
risk characterization for the key actors involved with nano innovation (e.g. government, 
researchers, industry and regulators). By these means, a more anticipatory approach can 
evolve from traditional precautionary measures to identify, mitigate or eliminate potential 
risks from NM and their products. There is still the important stage of proof of concept to be 
achieved, and the barriers to regulatory acceptance must not be under-estimated (ECHA 
2017; Hjorth et al.2016). They must achieve demonstrably inherent reliability and validity 
for specific nano risk assessments tests (ECHA 2017; ECHA 2012). If they do, then they offer 
a promise as future anticipatory applications with underpinning from a more efficient 
mechanistic approach to regulatory decision-making (Whelan 2014). These are important 
and central issues , which are tested within Proposition 2 in Chapter 5, which asks how much 
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confidence can be placed in these new tools for future nano-safety decision-making. Yet, in 
respect of the EC Objective 2, it cannot be said its expectations have yet been fulfilled 
following the above discussions. 
The EC Objectives 1&2 can be regarded as focused on the technocratic ‘safe’ innovation  of 
NM. This leaves EC Objective 3, with its more deliberative intentions to incorporate socio-
ethical considerations into nano innovation. The aim is the social alignment of nano 
innovation by promoting the other limb of the EC NanoStrategy for responsible 
development. I will discuss these issues  in detail in Chapter 3.  
 Conclusions  
This Chapter foregrounds  discussions on the potential risks from NM and the attendant EU 
risk policy. It has critically examined past, present and future EU regulatory policy and 
controls. In addition, it examines the epistemic underpinning for regulatory sciences, and 
importance of the emerging novel risk paradigms with their ground-breaking conceptual 
approaches. 
There is an absence of proven risks from NM, with no known human pathologies due solely 
to exposures to NM (Nel et al.2015; Nel 2014). Notwithstanding that lack of evidence, there 
remains considerable uncertainty in predicting the possibility of future risks from the long 
term EHS exposure to NM. In particular, risks from  2nd ,3rd and 4th generation NM , many of 
which are still in the theoretical or experimental stage. The EC policy to retro-fitted REACH 
to nano-safety has come in for considerable criticisms for its lack of nano-specific tests. 
Originally rejected, these criticisms are now  acknowledged formally by the EC as identifying 
a fundamental flaw for NM safety testing [COM (2012) 572 Final]. Notwithstanding that 
acceptance, and further Member States public criticisms, the EC response can only be 
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described as dilatory. With their solutions not to be enacted within the REACH Annexes 
before 1st January 2020 (EC DO 56122/02). A further regulatory deficiency has been that the 
EU draft definition for a NP [COM (2011)275] continues to be contested institutionally and 
scientifically. This is awaiting a further updated public consultation process promised for 
some time in 2019. So, the future outcomes for resolving both these regulatory and 
enforcement deficiencies adds to current uncertainties. Consequently, it has not been  
possible to quantify with any accuracy just how effective REACH has been for evaluating NM 
in the market. This is further complicated by the minimal number of REACH registration 
dossiers submitted during the 2008-2018 period (only 29 registration dossiers).   
New paradigms to replace traditional animal-based testing are rapidly being developed and 
tested. Though awaiting proof of concept, there is an optimism for their future application 
for industry and regulatory decision-making, and they are in receipt of important EU 
institutional support from the Joint Research Centre (Gottardo et al.2017), European 
Chemical Agency (2017), and the European Food Safety Agency (2018). Nevertheless, these 
deficiencies in scientific rigour for regulatory control have left worrying gaps in EU risk 
governance of NM, and the exercise of its institutional responsibility for public health and 
safety.   
These deficiencies and concerns, which have no immediate solutions to hand, have led to 
debates by sectoral stakeholders as to the future format for EU nano risk governance. In 
particular, should it now be re-framed by conceptual approaches which promote a more  
anticipatory governance approach within EU policy. These issues will be discussed  in more 
detail in the next Chapter.
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Chapter 3: Literature Review  
 Introduction 
The previous Chapter reviewed the grey policy literatures on EU nanotechnology to provide 
a background for the study’s legislative and regulatory framework. In this Chapter, I discuss 
the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings for the empirical research, which I derive from 
academic literatures. Framing my work are two theoretical strands, which I believe set out 
different but complimentary governance perspectives. These I use to develop my analytical 
approach to examine NM innovation activities, and the potential for new deliberative 
processes to improve NM regulation efficacy.This approach provides the foundation for the 
study’s data collection (principally through prioritising stakeholder identification and 
sampling strategies), the critical analysis of empirical materials derived from my field 
research, and my derivation of the study’s conclusions.  
The two theoretical literatures are as follows. Firstly, risk governance within which I include 
the conceptual framings of the Taxonomy of Regulation (Centre for European Policy Studies 
2014), Analytical-Deliberative approaches (Rosa and Renn 1999) with related work on 
integrative risk governance (Klinke and Renn 2012), and work on Safety by Design (Gottardo 
et al.2017; NanoReG2 http://www.nanoreg.eu/; ProSAFE http://www.h202-prosafe.eu/). 
This is complemented by a second strand of work in the social sciences on the closely related 
topic of anticipatory governance. It is under this heading I examine work on the Precautionary 
Principle (COM 2000), Midstream Modulation (Fisher et al. 2006) and Responsible Research 
and Innovation (Horizon 2020; Rome Declaration 2014).  
As I seek to show, the conceptual framings of both strands of  literatures are highly pertinent 
in informing the need for and the configuration of new approaches to the regulation of NM. 
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In particular, I argue the insights offered by these literatures can advance discussions on the 
development of new EU policy regulation, scientific and technological practices to support 
delivery of the three EC NanoStrategy risk governance objectives. Consequently, here I 
discuss the scope and purpose of these objectives, including their limitations, and how these 
limitations might be resolved. This theoretical discussion provides the basis for design of an 
‘ideal-type’ illustrating the conceptual intersections for the empirical examination of the 
governance for the safe and responsible development of NM which is conducted in 
subsequent Chapters.  
 Risk Governance  
The literature on risk governance has grown enormously over the last three decades. Much 
of this work shares a common goal in seeking to account for the handling of risk and 
uncertainty under conditions of collective decision-making and decision-taking increasingly 
found in “risk society” (Beck 1992; Jasanoff 2004,2006; Renn 2005,2008; Klinke and Renn 
2012;Bennet 2016). In essence, ‘Risk governance looks at the complex web of actors, rules, 
conventions, processes and mechanisms concerned with how relevant risk information is 
collected, analysed and communicated, and how management decisions are taken’ (Renn 
2008 p36). More recently, work in this area has sought to distil core principles of governance 
that can be used to inform risk-related policy making. From this perspective, risk governance 
goes beyond the three established components of risk assessment, risk management and risk 
communication to address how political, institutional, and commercial responsibilities and 
accountabilities play a crucial role in shaping collective decisions (Rosa et al. 2013). Thus, the 
International Risk Governance Council (2005) describes risk governance as sitting at the 
confluence of all analyses and actions related to the development of new science and 
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technologies. A crucial element here is ensuring that stakeholders and publics engage with 
these new technologies at an early stage, as individuals and societies perceive technological 
risks in disparate ways (Douglas 1992; Adams 1988). Moreover, in developing these 
technologies, researchers have argued that risk governance principles should be applied in a 
systematic manner throughout all aspects (formulation, development and implementation) 
of the new product innovation  decision-making process (Tinkle 2014).   
Applied to nanotechnologies, work from a risk governance perspective has highlighted the 
multiple novel biophysicochemical characteristics that NM can exhibit. Consequently, there 
is a necessity for new nano-risk metrics and procedures for nano-risk evaluation, if regulators 
are to keep pace with the rapid trajectories of nanotechnological developments. Marchant et 
al. (2011b.p23) label this the ‘pacing’ problem in which regulatory controls constantly lag  
behind innovation at the frontiers of science, as do ethics (Jasanoff 2016).  
However, compliance with criminal-based safety regulation such as REACH is not the only 
legal responsibility that NM innovators and product manufacturers have to exercise within 
the EU. A further EU governance policy response for achieving safe NM is their civil legal 
obligation to ensure safe products under the requirements of the EU Product Liability 
Directive ( 85/374/EEC). This imposes on all nano producers a duty of care/ legal liability, in 
respect of their consumers, for any defects or harms from the  finished product, component 
part or any raw material supplied by them. To establish liability under Directive 85/374/EEC, 
the injured person must prove the existence of the defect, clear evidence of the 
damage/harms, and that there exists a causal link between the two (Article 2). The aggrieved 
consumer may then pursue a Product Liability Tort ( i.e. civil action for compensation) through 
the Courts to obtain appropriate financial compensation for any harm by means of awarded 
damages ( Freeman et al. 2018). At the heart of this civil redress is the  concept of defect. If 
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the defective product  does not provide the  level of safety that a person is entitled to expect, 
taking all the circumstances into account, then the producer is at fault (Article 6(1) ). These 
protective rights run in parallel with formal ‘black law’ regulations such as REACH in an EU 
governance policy endeavour to secure product safety within the EU.   
Now in respect of such potential risk of harms from NM, these currently arise from so-called 
passive nanostructures associated with existing NM on the market, as well as the likelihood 
of active nano-manufacturing systems being developed in the near future. As Renn and Roco 
(2006.p153) reflect therefore, “Active nanoscale structures and nano-systems have the 
potential to affect not only human health and the environment but also aspects of social 
lifestyle, human identity and cultural values”. Consequently, I discuss in detail below key 
concepts within the risk governance literature that apply to NM policy, design and 
implementation. First, however, I consider how risk governance fits in with the wider palette 
of hard and soft law within the Taxonomy of Regulation to provide clarity on the range of 
measures available to regulators in handling risks arising from novel technologies.   
3.2.1 Risk Governance and the ‘Taxonomy of Regulation’  
Regulation is the usual method to control commercial activities by the state (Bowman 2017; 
Calster and Bowman 2002), with evidence-based regulation used to establish the scope of 
legitimate, socially accountable innovation processes in manufacturing (Macnagthen et al. 
2016). This use of formal regulatory controls features in the ‘Taxonomy of Regulation’ (CEPS 
2014, Figure 3.1) as one element in a broad portfolio of public policy tools that extends far 
beyond the remit of established ‘black letter’ law and other ‘command and control’ 
approaches (CEPS 2014). The Taxonomy enables consideration of how more nuanced hybrid 
constructions of hard and soft law might be achieved that blend regulatory with forms of self-
regulatory activity and moral suasion (Vaughan 2015). Such a portfolio approach is essential 
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in addressing risk governance of the complex challenges posed by regulating, controlling and 
using new technologies, and provides a lens through which existing EU regulation of NM can 
be viewed and analysed (Arnaldi 2017). Stone et al.(2018) for example, consider that risk-
based decisions on NM have to be taken within the context of this portfolio approach of hard 
and soft law, arguing that all policy tools are needed to support current EU risk governance 
of NM. This necessity is due to the ongoing scientific and regulatory uncertainty, complexity 
and ambiguity surrounding their development, manufacture and sale. It is, therefore, 
unsurprising that the use of REACH, to regulate risks associated with the production and 
marketing of NM, has been a continuing source of political, scientific and legal debate within 
the EU (cf. Bowman 2017; Reichow 2016; Vaughan 2014; Stokes and Bowman 2012; Stokes 
2012; Som et al. 2010). Some have argued that by using REACH to manage NM, the EU has 
defaulted to tried and tested regulatory procedures. This is despite the criticism of its 
inadequacy in meeting current challenges posed by novel NM, and the possible future 
nanotechnology delivery systems (Stokes and Bowman 2012). I use the taxonomy here to 
identify the different risk governance tools that are being used for the regulatory controls for 
NM. Specifically, I test whether REACH, as currently implemented, offers the necessary hybrid 
hard/soft law approach required to regulate the manufacture of NM to ensure acceptable 
levels of environmental and public health risks (Vaughan 2014; Stokes and Bowman 2012, 
Stokes 2012; Som et al. 2010).  
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Figure 3.1: Taxonomy of Regulation (source: Centre for European Policy Studies 2014) 
The base of the taxonomy comprises ‘soft’ law, exemplified by industry advisory codes to 
promote self-regulatory ‘safe’ approaches to nano-manufacturing. An example is the EC 
NanoCode (European Commission 2008c) which aims to encourage a culture of self-regulation 
in the nano industry; but so far it has been difficult to judge whether this has been successful.  
The next step in the taxonomy is the essential scientific and technology standardization of 
new methods and tools for accurate NP characterization, exposure assessment, and 
determination of EHS risks. However, these activities need substantive advances in NM 
metrology if they are to be effective. In particular, the development of scientific and industry 
SOPs are essential elements in fulfilling Objective 2 of the EC’s NanoStrategy, yet both are 
problematical and unresolved (Fadeel et al.2018). Next upwards in the taxonomy is the 
application of market-based instruments to steer the course of the innovation processes. 
These can include government funding for risk research and industry innovation grants.  
Again, very little research exists on this topic and consequently it is difficult to judge whether 
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such measures are making a telling contribution to delivering the NanoStrategy. Finally, at 
the apex of the taxonomy are statutory Environmental, and Public Health and Safety 
compliance standards approved by the European Parliament (e.g. statutory emission or 
exposure levels). These are essential in setting the markers for regulatory controls of NM and 
the enforcement of any infractions. 
The Taxonomy provides a useful heuristic with which to consider the roles of complementary 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ regulatory approaches to address the needs of nanomaterial product 
development and authorisation. I now consider specific risk governance approaches that have 
been applied to nanotechnologies and examine their utility in relation to the current study.   
3.2.2 An analytical-deliberative approach to risk governance for 
nanomaterials 
Rosa, McCright and Renn (2013) make a strong case that emerging technologies in the 21st 
century need a different set of risk governance decision tools due to their inherent 
technological complexity, scientific uncertainties and socio-political ambiguities. They 
advance the analytical-deliberative model (see also Klinke and Renn 2012; Renn 1999; Stern 
and Finsberg 1996) as a useful starting point in addressing risk arising from these 
technologies, including NM. This model emphasises the need to integrate regulatory 
frameworks within a properly democratised governance of risks. To undertake these actions 
requires synthesising the systemic knowledge underpinning evidence-based risk 
management (analytical), with the creation of a culture of innovation responsibility which is 
deliberative by being participative and inclusive of multiple stakeholders (deliberative). Here 
I adopt Dryzek’s (2000.p1) definition of “deliberative” as “the social process where 
deliberators (stakeholders) are amenable to changing their judgements, preferences and 
views during the course of their interactions, which involved persuasion and not coercion, 
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manipulation or deception”. According to Habermas (1984), optimal policy outcomes are 
those that achieve consensus amongst all parties, based on improved and enhanced 
arguments delivered through a deliberative process. Though Carralho and Nunes (2018) 
believe that, realistically, workable agreements are more likely in most circumstances. The 
analytical-deliberative model, therefore, potentially provides a fruitful way of thinking 
through how the expanded risk management paradigm foreseen in the EC NanoStrategy  
document [COM (2004) 338] might be achieved. For example, this could be by incorporating 
regulatory, risk assessment and socio-ethical components into its decision-making  processes.  
Using this approach, I identify in Table 3.1 below how this might apply to the NanoStrategy’s 
three Risk Governance Objectives. 
Table 3-1: The EC NanoStrategy objectives from an Analytical-Deliberative perspective 
EC NanoStrategy Risk Governance Objectives Analytical-deliberative 
framing of objectives 
EC Objective 1 proposes that maximum use would be 
made of existing regulation though adjustments may 
be necessary. 
 
Analytical 
EC Objective 2 which recognises that existing 
parameters for EHS chemical safety testing may not be 
appropriate for the unique properties of nanoparticles, 
requiring new methods and tools for risk assessment, 
and refinement of nano-scale metrology and 
standardisation activities. 
 
 
Analytical 
EC Objective 3 proposes that the Risk Management 
paradigm to be expanded to incorporate Socio-ethical 
considerations into the R&D process with the creation 
of a culture of responsibility which is participatory and 
inclusive. 
 
Deliberative 
 
Rosa et al. (2013) note that the analytical framing requires reproducible scientific knowledge 
to be applied within a regulatory decision-making framework; whilst the deliberative must 
rely on a mutual exchange of arguments and reflections by stakeholders, with the aim of a 
consensus to mobilize legitimate actions and social acceptability. Clearly, however, 
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developing a model based on the possibilities implicit in the relationships in Table 3.1 requires 
much greater attention to the structures, mechanisms and configuration of governance. With 
the need to address the three risk characteristics relevant to NM production, namely its 
technological complexity, scientific uncertainty, and socio-political ambiguity currently 
inherent in nanotechnologies. This requires turning to other risk governance tools,  
specifically the adaptive and integrative risk governance framework specifically designed for 
NM. 
3.2.3 Adaptive and integrative risk governance for nanotechnologies  
Klinke and Renn (2012. p278) define adaptive and integrative risk governance as “the ability 
of politics and society to collectively design and implement a systematic approach to 
organizational and policy learning in institutional settings that are conducive to resolve 
cognitive, evaluative and normative problems, and conflicts of risks”. According to these 
authors, the advantage of this risk governance approach is that it can address public policy 
challenges that  result from insufficient and/or competing knowledge concerning the three 
risk characteristics of technological complexity, scientific uncertainty, and socio-political 
ambiguity described above. This accords with Stone et al. (2018) assertion that any viable risk-
based approach for nanotechnologies must go beyond ‘black letter’ legislative controls to 
directly involve key stakeholders, including civil society, in risk decision-making processes, 
through the facilitation of interactive networks of relations. Stone et al. (2018) provide some 
guidance as to how this might be achieved, by proposing three elements for effective adaptive 
and integrative risk governance framing specifically for NM (see Table 3.2). Linkov et al. (2018) 
are supportive of these views in emphasising the need for multi-stakeholder involvement in 
situations where quantitative risk assessment remains uncertain or incomplete – exactly the 
situation currently pertaining to NM development and production. In these circumstances, 
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multiple data sources, including reviews of various EHS endpoints and technological 
outcomes, must be drawn upon and evaluated in risk decision-making and decision-taking 
processes. Based on these observations, Table 3.2 below outlines how Stone and Linkov’s 
findings might be used to inform my research design and empirical analysis in two main ways. 
Firstly, to provide for an analytical benchmark of the effectiveness of REACH to the current 
operation of the three EC Objectives. Secondly, to inform the possible development of new 
hybrid (formal and informal) governance approaches to enhance the effectiveness of adaptive 
and integrative risk framings for NM futures. 
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Table 3.2:Comparison of EC NanoStrategy objectives against selected published criteria for adaptive 
and integrative risk governance of nanomaterials. 
Domain EC NanoStrategy 
(2004)  
Stone et al. 2018. Linkov et al. 2018 
 
Regulatory 
compliance  
(Analytical) 
EC Objective 1 
‘Maximum use would 
be made of existing 
regulation though 
adjustments may be 
necessary’ 
 
Legal and other 
(nano-specific and 
general) regulatory 
requirements are 
necessary to ensure 
compliance and to 
stimulate proactive 
approaches to safety 
 
A broad evidence 
base is necessary for 
regulatory 
considerations in 
cataloguing potential 
risk outcomes   
Nanoparticle   
characterization 
and risk analysis  
(Analytical) 
EC Objective 2  
‘Recognises that 
existing parameters for 
EHS chemical safety 
testing may not be 
appropriate for the 
unique properties of 
nanoparticles, requiring 
new methods and tools 
for risk assessment, and 
refinement of nano-
scale metrology and 
standardisation  
activities’ 
Identifies the 
continuing need for 
dynamic, advanced 
scientific tools and 
strategies for nano-
risk assessment, 
mitigation and 
transfer   
Promotes the 
continued 
development of risk 
analytical tools to 
resolve incomplete 
answers or outcomes 
and to 
comprehensively 
catalogue risks from 
NM   
Social appraisal 
of nano-
innovation  
(Deliberative) 
 
EC Objective 3  
‘The Risk Management 
paradigm to be 
expanded to 
incorporate socio-
ethical considerations 
into the R&D process 
with the creation of a 
culture of responsibility 
which is participatory 
and inclusive’ 
Promotes the 
fostering of dialogue 
with civil society by 
behavioural insights 
to determine 
societal concerns for  
nano-innovation 
risks, mitigation, and 
transfer. 
Identifies that multi-
stakeholder insights 
are necessary to 
bridge gaps in 
experimental risk 
assessment data and 
outcomes. 
 
As can be seen in Table 3.2, Stone et al.'s (2018) and Linkov et al.’s (2018) findings on NM  
map neatly onto the intentions of the three EC NanoStrategy objectives and, I argue, provides 
for an insightful means of evaluating their current effectiveness and efficiency. Additionally,  
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they are being strongly suggestive of identifying potential pathways for improving their future 
design and implementation. In doing so, the findings from both studies provide a schema for 
the research design for this study, by informing, respectively, current and anticipated future 
risks arising from NM development and production. I consider anticipated future risks arising 
from NM later in the Chapter. But, before that, I examine some of the practical issues that 
arise from the discussion so far, namely how can the multiple stakeholder groups, foreseen 
by Stone and Linkov, be involved in oversight of risk governance for NM production and 
development? To do so, I turn to debates in risk governance on a second highly relevant 
concept: Safety by Design.   
3.2.4 Safety by Design – risk governance to oversee ‘safe’ nano-
innovation?  
In Chapter 2, I showed how the established system of EU regulation is being rapidly outpaced 
by nanotechnological developments, resulting in this sector ‘overflowing’ its current 
regulatory boundaries (Bowman 2017; Stokes and Bowman 2012). Marchant et al.(2011b. 
p23) call this the ‘pacing problem’, whereby a growing gap is developing between this 
emerging technology and its legal-ethical oversight. Marchant et al. believe that governments 
are more static that dynamic in these situations, and the potential for a traditional regulatory 
approach to catch up is not promising. Therefore, researchers are increasingly advocating the 
need for new perspectives to steer the transition from nano-safety being simply about 
regulatory controls, to embracing its socio-ethical dimensions within a new taxonomy for the 
safe and responsible development of nano-innovation (see for example Gottardo et al. 2017).  
One potentially viable approach of addressing this challenge is Safety by Design (SbD).  SbD 
emerged in process engineering but is now applied across disparate technological platforms 
including pharmaceuticals, computers, and aerospace industries (Kraegeloh et al.2018). It 
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seeks to provide an operational map for directing new products from the discovery stage to 
commercialization as efficiently and effectively as possible (Cooper 2001). In its stage-gating 
form, it fits well with the modern manufacturing value chain pathway where, at each stage, 
progress is tested against selected parameters such as occupational and consumer 
risks/safety, economic viability, product quality parameters, operational feasibility, and 
product marketability (Cooper 2018). If any of these tests fail, then the prospective product 
may be deemed unsuccessful and a decision taken to discontinue development.  
Importantly, SbD is already established as an important concept within EU funded research 
projects to achieve ‘regulatory preparedness’ for nano-innovation (JRC 2018;  
NanoReG2 http://www.nanoreg.eu/; GRACIOUS https://www.h2020gracious.eu/  
ProSAFE http://www.h202-prosafe.eu/), and ‘Safe Innovation Approach’ (Noorlander 2019). 
SbD is acting in an analytical risk assessment capacity, as a proposed new pillar for REACH NM 
regulatory control (Gottardo et al. 2017). In this role, SbD addresses the temporal discrepancy 
described by Owen et al. (2009), as the difference between market readiness and full 
understanding of all potential risks. In doing so, kits application contributes to the  ‘early 
warnings’ for adverse EHS impacts that the European Environment Agency has identified as 
necessary for all novel technologies (EEA 2013). In this context, Gottardo et al. (2017. p102) 
defines SbD as “a process that considers and incorporates safety considerations into product 
design and development, by addressing the functionality of a material and its toxicity in an 
integrated way”. 
However, applying SbD this way is I argue a wasted opportunity, in that its effect is simply 
reflecting the demands regulators place on applied science, to provide quantitative 
probabilistic data on novel NM for decision-making under REACH. In doing so, it perpetuates 
the narrow normative definition of ‘safety’ that is central to established regulation. Crucially, 
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there is no intention that this decision-making takes a broader deliberative approach which 
could incorporate multiple normative values (e.g. societal concerns and values) into the 
decision-making process. Instead, the European Commission foresees decision-making and 
decision-taking on NM approvals being conducted within the traditional Expert Groupings 
(NANoREG2 D6.03 http://www.nanoreg.eu/). I argue that an opportunity is being missed here 
to use SbD in a more creative and far-reaching way. Namely, to redesign and refocus the 
current narrow regulatory approach so that it is participative and inclusive of non-experts 
including civil society as foreseen in EC Strategy Objective 3. This is supported by Ribeiro et 
al.(2018) who consider that aligning technical programmes with societal goals will allow a 
shaping of the innovation process, lessening the chances of technology ‘lock-ins’ and pathway 
dependencies. Similarly, Nordmann (2018.p335) notes the importance of societal alignment 
in technological development, leading to “more horizontal relationships with a constant 
negotiation over the needs and concerns of diverse actors”. I develop this deliberative 
application of SbD at length in Chapter 6 as a new concept: Safety by Social Design (SbSD).  
Risk governance, therefore, provides a range of theoretical concepts that can be used to 
interrogate REACH’s NM approvals process and to consider the effectiveness of 
implementation of the three NanoStrategy objectives. However, in foreseeing future risks 
associated with the development of entirely new NM, another theoretical approach is 
required to identify how these can be addressed as part of R&D practices: namely  
anticipatory governance.  I consider this next. 
 Anticipatory Governance of Nanomaterials 
This study seeks to answer whether EU risk governance can be progressed from its current 
traditional risk management methodology (chiefly a precautionary mode) to one of 
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anticipatory risk prevention, where safer alternatives are considered at an early, upstream 
stage in the innovation process (Malloy et al. 2016). Jasanoff (2016) argues that a contributory 
factor in failing to identify unintended future consequences from novel technologies is that 
design and R&D processes are rarely if ever exposed to public scrutiny. Jahnel (2015b) 
similarly contends that adopting socio-ethical approaches to scrutinizing technological 
development would confer a democratic quality on risk management decision-making, and a 
procedural legitimacy to any new technologies that are forthcoming. Both authors 
foreground the need for foresighting in the policy process, which is the focus of a second 
strand of governance inquiry, namely anticipatory governance. This can be defined as “a 
broad-based capacity extended through society that can act on a variety of inputs to manage 
emerging knowledge -based technologies while such management is still possible” (Guston 
2014. p204).  
Genus and Stirling (2018.p62) characterise “anticipatory” as:  a pragmatic means of exploring 
value-laden positions of society to reduce the indeterminacy of future unintended 
consequences and impacts. This implies that being anticipatory is not a substitute for accurate 
forecasting of predicted consequences and outcomes, but instead recognises our limited 
capacity to shape innovation for plausible futures (Guston 2013b). Despite this limitation, the 
aim of Objective 3 of the EC NanoStrategy is to incorporate socio-ethical considerations into 
nano-risk management. Grumwald (2011) notes that to achieve this requires developing 
appropriate tools and methodologies which can be incorporated within R&D processes to 
shape the innovation process, rather than the technology itself. Such anticipatory approaches 
have their origins in EU environmental law, such as the Precautionary Principle (PP) which is 
both precautionary and deliberative in its actions (COM 2000), and which I shall discuss next.  
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3.3.1 The Precautionary Principle and Anticipation 
From the discussion in Chapter 2, it could be concluded that PP is generally used solely for 
risk minimisation, i.e. in a precautionary mode.  In fact, Gottardo et al. (2017. p100) appear 
to confirm this conclusion by their explicit description of the role of SbD within the NanoREG 
2 project as: ‘it forms an exemplary platform for the early stage application of the 
precautionary principle in R&D projects…. Including precautionary measures and tools…..’ 
However, this narrow interpretation of the  utility of PP is in contrast to the fact that it was 
also designed to have an explicit anticipatory purpose which is deliberative and future facing, 
on which I want to briefly comment.   
The EC Communication on the Precautionary Principle (COMM 2000.p6) is explicit not only 
that it requires the scientific evaluation of risk, but ‘ all interested parties should be involved 
to the fullest extent possible in  the study of various risk management options that may be 
envisaged once the results of the scientific evaluation and/or risk assessment are available 
and the procedure be as transparent as possible.’ 
With this in mind, Von Schomberg (2006) sees the PP as deliberative as well as precautionary 
in scope across a range of normative dimensions. Here the term normative refers “to all the 
prescriptive statements and/ or value judgements in contrast to factual scientific statements” 
(Von Schomberg 2006.p33). Von Schomberg’s inference is that the PP can provide a platform 
for technology mediated normative interactions by stakeholders, allowing for their 
participation in decision-making and problem solving. Building on von Schomberg (2006), 
Reber (2018), Genus and Iskandarova (2018) and Von Schomberg (2014) offer contemporary 
interpretations of PP that are both anticipatory as well as precautionary in their operation.  
By virtue of its anticipatory characteristics, they argue that PP is in fact a precursor of 
Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI), as both practices are future facing, safety is the 
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fundamental concern, they act in both precautionary and anticipatory modes, and are 
adaptable to multi-level stakeholder participation.  
3.3.2 The role of Responsible Research and Innovation in 
Anticipatory Governance 
The roots of RRI lie in seminal publications in science and society (Jasanoff 2004; Latour 1993) 
and following on from the work on Constructive Technology Assessment (Schot and Rip 1997), 
and Real-Time Technology Assessment (Guston and Sarewitz 2002) that connects science and 
technology studies with social science and policy issues. However, RRI has a broader scope 
than either of the concepts above, as it comprises socio-ethical as well as wider governance 
issues (Burget et al. 2017). Its policy importance is reflected in its appearance in the EU 6th 
and 7th Research Frameworks of Horizon 2020, with the purpose of progressing risk debates, 
beyond limiting techno-scientific and economic considerations (e.g. cost-benefit analysis), 
towards a more broadly-based deliberatively driven innovation policy (Felt 2014; Levidow and 
Neubauer 2014; Stahl 2013). Academic debate on the RRI concept has been led by Owen et 
al. (2013) and Stilgoe et al. (2013), providing focussed and concise definitions and 
understandings of Responsible Innovation.   
Nonetheless, separate policy debates on RRI emerged in the EU Rome Declaration (21st 
November 2014). This Declaration defines RRI as how “societal actors work together during 
the whole research and innovation process in order to better align both the process and its 
outcomes with the values, needs and expectations of European Society” (Rome Declaration 
2014 .p1). This definition takes ‘responsible’ to have a meaning beyond that of obligations for 
minimum statutory compliance, or simply a tacit understanding of the need to act 
‘responsibly’ (Solbu 2015).  
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Yet beyond these policy circles the RRI concept is barely known, and certainly lacks traction 
with NM and nano-industry practice (van de Poel et al. 2017; Auer and Jamia 2017). Roig 
(2018) suggest that currently there are two drawbacks in promoting industry recognition and 
adoption. First is that RRI is used on an ad hoc basis as it is without any statutory formality.  
Secondly, and closely related to the first point, there is no accepted template for the 
implementation of RRI in innovation contexts. This is problematic as a key aim for RRI under 
the Rome Declaration (2014) is to contribute to delivering smart, sustainable, inclusive 
solutions to our societal challenges. Moreover, RRI lacks the practical framework that would 
allow its implementation in a variety of research and industry settings (Goujon 2016; Antelo 
2016; Wickson and Carew 2014), while its process steps are highly problematic (Burget et al. 
2017; Blok and Lemmens 2015).  
If RRI is to move from being an engaging but impractical idea to practical implementation,  
then a risk governance framework must be devised in which it can have a practical application. 
This needs to be in the form of a framework for implementation that is readily understandable 
by academia and industry (Winickoff 2016). In my own experience at RRI conferences and 
workshops, it is this lack of an authoritative and accepted operational framework or roadmap 
which is understood to be its single biggest deficit (in fact, this was a significant discussion 
point at an RRI conference I attended at the European Parliament in January 2016).   
The lack of industry engagement continues to be a problem for RRI. Shelly-Egan (2016) 
believes that RRI has traction at the macro scale (International & National Governments) and 
meso scale (International Organisations e.g. OECD, and research funders such as EPSRC) but 
has made little progress at the micro scale (Research labs, SMEs). Though Valdivia and Guston 
(2015) believe RRI is compatible with the role of markets, they also acknowledge that social 
interaction costs must be factored into the overall cost base for nano-innovation and must be 
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an additional cost overhead for cash strapped enterprises. In particular, SMEs struggle to 
implement ‘soft law’ initiatives due to corporate pressures, limited finances, and their distrust 
of the reliability, measurability, and business value of the RRI outcomes (Roig 2018; van de 
Poel and Robaey 2017). Thus, the  imposition of extra innovation costs is thus likely to create 
further barriers in attracting business investment partners to the nano industry projects 
(Friedrichs 2014, European Risk Forum 2014).  
On a more optimistic note, van de Poel et al. ( 2017) believe  that industries are committing 
to  more socially orientated outlooks, with a gradual movement to social alignment included  
in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policies and business plans (e.g. sustainable 
products). So, this groundswell towards  more socially aligned business activities may provide 
opportunities to identify missing links in industry contemporary thinking and best practice in 
respect of RRI. With the purpose to illustrate that it can have the potential for mutually 
beneficial outcomes to both the business and consumer.   
I draw five conclusions from this debate. First is that RRI has been adopted formally within 
critical EU policy documents (Horizon 2010; Rome Declaration 2014) as a central policy driver 
for societal alignment of innovation. Secondly, RRI currently lacks an accepted operational 
framework appropriate for various R&D settings. Thirdly, it recognises that nano innovation 
is not the work of single individuals but is shared collectively among multiple actors for socio-
ethical outcomes (scientists, technologists, investors, manufacturers, marketers, retailers, 
consumer groups). Fourthly, there is a lack of engagement with industry particularly SMEs, 
with RRI being either invisible, misunderstood, or simply ignored because of more pressing 
temporal, financial, technological and market-based pressures. Finally, to offset the predicted 
additional social interaction costs, there may be a need for incentives, governmental or 
others, to encourage active R&D engagement and adoption of RRI.  
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Having considered the potential role of RRI in anticipatory governance, I now conclude by 
considering where and how RRI might be implemented in the NM production process.  
3.3.3 Midstream modulation – the upstream management of risk  
The Collingridge Dilemma (1980.p11) states that if policy interventions occur too early, they 
potentially deter development of promising new technologies; if too late, then technology 
lock-in or path dependencies can occur. By ‘path dependencies’ I mean “decisions dependent 
on past knowledge trajectories and that are limited by current competencies” (Nordmann 
2018. p334). Consequently, the timing of the testing is important, yet it is in the early stages 
of innovation that there is the greatest opportunity for control. The delicate balance to be 
achieved is not to be too risk averse at this point in the product development (Jasanoff 2016; 
Owen et al. 2013), to late and it contributes to the pacing problem previously discussed above 
(Thier 2018). By applying a ‘mid-stream modulation’ approach, where societal concerns are 
brought into contact with innovation processes upstream of regulatory controls and market 
selection, therefore, offers the best opportunity to pragmatically influence the safe 
development of NM (Flipse and van de Loo 2018; Lukovics and Fisher 2017; Flipse et al. 2013; 
Fisher, Mahajan and Mitcham 2006, Schot and Rip 1997).  
The identification of the ‘right’ moment for RRI intervention is not easily determined. 
Nordmann (2018) suggests that this may need to be a graduated process over separate stages 
of the innovation process. Whatever the point of intervention, midstream modulation aims 
to enhance responsive capacity, by asking interdisciplinary stakeholders to reflect on the 
social and ethical aspects of the proposed nanotechnological development (Boer et al. 2018).  
Fisher, Mahajan and Mitcham (2006) define the role of ‘midstream’ as providing a focus on 
R&D governance in a societal context rather than simply on technoscientific considerations. 
They consider that upstream must be carefully calibrated to avoid too early interventions, or 
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too late when the downstream focus and activity becomes engulfed in passing regulatory 
hurdles and market selection. ‘Modulation’ refers to consequent reflexive actions to modify 
the direction of the innovation pathways (Flipse and van de Loo 2017; Fisher, Mahajan, and 
Mitcham 2006). 
Consequently, mid-stream modulation not only supports improved risk governance by 
allowing flexibility for decision-making in innovation, it also responds pragmatically to the risk 
versus benefit challenges of the commercial context (Von Schonburg 2014). It is both reflexive 
and deliberative, encourages risk governance from within the innovation process, and gives 
rise to goal directed modulation (Fisher et al. 2006). However, the barriers to effective RRI 
engagement must not be under-estimated (e.g. poor communication strategies; limited 
knowledge of complex science). These can foster an undermining of trust amongst actors 
involved (Kuzma and Roberts 2018), particularly as innovation trajectories are rarely linear, 
and often messy activities ( Krabbenborg and Mulder 2015).  
Nonetheless a crucial question is whether NM industries will respond positively to what will 
be an extra temporal and financial burden, without a clear business advantage? The industry-
based European Industrial Research Management Association (2015), believes that business 
can respond positively to RRI, but will need to develop new organisational and 
communication competencies. These could include building business orientated models 
incorporating RRI with their stakeholder network(s), focused on social-ethical growth, 
innovation and sustainability as new corporate goals.  
 Conclusions 
I have reviewed two strands of governance literature to provide the conceptual underpinning 
for the empirical analysis in subsequent Chapters of this thesis. I have shown, first, how the 
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Taxonomy of Regulation identifies a wealth of policy tools available to regulators, offering 
multiple ways of bringing together hierarchical, market-based and networked policy tools and 
regulatory controls for NM. I then proceeded to outline how risk governance (analytical-
deliberative and integrated risk governance) concepts can be coupled with insights from 
anticipatory governance (three concepts identified were the Precautionary Principle (PP), 
Safety by Design (SbD), and Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI)).  Importantly, I have 
identified from the literature that these concepts are closely related theoretically, and, 
therefore, have high complementarity in public policy terms. The important link here is the 
Precautionary Principle, which Reber (2018), Genus and Iskandarova (2018) and Von 
Schomberg (2014) all claim is a precursor to RRI. Similarly, Gottardo et al. (2017), Kraegeloh 
et al. (2018) and Suarez-Marino et al. (2017) all note the Precautionary Principle is an essential 
driver of the Safety by Design concept. 
Consequently, in Figure 3.2 below, I outline an ‘ideal type model’  schematic which illustrates 
the linkages between three concepts previously discussed, which I propose will have leading 
roles  in this thesis for empirical examination of the governance of the safe and responsible 
development of NM.  
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Figure 3.2: Schematic of the ‘ideal type model’ conceptual intersections for the governance of the 
safe and responsible development of Nanomaterials 
 
The schematic provides conceptual pointers to an iterative process of EU policy progression 
to achieve its aim for the safe and responsible development of NM. The Precautionary 
Principle can be viewed as a proto-typical aspect of anticipatory governance whose highly 
developed precautionary features have tended to disguise its equally significant, if much less 
well-known, deliberative intentions (COM2000). The importance of Safety by Design in NM 
regulation is gathering momentum, with its role in developing ‘regulatory preparedness’ for 
nano-safety now foregrounded by the EU (JRC 2018; NanoReG2 http://www.nanoreg.eu/; 
ProSAFE http://www.h202-prosafe.eu/; GRACIOUS https://www.h2020gracious.eu/). The 
influence of the PP within SbD offers the prospect of a meso-level approach to anticipatory 
governance. However, by bringing RRI into play as a third element, there is the prospect for 
the  anticipatory governance of  NM by integrating public perceptions in the nano innovation 
process. I argue that, if these three elements can be harnessed effectively and implemented 
efficiently by industry, NM development could be viewed by publics as proceeding in a socially 
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acceptable, ethical and legitimate manner (RIVM Report 2014; Renn and Grobje 2010). Clearly 
this is an important component of this  research and is discussed in detail in later Chapters.  
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 Introduction  
In this Chapter, I identify my research theoretical framing, the research design, its 
implementation methods and my own positionality. Central to the research is the primary 
empirical data that I have collected from selected expert actors actively engaged with  
nanotechnologies. But, firstly, I identify the theoretical framing within which I have conducted 
my research.  
 Theoretical Framing for my research design  
I have primarily adopted an Inductive approach based on Grounded Theory i.e. theory 
development ‘grounded’ in the data collected (Glaser and Strauss 1967). This approach  
allows me the opportunity to progress inductively from observations to theory generation 
(Robson and McCartan 2016), and to offer novel perspectives resulting from my own 
systematic data analysis (Saunders et al. 2012). This study is exploratory in its methodology, 
in seeking to inductively fill existing knowledge gaps identified from the literatures and the 
respondents (Kumar 2014; Saunders et al. 2012; Gallagher 2010; Churchill 1999). It is an 
appropriate methodology for developing an anticipatory approach for nano risk governance, 
which is acknowledged to be multi-dimensional in its practice (Guston 2014; Von Schomberg 
2013; Stilgoe et al. 2013;Owen et al. 2013). The reason is that it requires the adaptation and 
integration of EU policy, regulation, and its underpinning science with deliberative actions. 
This is in response to the multiplicity of diverse factors that can impact on the safeguarding 
of nano products. Consequently, this research is qualitative in design, using softer 
instruments for data gathering such as observations and interviews (Gallagher 2010; 
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McDaniel and Gates 2006; Churchill and Iacobucci 2005). I have summarised this framing in 
Figure 4.1 below. 
 
Figure 4.1: Primary theoretical Framing for Research Design 
 
In conclusion, this type of design framework allows research flexibility and adaptability, in 
responding to changes identified from new, pertinent insights that emerged from the 
research process (Saunders et al. 2016, 2012). The adoption of this qualitative research 
approach has allowed flexibility and adaptability in the methodology in response to the 
evolving nature of the study (Mahapatra 2016), with the disaggregation of the raw interview 
data into meaningful groupings for comprehensive analysis, linkages, relationships and 
emergent patterns (Patton 2015; Kumar 2014; Saunders et al. 2012; Hsieh and Shannon 
2005). With my own learning from the emergent themes, patterns and relationships, then 
allowing me to make appropriate adjustments for future data collection (Mach et al.2005; 
Saunders et al. 2002). 
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Notwithstanding the above, because Induction exploration involves inference as to the best 
possible explanation i.e. conclusions based on the available evidence to support the 
subsequent reasoning ( Robson and McCartan 2016), these explanations can be contested by 
contradictory cases ( SAGE Encyclopaedia of Qualitative Research 2008 p.429). Consequently, 
to mitigate this possibility, Patton (2015) and the SAGE Encyclopaedia (2008) recommend a 
mixed methods methodology, whereby the Inductive reasoning is supported by the 
secondary approach of Deductive evaluation from other information sources to test and 
support the study conclusions. Therefore, the validity of the reasoning can be tested by 
recourse to triangulation and evaluation of the study findings against existing published 
research, briefing papers, professional/industry guidance and practices, and other relevant 
data sources ( Patton 2015; SAGE Encyclopaedia 2008). This deductive approach will be 
applied, in later chapters, in tandem with the inductive evaluation of the empirical findings, 
with both approaches contributing to the final study conclusions.   
In the next section, I follow on from this explanation of the theoretical framing to discuss the 
detail of my research design. Specifically, the processes for the data collection and data 
analysis.  
 Research Design   
4.3.1 Introduction  
The forming theories for this study are risk governance and anticipatory governance, and I 
needed to develop a research design that allowed me to test their dynamics and  
discrepancies as identified in Chapters 2 and 3. In this section, I identify the methods and 
procedures which I used to collect and analyse the data from respondents (Kumar 2014). The  
research framework, in Figure 4.2 below , provides an overview of the  plan for data collection, 
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its analysis and interpretation to address my  research objectives (Hair et al. 2003). It provides 
a hierarchy of relationships between the research theory, design, implementation with the 
methods selected.   
 
Figure 4.2. Research Framework :adapted from Saunders et al. (2012) 
Figure 4.2 illustrates that within this framework hierarchy, each step influences the step that 
follows. Once the theoretical  framing for the research design and its methods have been 
selected,  then follows the task of the implementation of that design plan.  This is of a critical  
importance as, ultimately, the quality of the data collected is dependent on developing  the 
appropriate design and implementing it correctly.  
4.3.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
When reviewing the possible methods for gathering empirical data for this study, I considered 
the options for data gathering. These included the self- administered survey questionnaire 
circulated to as many prospective respondents as could be identified, either in hard copy or 
online. But this has a low response rate, offers little options for supplementary questions, and 
interesting and insightful responses are difficult to pursue in any depth (Saunders et al. 2012). 
Conceptual 
Models for 
theory/design
Identification of 
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Consequently, I selected the semi-structured interview as offering the opportunity to ask 
questions on the key themes/concepts, develop new lines of enquiry, and delve deeper into 
idiosyncratic responses during the interview process itself (Kumar 2014; Saunders et al. 2012).  
This approach offered to me the flexibility and adaptability to apply discretion to amend 
questions, depending on the sectoral interest of the interviewee, redirect the flow of the 
conversation, and probe new insights as they arose (Jankowicz 2005; Sekaran 2003). 
Reflecting back on my experience of this process, this flexibility was essential as each 
interview proved to be slightly different. The face to face interviews offered  a rich source of 
information, explanations, with new and unexpected insights. They also allowed me to project 
my own enthusiasm and commitment for my research, establish my credibility, and develop 
a good rapport. (Sekaran 2003). 
4.3.3 Development of the Questionnaire 
The semi-structured interview method allowed me the opportunity to develop my own 
research schedule of questions.  It allows for consistency in approach, but with flexibility in 
response to divergent expert knowledge,  individual experiences and opinions (Savath et al. 
2013). My starting point was the development of a draft questionnaire reflecting the critical 
issues identified from the literatures in Chapters 2 and 3. Then I considered customizing the 
questionnaires for the different sectoral interests, but this proved to lack applicability due to 
the diversity of interests  even within the individual groupings e.g. academia. A further option 
was to provide a separate set of individualized questions for each interviewee e.g. by reading 
up on their published papers, but  this proved to be  logistically impractical.  
Instead, I developed an ‘adaptable approach’ (Mach et al. 2005) for a common framework of 
questions (see Appendix A). This became more of an abridged ‘menu’ from which the 
interviewees could select the key topic areas in which they felt competent to make responses.  
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For example, social scientists could discuss in depth the concept of Responsible Research and 
Innovation, but not multi-cellular assay techniques. This questionnaire was  shared in advance  
and acted as the base point for all discussions. I provided additional information or 
documents, as appropriate, to the interviewee on their expert subject area. For example, a 
key reference document in this study is the novel Toxicological Paradigm (see Figure 2.1, 
Chapter 2)  which was a helpful heuristic in discussions with environmental nanoscientists, 
toxicologists, government policy makers, regulators, and industry. But, of little value, when 
interviewing social scientists other than demonstrating deontological alternatives exist to 
traditional animal based regulatory testing. I would also make the point that whilst the ‘menu’ 
simplified the interview process, I undertook considerable advance research for each 
interviewee on their organisation, policies, briefings and published papers. The purpose was 
a familiarization process to establish an easier personal rapport, to show respect for their 
positions, and to smooth the interview process. In the next section I will discuss the process 
for my framing and construction of those interview questions provide in the abridged 
questionnaire.  
4.3.4 Constructing the Interview Questions  
The framing for the questions needed to reflect the research objectives for this study,  identify 
any policy and regulatory lacuna, and current gaps in science and technology knowledge and 
practice. (see Appendix A for the Research Schedule of Questions). A first example is  Research 
Objective 1 (RO1) which is ‘to critically review whether the current EU chemical safety 
regulations (REACH) provide acceptable public environmental health assurances for nano-
safety’.  
The term ‘acceptable’ is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘tolerable or allowable 
within prescribed parameters ’e.g. cost-benefit analysis (OED online https://www.oed.com/). 
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Without specific parameters, it can be ambiguous in its interpretation, but it is a common 
descriptor in policy, legal and many risk- based situations. For example, it is found in the 
REACH Annexes XI para 1.1.1(1) and Annex XIV para 3(1) in respect of reducing risks to 
‘acceptable’ levels. Three key EC Scientific Committees (SCHER, SCENHIR and SCCS), in their 
2013 joint report into ‘new challenges for risk assessment’, identified that there continues to 
be no adopted definition of ‘acceptable’ risk by the EU. This report concluded that individual 
understanding of ‘acceptable’ may be based subjectively on conservative and non-
scientifically derived factors, that are not easily avoidable, as well as validated risk assessment 
data. Consequently, with 55 respondents interviewed from six sectoral groups and their sub-
groups, I recognised that their responses/opinions would be subjectively framed, but within 
the parameters of their own experience due to their differing backgrounds, education and 
experiential learning. The three RO1 questions in the Schedule of Questions do not specifically 
use this term but, in the interview responses, this term is regularly used by respondents. 
Consequently, I have interpreted its meaning for the respondents data in accordance with the 
above OED definition above i.e. ‘tolerable or allowable’ when synthesising my conclusions. 
 Relevant questions have been developed relating to RO1 for inclusion in the questionnaire 
that have arisen from the literatures. For example, the EC definition of a NP, proposed in 
2011, is still not formally approved, with no given date for the next public consultation (EUR 
27240 EN). As I pointed out in Chapter 2, if you cannot scientifically  identify a NP with 
accuracy, then you cannot enforce relevant legislation. Secondly, I was able to establish there 
are significant criticisms of REACH for its lack of nano specificity in its testing protocols. This 
is an issue of  critical importance as it must undermine the efficacy of REACH for assuring 
public environmental health safety. Thirdly, there are cross -sectoral  criticisms regarding the 
over- application of the precautionary principle (PP) for hazard rather than evidence- based 
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risk situations. The treaty bounded PP is central to the EU policy goal of achieving a high level 
of human and environmental health safety. It is important to test whether an over-application 
of hazard-based approaches, instead of evidence -based risk,  are a response to the 
inadequacy of current regulatory controls. 
Research Objective 2 (RO2), aims ‘ to determine to what extent can existing and emerging 
scientific methods, tools and models provide for future competent risk analysis of 
nanomaterials’. In Chapter 2, I discuss that traditional toxicological animal testing is  criticised 
for  potentially flawed single probalistic tests (false positives/negatives). The questionnaire 
examines the prospects for their replacement with novel alternative scientific tools and 
toxicological paradigms to generate a ‘weight of evidence approach’. As well as their  
potential to contribute to activate the implementation of the Safety by Design conceptual 
approach within nano R&D practices. 
Finally, Research  Objective 3 (RO3) aims ‘to consider the development of  a deliberative 
model to  facilitate socio-ethical considerations for safe design  into nano risk management’. 
The role of RRI is foregrounded in Chapter 3 as the principal EU policy mechanism to facilitate 
this change. In that Chapter, I  discuss  the EU  intention for RRI to play a de facto policy role 
in the co-regulation of techno-scientific innovations for both safe and responsible innovation. 
But, there continuous to be an important policy omission, in that there is no accepted 
template proposed for the implementation of RRI into innovation practices. So, discussing the 
role that RRI might play, as a bridging mechanism for normative values to facilitate the safe 
design of NM, is a key part of the interview.  
So, in conclusion, I have provided the framings for the interview questions which have been 
identified from the literature reviews. The detailed questions are provided in Appendix A for  
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this Chapter. In the next sections I will discuss the issues regarding the sample selection, its 
composition and its size. 
4.3.5 Sample Selection.  
In Chapter 1, I foregrounded Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) proposal for a post-normal 
scientific approach when traditional methodologies are ineffective for governance of 
emerging technologies as very relevant to this thesis. In such circumstances, this novel 
conception for the management of complex techno-scientific-related problems, recommends 
that the quality assurance of scientific inputs to the policy process requires an ‘extended peer 
community’ consisting of all those with a stake in the dialogue (Funtowicz and Ravetz 
1993.p739). Ideally, post-normal science offered me a new research pathway to incorporate 
respondents beyond the traditional triple helix of government, industry and academia (Wiek 
et al. 2016) with the other identified nanotechnologies stakeholders.  
Now the selection of the right actors to interview is critical to the success of this research 
project (Kumar 2014; Saunders et al. 2012). From the literatures, I identified key sectoral   
groups that have important influences and interests in the EU risk governance of 
nanotechnologies. I also identified the key sectoral groups from a series of publications by the 
OECD which related to issues on good governance, policy and practice for regulation and 
regulators (OECD 2013a, 2013c, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015c, 2015d). These documents 
identified that key experts would come from government, regulators, academic communities, 
nano industry and their representatives, jurisprudence, and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). Here, I  define experts as individuals who are recognised as specialists in their field of 
study, are professionally established and well-recognised in their professional networks( 
Mahapatra 2016). But, as argued by Wynne (1998) and others e.g. Stilgoe (2006),  people with 
science education or education in a particular discipline need not be the only experts who are 
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invited contributors. In that respect, the final group needed to achieve the recommended 
‘extended peer community’, was to be inclusive of non-expert lay members. However, this 
opportunity was not available to me. 
 The reason is that at that time of finalising the research strategy (2013-14) the 
nanotechnologies community was still nascent, divided into discrete sectoral groups, without 
established cross community networks, or trusted environments where lay members could 
engage in collaborative discussions. In 2010, in the EC Special Eurobarometer Science and 
Technology Report on public opinion within EU member states, determined that less than 
11% of citizens considered they had an understanding of the emerging science and technology 
innovations. The FP7 NanOpinion project (https://nanopinion-edu.eu/) launched in 2012 
reported on its public engagement programme in 11 EU countries and, inter alia, concluded 
that there was little public understanding or engagement with nanotechnologies by the EU 
lay community. It also concluded that networks/trusted environments for better public 
understanding and collaborative actions were not visible. 
So, without the necessary logistical resources to develop such a lay community network, my 
alternative response was to look to non-governmental organisations(NGOs), with a particular 
interest in nanotechnologies, to act as proxy representatives for lay opinions. Whilst this 
approach has gone some way to mitigate the absence of lay opinions, I have to accept there 
are limitations in applying this research in a post-normal context when lay stakeholders are 
not directly involved with the debates.  
In respect of the other sectoral groups, my expectation was that each sectoral  group would  
provide differing perspectives as to the current and future efficacy of EU risk governance 
instruments. My aspiration was that conversations with selected respondents, with their 
deep understanding of their own sector, would provide me with the fresh insights to inspire 
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novel ideas and solutions to reshape the current frameworks. But risk governance for 
nanotechnologies is a multifaceted topic, involving policy and regulation, interwoven with 
complex science and technology, across international boundaries, with continuing contested 
and conflicting interests. No single sectoral group, with their own vested interests, would be 
able to provide the detailed insights needed for a fully rounded perspective of the current 
efficacy of EU risk governance for NM.  
From the OECD publications, I identified that respondents would need to be from a range of 
relevant contributory backgrounds, with the appropriate educational/professional 
backgrounds, and overlaid with relevant specialist experience in the nano world. By utilizing 
the findings from the OECD literatures, I aimed to interview ‘expert’ actors from the following 
sectors:  
➢ Policy makers (Government and Legislators) 
➢ Jurisprudence (Academic and Practicing Lawyers) 
➢ Regulated entities (Industry) 
➢ Regulatory agencies (ECHA, EFSA,HSE) 
➢ Academia (Universities) 
➢ Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
So, my first sieve of the stakeholders was their separation into these distinct sectoral groups. 
Though there will be inevitable intersectoral overlaps in their interests (e.g. environmental 
lawyers advising nano industry clients).  These overlaps may be collaborative at times, and  in 
other times they may be conflicting (e.g. regulators advising or enforcing on industry).  
However, their sectoral viewpoints will have collectively shaped the current EU risk 
governance framework as it is today, and their voices will also influence its future shape and 
practices (Mabey and Salaman 1997). 
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It quickly became clear to me that within each sectoral  group there are a sub-sets of different 
actors which would have to be teased out. A good example is the Industry group which 
differentiated from multi-national companies to small and  medium companies (SME). In 
addition, the perspectives provided by national and international chemical trade 
organisations proved important. The reason is that they develop and promote policy 
viewpoints on behalf of significant numbers of member companies and represent them at EU 
governmental levels e.g. Nanotechnology Industry Association (NIA), European Chemical 
Industry Council (Cefic). 
From my study of the grey literatures for Chapter 2, I concluded that, whilst being treaty- 
bounded to follow the same overarching EU policy and adopted regulation, the UK 
government and the EC had differences in policy weightings for hazard and risk for NM.  
Consequently, I decided to conduct separate interviews within relevant UK Government 
Departments (Dept of Business, Innovation and Skills and the Department of Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs) and within key EC Directorate- Generals  (Environment, Health and 
Food Safety-Santé, GROW, Joint Research Centre, and Research and Innovation).  
 I also needed to determine whether those differences of policy opinion at governmental level 
were reflected within the EU and UK regulatory agencies. At a European level, the European 
Chemicals Agency (ECHA) and the European Food Standards Agency (EFSA) are the principal 
enforcement agencies for nano related regulations. Within the UK, I needed to approach the 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Environment Agency (EA) are the designated 
Competent Authorities for REACH regulations. 
As for the others sectoral groups, Savath and Brainard (2013) correctly predicted that  the 
sub-sets within the academics grouping would be diversified. These included materials 
scientists, environmental nanoscientists, toxicologists, omics scientists, social scientists and 
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social philosophers. For the legal practitioners, I have labelled them as Jurisprudence as the 
discussions related more to the theory and construction of the EU legal framework rather 
than its  detailed practice and enforcement.  The sub-sets for this group were law academics 
and practicing environmental lawyers. The final stakeholder group is the Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), with few in number with specific interests in NM.  
The one common issue I needed to take into account for all these groups is the question of 
Bias in their responses. The SAGE Encyclopaedia ( 2008.p60) refers to bias as a predisposition 
or partiality, and Glaser (2002) believes that bias can be a  threat to the validity of the study 
i.e. the factual soundness of the data, its interpretation and concluding findings. However, it 
is important not to confuse bias with error( Roulston and Shelton 2015), if the respondents 
subjectivity refers genuinely to their individuals experiences, feelings, opinions and 
preferences. The SAGE Encyclopaedia (2008) suggests these subjective responses can allow 
the individual to properly situate an objective problem and coherently apply the analysis to a 
real-world situations. This is the outcome I hoped to achieve from my interviews, but with 
necessary caveats. By this I mean, weighing differing sectoral viewpoints against each other 
when drawing my conclusions, by highlighting where they agree or disagree , explaining why 
and then justifying my own conclusions.  
4.3.6  Sample Size 
The application of qualitative research techniques generally allows for a relatively small 
number of interviews, with the nature and content of the interview being more  important 
than the number of respondents (Zigmund et al. 2010; Jankowicz 2005). However, for the 
research to be authorative in its outcomes, the interviews needed to be in-depth, rich in data, 
and highly informative (Saunders et al. 2012, Creswell 2012). The logical relationship between 
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the sample selection technique and research focus is important. The sample size is dependent 
on a number of factors: 
(a) What data is needed to answer the research questions?  
(b) Will the participants provide credibility to the research outcomes? 
(c) What can be achieved within the resources available? 
Patton (2002) 
These criteria are particularly relevant when collecting qualitative data using structured or 
semi-structured interviews (Saunders et al. 2012). Also, the validity of the results will be 
functions of  the research design, the data collected and analytical process rather than the 
sample size (Patton 2002). Nevertheless, the literatures are not helpful on the important 
matter as to how many respondents should be interviewed.  For example, for a general study 
at PhD level, Creswell (2009) suggests that 25-30 interviews may suffice, whilst Gerson and 
Horowitz (2002) suggest a minimum of 60 interviews. Saunders et al. (2012) suggest that 
where comparisons are to be made between heterogeneous groups, who will each be treated 
as a separate homogenous population, it will need to be of a significant size. Though no 
helpful metrics are offered for assistance to the researcher.  
With no definite guidelines for non-probabilistic purposive sampling sizes, I adopted the 
suggestion that the researcher continues to interview until there is a sense of “data 
saturation” being reached (Bryman 2012, Saunders et al. 2012). That is, when the new data is 
simply confirming themes and conclusions already expressed and does not suggest new 
insights or theoretical categories. Though conceptually helpful, this idea provides little 
practical guidance as to the estimation of the sample size, and it finally came down to my 
discretion to make that judgement (Brannen et al. 2012, Saunders et al. 2012; Guest et al. 
2006). The total respondents interviewed was 55 from the 72 approached. 
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Table 4-1: Breakdown of Respondents by Sector 
Sector Interviewed 
UK/EU Government 12 
Academic 20 
UK/EU Regulators 3 
NGO 3 
Industry 14 
Jurisprudence 3 
Totals 55 
 
Ideally, I would have preferred a more equal spread of numbers amongst the sectoral groups 
but there were difficulties in accessing some groupings which will be discussed later. The 
respondents included senior academics in philosophy, environmental nanoscience, 
nanotoxicology and jurisprudence (UK/EU/USA); senior governmental scientists and policy 
makers (UK/EU); industry included directors, chief executives and departmental heads in 
multi-national companies, SMEs and national/international chemical organisations (UK/EU); 
senior UK regulators; jurisprudence academic and environmental lawyers (UK/USA), and 
NGOs(UK/EU). The listing of the interviewees is giving in the Appendices for this Chapter. 
In conclusion, the key sectoral groups for this research project were identified, in sufficient 
numbers, and were interviewed to provide a rich source of data for this study. In the next 
sections I will discuss the process of converting that raw data into useful formats for data 
analysis.   
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 Data Analysis  
4.4.1 Research Objectives, Propositions and supporting Conceptual 
models 
The starting point for my analysis is how that data can be investigated so that I can achieve 
the research objectives for this study (Kumar 2014). These objectives are the explicit 
statements of what I need to know to be able to generate new insights on the forming 
theories for this study and their application to NM (Bryman 2012; Saunders et al. 2012; 
Jankowicz 2005). By generating and then utilizing my Research Objectives, I have been able 
to operationalize my enquiries into the effectiveness of the individual EC strategy risk 
governance objectives 1, 2, & 3 (Saunders et al. 2012; Jankowicz 2005). In Table 4-2 below, I 
have set out a progressing rationale for their framing within their testable  propositions, and 
the supporting concepts from Chapter 3 to provide an  analytical structure for data analysis. 
The propositions-based methods adopted here, provide testing mechanisms for empirical 
analysis in a structured manner to facilitate inductive reasoning from the primary data    
(Hoddy 2018). 
Table 4-2: Research Objectives, Propositions and supporting Conceptual models   
EC Objective  Research Objectives  Propositions   Conceptual models 
EC Objective 1 
Maximum use 
would be made of 
existing regulation 
though adjustments 
may be necessary 
 
Research Objective 1 
To critically review 
whether the current 
EU chemical safety 
regulations (REACH) 
provide acceptable 
public environmental 
health assurances for 
nano-safety 
 
Proposition 1 
‘Current EU 
chemical safety 
regulation does 
provide sufficient 
public 
environmental 
health protection 
from potential 
risks associated 
with 
nanomaterials.’ 
 
Conceptual 
Frameworks 
a).Taxonomy  of 
Regulation 
(CEPS 2014) 
b).Analytical-
Deliberative model  
(Rosa, McCright and 
Renn 2013) 
c)Precautionary 
Principle (COM 
2000) 
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EC Objective  Research Objectives  Propositions   Conceptual models 
 
 
EC Objective 2 
Recognises that 
existing parameters 
for EHS chemical 
safety testing may 
not be appropriate 
for the unique 
properties of 
nanoparticles, 
requiring new 
methods and tools 
for risk assessment, 
and refinement of 
nano scale 
metrology and 
standardisation 
activities 
 
Research Objective 2 
To determine to what 
extent can existing 
and emerging 
scientific methods, 
tools and models 
provide for future 
competent risk 
analysis of 
nanomaterials 
 
Proposition 2 
‘That novel 
scientific  tools 
and  predictive 
paradigm(s) can 
provide future 
confidence for 
industry and 
regulators in nano-
safety decision-
making’ 
 
a).Analytical-
Deliberative 
(Rosa, McCright and  
Renn 2013) 
b).Alternative 
Toxicological 
paradigm model 
(Nel et al. 2012) 
EC Objective 3 
The Risk 
Management 
paradigm to be 
expanded to 
incorporate socio-
ethical 
considerations into 
the R&D process 
with the creation of 
a culture of 
responsibility which 
is participatory and 
inclusive 
 
Research Objective 3 
To consider the 
development of  a 
deliberative model to  
facilitate socio-ethical 
considerations for 
safe design  into nano 
risk management 
Proposition 3 
‘RRI can act as an 
anticipatory 
governance 
mechanism for 
embedding socio-
ethical values for 
safe design  within   
nano-innovation’  
 
 (a).Analytical-
Deliberative 
(Rosa, McCright and 
Renn 2013) 
(b).Responsible 
Research and 
Innovation.(Rome 
Declaration 2014) 
(c) Safety by Design. 
 (Gottardo et al. 
2017) 
(d).Mid-stream 
Modulation  ( Fisher 
et al. 2006) 
 
The testable propositions are informed by the literature analysis and findings from Chapters 
2 and 3. These are arguments whose purpose is to test the veracity of those findings against 
the opinions and insights gained from the interview data. For example, Proposition 1 is 
addressing the fundamental criticism that REACH is currently unsuitable to be applied for 
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nano-safety due to its lack of nano specificity. For Proposition 2, current traditional  animal 
testing protocols for regulatory purposes , with their single probalistic testing procedures, are 
challenged as being flawed and unethical. There is significant EU funding being invested in the 
discovery and development of novel replacement scientific techniques and toxicological 
paradigms. By applying Proposition 2 to the data, I am testing whether these new techniques 
and models can be judged to provide for future competent risk analysis.  Finally, from Chapter 
3, we learn that the RRI concept is regarded as the EU de facto policy mechanism for  
promoting the social alignment of nano innovation. This to be driven by an inclusive and 
participative process that can incorporate the  socio-ethical concerns of non-expert and civil 
actors into an anticipatory approach for safe design. The purpose of Proposition 3 is to 
examine whether RRI can act as that bridging mechanism for anticipatory governance and, in 
doing so, influence their safe design.  
In Figure 4.3 below, I illustrate the interdependence of the research objectives and the 
propositions in determining the overall efficacy of the current EU risk governance framework 
for achieving the key aim for the safe and responsible development of NM . 
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Figure 4.3. The interdependence of the Research Objectives and Propositions for determining the 
efficacy of the EU Risk Governance framework 
 
In respect of the conceptual models, their purpose is to provide framings in which the data 
can be analyzed. They help to identify patterns and relationships to enable reasoning and 
learning that facilitate logical outcomes. As mentioned in Chapter 3, though not lineal in 
application, they do provide for a progressive evaluation for the data analysis. They allowed 
me to infer the implications from the study findings as to relevant current and novel theory 
and practice (Gallagher 2010). In addition, they have challenged me to develop a new, refined 
conceptual framework for EU risk governance of NM  from the gathered empirical data (Grix 
2010).  
In the next sections, I will explain how  I undertook the data management, coding and analysis 
of the raw data. I will illustrate how the structure for this research  has been applied to provide 
answers to the questions posed by the research objectives and propositions.  
87 
 
4.4.2 Empirical Data Management and Coding  
From experience, I learnt the benefits of early transcription and analysis of the individual 
interviews, while their freshness, subtleties and insights were still  in my mind. Once gathered, 
the raw data then needed a process of management and analysis to support the inductive 
development of any theoretical explanations identified within the  contexts for this research 
(Saunders et al. 2012). For this study, I utilized the Nvivo Data Management System  for the 
systematic process of storing , coding, annotation and memoing of data. I identified 27 codes 
which I used for the separation, storage and organisation of the raw data collected. 
The first step is the allocation of data for its categorization by dissecting it into component 
themes, sub-themes, open and axial codes. Then to endeavour to identify patterns and 
relationships between variables to support the generation of new or adapted theory (Bryman 
2012; Saunders et al. 2012; Zikmund et al. 2010; Jankowicz 2005; Glaser and Straus 1967). To 
assist in this process, I developed a bespoke database using the NVivo Data Management 
System. Its purpose was for the storing, coding and manipulating of the primary empirical 
data, with a modifiable template of open coding for data organisation and analysis (see 
Appendix C to this Chapter).  I followed a stepwise approach recommended  by  Taylor et al.  
(2013 ),  by which I mean I used  distinct steps to use the coding narrative as descriptors of 
the data characteristics and  interactions given by the  sectoral actors.  
The process of identifying and selection of the themes and codes was a mixed approach. 
Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest that in an Inductive approach the themes should emerge 
from the data itself. I considered that the forming theories of Risk Governance and 
Anticipatory Governance are so prominent for this study that they should be  pre- selected as 
the two key themes. Gray (2014) suggests that the nature of themes is to capture important 
meanings from the data that address the research questions being asked in the study. Both 
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these themes proved their case, from the amount of relevant data captured, that this was the 
correct decision. What did emerge from the data was the need for a major sub-theme for risk 
management (under the Risk Governance theme), due to the quantity of data emerging on 
that topic. 
In respect of the coding, Straus and Corbin (1998.p62) define Open Coding as ‘ the naming 
and categorizing of phenomena through the examination of the data’. This is the process for 
the disaggregation, examination, comparison and categorizing the raw data (Gray 2014). 
Examples of open codes used are for Current Regulation and Safety by Design which are 
foregrounded in the interview data. In terms of Axial Coding, their purpose is to identify  
categories that make  connections between different strands of data. Gray (2014) suggests 
this approach requires to be able to identify the context for those linkages, the actions and 
interactions and possible consequences.  Examples that I used are Fate, Behaviour, Exposure 
and Environmental Effects of NM ; and RRI and Safety by Design .  
In conclusion, I have designed within the Nvivo data management system the architecture for 
collating and categorizing the raw data into appropriate themes and codes. However, Nvivo 
does not provide the analytics for the exploration and critical evaluation of the categorized 
data. This has to be undertaken by myself applying specific techniques which I shall discuss 
next.  
4.4.3 Directed Content Analysis of Data 
The exploration of the gathered data was undertaken by applying Directed Content Analysis 
(DCA) (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). As mentioned in the literature review, there are already 
existing alternative paradigms available to apply to nanotechnologies, but which need proof 
of concept testing ( e.g. Figure 2.1.- Toxicological profiling using a tiered approach for risk). So, 
what is required is an approach that will be a test bed for those available theories, which have 
89 
 
limited current application, due to uncertainties for their broad acceptance (Hsieh and 
Shannon 2005). In this case, Directed Content Analysis is defined by Hsieh and Shannon (2005. 
p1281) as ‘a  research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data 
through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes and patterns’. 
The goal for the researcher is by using this method to be able to validate or extend our 
understanding of current theory or theoretical framings.  
DCA gave me the opportunity to validate existing theory, concepts and models or extend 
them conceptually. In essence, it involves making interpretations of the data by its systematic 
and objective induction into the thematic and coding categories (Gray 2014). The process 
commences with the identification from the literatures of key concepts or variables as initial 
theme or coding categories (e.g. Risk Governance, Anticipatory Governance). Then the 
identification of sub themes and/or open  codes which emerged from both the literatures and  
respondents data (e.g. Current regulation, RRI). This coding approach promoted the 
development of  a representative range of insights, interactions and explanatory concepts 
referred to by respondents. 
My getting to know and understand the implications, explanations, and identifying further 
lines of enquiry  from the data, is critical in the analytical  process. I make the point above, 
that early personal transcription and review of the data  provided the  opportunity to closely 
scrutinize it whilst the discussions were still fresh in my mind.  For me, this proved invaluable 
in developing my understanding and for the critical evaluation of the data. So, this 
thematic/coding approach was applied to ensure that a representative range of insights, 
interactions and explanatory concepts referred to by interviewees were captured. The final 
stage of the analysis involved the mapping, interpretation and synthesis of answers to the key 
research questions and propositions posed in this study. Whilst I made every effort to ensure 
90 
 
that the results truly reflected the attitudes, beliefs, and values of the participants (Srivastava 
& Thomson 2009).  
I want to raise a  final point regarding this type of research design, before I move on to the 
research implementation section. This is made by Creswell (2009), who views this type of 
qualitative research as more orientated towards credibility, authenticity and transparency 
rather than validity. Though agreeing with Creswell, Saunders et al. (2012) point out that such 
weakness can be offset by the strength in its inherent flexibility to new interview insights and 
then to explore complex issues in-depth. This I found to be an important outcome stemming 
from this research design.  
 Research Implementation 
4.5.1 Selection of respondents and negotiating access 
As I discussed in 4.2.4 above, I identified then differentiated the relevant sectoral groups for 
this study. The second stage was to identify and approach directly the potential participants.  
To be of real value to the study, they needed to be able to provide an information rich 
interview to allow me to gain theoretical as well as practical insights (Saunders et al. 2012). 
Flick (2009) suggests the need for relevant specialist  background, knowledge, experience and 
skills to be able to  do this.  I did not wish to apply a randomized approach as I wished to select 
the most suitable candidates for interview (Patton 2002). Therefore, the selection was by non-
probability sampling which relied on my identification or personal recommendation from 
others.  As my research approach is to investigate within heterogeneous groupings, Jankowicz 
(2005) advises that this necessitates the application of common generic criteria in the  
selection process. I have set out in Figure 4.4 below , the common selection criteria that was 
applied in each case.  
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Figure 4.4. Criteria for Common Selection Characteristics for Respondents: Source:  Jankowicz 2005 
 It is accepted that these criteria are broadly framed and, therefore, requires a greater 
reliance on my judgement in the selection process.  In identifying suitable respondents, the 
major deficit was my lack of an active personal/professional network in the nanoscience and 
technology sectors.  This proved to be a constant and difficult hurdle to overcome. Whilst my 
supervisors suggested suitable interviewees within their academic specialism, it was much 
more difficult to identify suitable candidates in UK / EU Governments, Regulators, Industry, 
Jurisprudence and NGOs sectors. This was eventually achieved by various means: 
• Identifying key commentators from the literature reviews 
• Attendance at nanotechnology conferences/seminars and workshops and identifying 
appropriate candidates to approach directly  
• Respondents providing personal introductions or recommendations for other  
potential participants in their sector  
• Webinars speakers on nanoscience and technology related subjects 
Consequently, the method that I adopted was to combine two research approaches. Firstly, I 
followed the methodology example of Macnaghten and Chilvers (2014) and Savath  and 
Brainard (2013) by selecting a Purposive sampling approach for examining heterogenous 
Actively and professionally engaged with 
nanoscience and technology
Suitably qualified and experienced to provide 
indepth insights for their sector
Relatively senior within their organisation
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groups. This allowed me to use my judgement on who to approach to provide information 
rich interviews (Gray 2014). Secondly, I applied  Snowball sampling, in  which colleagues and  
respondents shared their informal networks with me to recommend further potential 
candidates (Kumar 2014). This sampling technique is applied when it is difficult to identify 
members of a desired population, though it is not statistically representative of that total 
population (Saunders et al. 2012;Zigmund et al. 2010). For a nascent community, as is to be 
found in nanotechnologies, this proved to be the most appropriate and productive  method 
to adopt.  
Overall, the selection of respondents proved to be a difficult, protracted and frustrating task. 
Not all of those contacted were prepared to consent to interview, or often proved elusive in 
keeping pre-arranged appointments. In some cases, the delay was months in making before 
the interview was finally achieved. The personal learning for me is that snowball respondents 
require considerable effort to track down, then to pin down for interview dates (Kervin 1992). 
One very helpful commonality amongst those interviewed is that 95% had achieved doctoral 
status. This meant that once they had engaged with me, there was an often an empathy which  
was an important and positive element for obtaining a high-quality, in depth interview. 
With much personal effort, and some timely introductions, I was able to undertake 55 
interviews (schedule of interviews in Appendix B for the Chapter). But, despite the best efforts 
of myself and sympathetic others, it proved impossible to obtain a European regulatory 
perspective for NM directly from the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) and the European 
Food Standards Agency (EFSA). Both declined repeated invitations to participate which is the 
major disappointment to me in this study. Finally, I was advised by an Executive Director of 
ECHA to approach the EC Joint Research Centre (JRC) with my request for interview on the EU 
regulatory issues for nano  policy, risks, and safety. The JRC is the science portal for the EU 
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and, by lucky coincidence, I attended  a conference where a suitable JRC representative kindly 
agreed to be interviewed. In addition, the respondents from the EC Directorates-General had 
close working relationships with ECHA or EFSA and were able to provide proxy insights into 
their regulatory thinking. So, I was able to triangulate information inductively and deductively 
for the ECHA and EFSA regulatory viewpoints from these proxy insights, their own websites, 
and their relevant publications (Saunders et al. 2012). 
In conclusion, the selection of respondents was of critical importance to the success of this 
study and it proved to be very demanding process. To ensure that I could maximise the 
benefits from those interviews I decided to carry out a pilot study to finesse my approach 
which I discuss next.  
4.5.2 Pilot Survey  
Kumar (2014) suggests that when a researcher has limited knowledge of their study area that 
they should undertake a short pilot survey.  The purpose of this approach is to develop, refine 
and test the research design and, in particular, the Schedule of Questions. I approached a 
small number of interviewees from different scientific disciplines to discuss my research 
approach and to test my draft questions.  As I explained in  4.2.3 above, my initial approach 
was to provide a separate set of individualized questions for each interviewee, but I found 
that this would be logistically difficult and impractical because of the amount of time it 
required. Consequently, I developed an adaptable approach recommended by Mach et al. 
(2005), which by iteration, and the experience from the pilot study, I modified the original 
draft to a smaller list of common questions (see Appendix A). This abridged schedule became 
a menu from which the interviewees could select the topic areas in which they felt most 
competent to discuss.  The Schedule of Questions was shared in advance of the interview and 
acted as the  base point for discussions. I provided additional information or documents as 
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appropriate to the interviewee and their subject area. For example, a key reference document 
in this study is the  novel ‘Toxicological profiling using a Tiered approach for risk identification 
and characterization’ (see Figure 2.1, Chapter 2) which was relevant, and very helpful in 
discussions with some environmental nanoscientists, toxicologists, government policy 
makers, regulators, and industry. But of little value when interviewing social scientists, other 
than to demonstrate that alternatives exist to traditional animal based regulatory testing. In 
the next section, I will discuss the process I undertook to conduct interviews to obtain answers 
to those questions. 
4.5.3  Conducting the Interview Process 
Data gathering from an interview format has become a  standard technique in qualitatively 
researching subjects of complexity (Denzin and Lincoln 2018). My standard approach was with 
open-ended questions to encourage respondents to offer their perspectives on the issues 
raised, with variations on the questions asked in accordance with the flow of the conversation 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2018; Easterby –Smith et al. 2008; Jankowicz 2005). This method also 
allows the interviewee to raise their own questions and objections within the interview 
process (Latour 2000). I was able to present relevant questions, observe, listen, interpret and 
respond to their answers, and to gain understanding for the reasoning behind the 
respondents attitudes and opinions (Saunders et al. 2012; Zigmund et al. 2010). I chose this 
interview approach as it most suited  my research questions and my personal communication 
style (Jankowicz 2005).  
However, as I progressed in my programme of interviews, I faced significant barriers to its 
completion.  An important Confounding Factor is that this research has been  conducted part 
time and incorporated within the confines of a busy business and family schedule. These 
extra-curricular demands provided constraints for time scheduling of the interviews. In 
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addition, some respondents were located in different countries, continents and time zones. 
So, to interview internationally based respondents in Europe or in the USA, face to face, 
ranged from the financially difficult to the impossible. Thankfully, modern technology 
provided the remedy in terms of Skype video or telephone calls. The interviews occurred 
across a spectrum of intercontinental time zones according to the convenience of the 
interviewee.   
Table 4-3. Breakdown of the interview format 
Face to Face Skype Telephone Skype Video 
23 21 11 
 
Table 4-3. provides a breakdown of numbers for each type of interview format. Every 
respondent was formally promised anonymity and that they would not be quoted publicly 
without their prior consent. This contributed to their being open and honest in their answers 
subject to any organisational constraints. For example, one interviewee, from an international 
aerospace company had an adjudicator present online to intercept any commercial 
confidentiality issues. In another instance, a regulator would not allow the taping of the 
interview, due to organisation rules, so hand notes had to be taken instead. I think the fact 
that so many interviewees had doctoral qualifications provided a spur to their generous co-
operation with me. With their permission, each interview was audio recorded and then  
transcribed by me. The transcriptions required 225-250 hours of my time and were more 
problematic when the Skype signal was weak, or if English was a second language.  
This labour was offset by my learning in terms of new, sometimes idiosyncratic insights. 
Almost without exception, I found the interviewing process to be a rewarding and valuable 
learning experience, and well worth the preceding effort. From many respondents, I felt I 
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benefited from a high level one to one tutorial from a subject expert in that field. This made 
up for the many frustrations that occurred in making those individual arrangements, by being 
a satisfying personal experiences in itself. However, I understand that those personal 
experiences, to a certain extent, are reflective of  own positionality in relation to this research 
which I discuss next. 
 Positionality of the Researcher 
Whilst I believe I have made every effort to accurately reflect the data collected from my 
respondents, no research investigation is neutral (Jankowicz 2005). My role as researcher was 
to capture the reality of the data and then interpret and accurately represent it (Holloway 
and Francis 2011). Chiseri- Slater (1996) believe that all researchers are shaped by their 
subjective–contextual factors such as their life history and experiences. They are positioned 
by their age, gender, race, class, nationality, personal circumstances and intellectual pre-
disposition. Consequently, my Positionality must be regarded as an influencing factor on this 
research and it needs to be known, explained and understood by others.  
My first degree was a BSc (Hons) in Environmental Health Sciences which took me into a 
practitioner career in local government, where I specialized in environmental risk 
management and environmental protection. This required a detailed understanding of risk 
management theory and strategy, relevant UK/EU legal frameworks, regulations, and 
compliance and enforcement  processes and procedures. This included attending the law 
courts as an expert witness in prosecutions.  At a later date, I  supported the development of  
my managerial career with a  Master’s in Business Administration (MBA). This gave me a 
better insight into the business/ commercial sectors, and their responses to a variety of 
regulatory challenges.  In 2003, I joined the University of Birmingham as Head of Teaching in 
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Environmental Health. At this time, the School was developing its research interest and 
capability in environmental nanoscience. This was a novel subject which caught my interest  
and, initially, I studied it more for personal than academic interest. Eventually, I gained 
sufficient understanding to be asked to lead knowledge transfer workshops and seminars for 
industry professionals and environmental health  practitioners. It seemed a logical step for 
me to  develop my academic interest into a PhD proposal. In 2013, I left the university to set 
up my own environmental health sciences consultancy which included clients with 
nanotechnology interests. This experience provided a deeper insight  into the pressures and 
problems in organising and operating a  privately-run  profit -making business.  
So, my professional background and experiences have fitted  me with a number of positive 
attributes to make this study a success. Firstly, I am comfortable with the language of 
government, regulation and academia. I understand the politico-economic, policy, legal, and  
organisational structures in which they have to operate. The cross- linkages between the 
differing sectoral groups, and the strengths and weakness in their communication and 
collaborative processes. My own communication skills have been honed  over my professional 
life in response to many external influences. They have proven to be  an essential asset in the 
recruitment and interviewing of respondents.  
In respect of this study, I realised I needed to develop my theoretical sensitivity which Glaser 
et al. (2004) say is essential for grounded theory studies. This requires the development of 
the  ability to evaluate data by relating it to normal models of theory, and then synthesising  
it for novel emergent theory and conceptual approaches. This sensitivity is developed by a 
deep understanding of the relevant literatures for that subject area (Glaser 1978). 
So, responding to this advice, I have accessed many differing sources of knowledge, 
information and published research from peer-reviewed academic writings and grey 
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literatures.  As my own ideas have developed, during the timeline of this research project, I 
felt confident to contributed to the ongoing debates in this dynamic and contested  research 
area.  I have presented  elements of my research findings at six  international conferences 
during the period 2014-2018 (see Appendix D for full listing).  I also attended as a delegate an 
influential two-day conference on Responsible Research and Innovation hosted in the 
European Parliament in 14th-15th January 2016 in Brussels. It offered renowned speakers 
presenting at plenary sessions or chairing workshops such as Arie Rip, Jeroen van de Hoven,  
Richard Owen and  Philip Macnagthen. This event provided for me a richness of insights into 
the emerging and dominant themes for Science and Technology in Society (STS). Specifically, 
insights into EU RRI policy and its potential for facilitating safe and responsible innovation. 
But also evident were the conference frustrations regarding the urgent and unresolved need 
for an RRI operational template for industry, with the provision of a deliberative mechanism 
for responsible innovation. 
The development of my theoretical sensitivity had an impact on my philosophical outlook, 
which had been forged by the critical examination of my personal and professional 
experiences.  My longstanding approach had been one of direct personal observations, with 
careful evaluation of facts, as my way of verifying phenomenon and establishing the truth as 
I see it. This could be categorised as being ‘positivistic’ in my outlook (accepting only that 
which can be personally or scientifically  verified). However, the hybridity of this study has 
necessarily taken me to the previously unknown world of social sciences. When matters have 
become less certain, more fluid and subjective in their interpretations. With a research 
approach that requires a more fundamental understanding of the meaning of experiences 
rather than simply their measurement and management. I would now interpret my  
philosophical stance as more representative of Critical Realism (Bashkar 1979, 1975). This 
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philosophy requires an acceptance that knowledge becomes meaningful by its relationship to 
some worldly entity. The critical realist questions what we are learning about in the world 
itself that makes knowledge possible, and what causal explanations can account for them. 
With that  knowledge and causal explanations being  open to revision by empirical research 
(Hoddy 2018). 
In conclusion, this research project has caused a shifting in my own positionality in response 
to what I have learnt. Whilst I have consciously avoided any overt bias, there may be some 
element of unconscious bias in the conduct and conclusions to be found in this study. One of 
the objectives of applying for research ethical approval is to minimise such an effect which I 
shall briefly discuss next.  
 Ethics  
Research needs to be undertaken within the ethical boundaries of the research organisation. 
The University of Birmingham sets out clear guidelines for the standards of behaviour for the 
researcher conduct in respect of its  integrity, non-maleficence and voluntary nature. Ethical 
approval for this study was given by the University Ethics Committee.  
An important condition for that approval is that the Informed Consent of individual 
participants must be obtained. For this study, anonymity was given without any conditions 
proffered, as was  respecting wishes for prior consent before personal quotation in the thesis 
or future papers (this has not been necessary to date). Every respondent was briefed as to 
the purpose of the interview and a written Informed Consent pro-forma sent with other 
relevant information (see Appendix E). The very high proportion of respondents with a 
doctoral qualification meant little induction was necessary prior to the interviews themselves. 
The voluntary nature of the proceedings were emphasised, confidentiality and anonymity 
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assured, with the offer of a written copy of the transcript to be sent (which was only 
requested once). No issues of ethical significance emerged during the interview process.  
 Conclusions 
The inductive/qualitative/exploratory approach has proven to be suitable, relevant and an  
adaptive component of my research methodology. The semi-structured interviews of 
carefully selected expert respondents has delivered the richness of data that I hoped for. The 
design and construction of the Nvivo data management system proved very time consuming 
but, ultimately worthwhile, in being able interrogate data held within easily accessible codes. 
The Directed Content Analysis demonstrated its suitability as a basis for constructing a novel 
conceptualized framework for the operationalization of RRI within the nano innovation 
process. It also influenced me to see this project as a treasure trove of data to be mined 
carefully and efficiently.  I believe that this has been important and  innovative learning to be 
taken from this research. In addition, there has been an evolution in my own personal 
philosophy, which was unexpected, but has contributed to the personal growth I have 
achieved during this project. 
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Chapter 5: Evaluating the efficacy of the EU 
risk governance of nanomaterials : The Strategy 
for Nanotechnologies from 2004  
 Introduction 
In this first empirical Chapter, I evaluate the efficacy of the EU risk governance approach to 
promote the safe and responsible development of NM [COM(2004)338]. A critical 
assessment of the extent to which risk governance mechanisms are delivering on the 
NanoStrategy’s three key objectives is presented, through semi-structured interviews, with 
experts drawn from the key stakeholder group sample outlined in Chapter 4. The risk 
governance instruments I discussed with these experts included relevant EU policies, 
regulations, and scientific research targeting the specific properties of and the safety 
concerns for  NM.   
I examine here the state of progress towards achieving the EC Strategy’s Objectives 1 and 
2 respectively. Using Rosa, McCright and Renn (2013) Analytical-Deliberative model, I 
classify  these objectives as analytically-oriented ( Table 3-2). Consequently, I have derived 
for each EC policy Objective a corresponding research proposition with which to test the 
primary data from respondents. My intention is to establish the inter-relations between 
the aspirational normative standards set out in the NanoStrategy, and the current on-the-
ground empirical reality of risk governance of NM as perceived by leading industry, 
academic, regulatory and other stakeholders. To do so, I compare the stated objectives of 
the two research propositions with interview responses, enabling the two EC strategy 
objectives to be examined empirically (Saunders et al. 2016; Vaus 2002). The two 
propositions are as follows:  
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Proposition 1 [derived from EC Objective 1] : Current EU chemical safety regulation does  
provide sufficient public environmental health protection from potential risks associated 
with NM. 
Proposition 2 [derived from EC Objective 2]: That novel scientific tools and predictive 
paradigm(s) can provide future confidence for industry and regulators in nano-safety 
decision-making  
I examine the two propositions here in turn to provide in-depth consideration of the 
emerging risk governance of NM in the EU. The propositions-based approach I have 
adopted provides for empirical analysis in a structured manner, facilitating inductive 
reasoning to develop conclusions from the primary interview data.   
The Chapter identifies three broad findings from the empirical research. First is that, in 
overview, nanotechnologies offer the prospect of important future benefits, and that 
concerns for nano-safety may be overstated. However, there continue to be unresolved 
risk uncertainties regarding their potential acute and chronic environmental health and 
safety (EHS) effects (Hemphill 2017; Gottardo et al. 2017). Secondly, interviewees were in 
broad agreement that there are significant deficiencies in the risk governance mechanisms 
of the NanoStrategy to realise ‘safe use’ of NM; in particular, REACH lacks a sufficiently 
robust evidence base to provide regulatory and public confidence over acceptable ‘safe’ 
levels for NM. This is due to the absence of nano-specific risk assessment testing protocols 
within REACH, even though it remains the de facto nano-safety framework for the EU. 
Respondents commented how some EU Member State governments, who were 
dissatisfied with this situation, had pressured the EC to bring forward proposals (published 
in September 2017) for nano-specific testing protocols to be included in revised REACH 
Annexes. Subject to EU Council and Member Sates approval, these will be effective from 1 
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January 2020 (EC DO 56122/02). This is an example of a policy preceding the ability to 
implement its aspirations, with its possible resolution 16 years later from publication. With 
this  policy change for REACH testifying  to the political salience and timeliness of my 
research.  
Thirdly, and following from this second finding, respondents expressed the view that 
current EU chemical safety regulations still do not provide sufficient EHS protection from 
potential risks associated with NM. With the evidence I will demonstrate later, I conclude, 
therefore, that proposition 1 is not fulfilled. In turn, this invites consideration of whether 
novel risk analysis paradigms can be developed that can address the current flawed 
approach to EU NM governance – the contention addressed by Proposition 2. Here, 
interviewees expressed optimism that cutting-edge risk analysis approaches (emerging in 
disciplines such as Systems Biology and (nano)informatics) could provide new frameworks 
for NM safety testing. Though, currently, these lack proof of concept as to how such data 
could be incorporated into regulatory risk assessment , as well as lacking validation of their 
predictive power for in-vivo outcomes. Consequently, interviewees noted that, at present, 
there continues to be a heavy reliance on the criticised traditional single probabilistic 
testing of animals in the laboratory (indeed, this is a mainstay of the revised REACH 
Annexes which indicate that major changes are unlikely in the near future).  
From the testing of both Propositions 1 and 2, I conclude that current EU risk governance 
instruments – and their regulatory and scientific procedures – do not yet provide an 
effective or efficient EU-wide safety and responsibilisation system for NM. However, I do 
show the potential for a novel approach for developing a new risk governance system, 
capable of delivering the key objectives for the NanoStrategy into the 21st century. How a 
revised and updated nano-governance framework might be taken forward is the focus of 
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analysis in Chapter 6. In the meantime, I will now set out how I have undertaken the testing 
and evaluation of the primary data relevant to this Chapter. 
 Evaluating EC Nano Objectives using the two research 
propositions 
The process for the derivation of the two research propositions from the NanoStrategy risk 
governance Objectives 1&2 is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Testing propositions in terms 
of their efficacy requires the recognition of the underlying patterns and relationships 
between these propositions and the qualitative data sets, utilizing the qualitative coding 
(Bryman 2012; Srivastava and Thomson, 2009; Jankowicz 2005; Taylor-Powell and Renner 
2003). Using Direct Content Analysis, I identified risk governance and anticipatory 
governance as the key themes with risk management the major sub-theme. Additionally, I 
identified concepts and variables to provide 27 coding categories for inter alia  current 
regulation, RRI, and risk policy (the themes and codes are given in the Appendix C). I then 
allocated qualitative data, relevant to each code, as a basis for developing explanations to 
confirm or deny the contentions made in each proposition, through exhaustive analysis of 
the primary data set.  As I show, my findings seek not only to explore the emerging 
governance of NM , set out in the EC NanoStrategy, but to also to advance debates in the 
literatures on risk governance and adaptive and integrated systems (see Chapter 3).    
As explained in Chapter 4, I applied an inductive approach to my qualitative data set which 
comprised semi-structured interviews with 55 experts in nanoscience, policy/regulation, 
and industry; supplemented deductive evaluations of other triangulated information.  
A first step in my evaluation is to establish clearly the purpose of the EC strategic objectives 
1, 2 and 3. According to the NanoStrategy, this is to provide a policy and regulatory risk 
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governance framework to promote the safe and responsible development of NM; to be   
achieved by introducing an integrated, coherent EU-wide approach [COM(2004)338]. I 
formalised the EU’s aim diagrammatically as an integrated risk governance model in 
Chapter 4 (Figure 4.3). This Figure illustrates the critical interdependence of the three 
strategy objectives with their interlinking in order to deliver the strategic goal of safe and 
responsible development of NM. Importantly, I would argue, that this model enables the 
identification of the fundamental requirements for any successful NanoStrategy, or indeed 
of governance of any new technology. To take this forward, in this Chapter, I have  
evaluated the empirical data with a view to establishing the extent to which progress has 
been made towards fulfilling NanoStrategy objectives 1 and 2.   
 Evaluating EC Objective 1  
EC Objective 1 seeks to minimise the need for new nano-specific legislation. When the 
NanoStrategy was introduced in 2004, the draft REACH regulations were close to achieving 
final EU Parliamentary ratification (approved 2006, enacted in 2007). Consequently, the 
effect of  this  Objective meant that, rather than implement new nano-specific regulation, 
NM  were included under this generic chemical safety legislation [SEC (2008) 2036]/ [COM 
(2008) 0366 final]. But, as previously mentioned, without nano-specific provisions or 
testing protocols (Bowman 2017), and with regulation proceeding at a faster pace than the 
supporting safety test guideline development and validation. By applying research 
proposition 1, I seek answers as to the effectiveness of this approach in delivering the EU 
nano- safety policy. Drawing on the primary data derived from the 55 interviews, this first 
proposition is evaluated below in three stages. Firstly, I report interviewee’s perceptions of 
the intrinsic hazards and risks posed by NM. This leads to discussion of one of the 
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fundamental guiding principles of EU environmental law, the Precautionary Principle, and 
its application to NM. The third section then considers whether REACH is appropriate for 
regulating NM development safely and responsibly, now and into the future. I then 
summarise findings from the analysis of the data for proposition 1 before moving on to 
consider Proposition 2.  
5.3.1 Intrinsic hazards and risks from Nanomaterials   
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is no experimental evidence supporting the view that NM   
are intrinsically hazardous per se, though, of course, this does not mean that individual NM 
are not toxic if they exceed threshold exposure levels of vulnerable targets. Nevertheless, 
the lack of nano-specific acute toxicity evidence (Nel et al. 2013a) lends credence to 
Proposition 1 that current regulation is effective for nano-safety (although epidemiological 
evidence for chronic, multi-generational effects are little explored). Indeed, as one 
nanotoxicologist pointed out in interview: 
“Until you have gone through everything, and are then willing to set a value, you 
must assume that there is no harm at all [from NM] (Academic interview. 6th 
December 2013).  
This viewpoint (which, interestingly, contradicts the EU precautionary principle approach 
to safety - see 5.3.2 below), was supported by academic respondents (including other 
nanotoxicologists), who asserted that the potential risks from NM were consistently 
overstated. Other sectoral respondents took a less sanguine view, with many emphasising 
that the biggest problem for government, regulators and industry was the continuing 
scientific uncertainty surrounding the safe long-term use of NM and their products. The 
overall consensus amongst interviewees was that continued caution was needed in policy, 
regulatory and scientific terms when regulating NM. This is not surprising bearing in mind 
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the potential unpredictable quantum properties of NM, which do not conform with the 
traditional knowledge frameworks for classical physics and chemistry. As previously 
mentioned, (Chapter 1), Maynard (2007) describes NM development as taking society into 
a new post-chemistry world. This is partly because there is no definitive understanding of 
emerging risks from NM that enables regulators to manage them effectively (Mazri 2017); 
as, indeed, they essentially span all chemistries in the periodic table as well as their 
potential for  infinite variations in sizes, shapes, coatings and multi-component materials. 
Clearly, there is a need to determine acceptable EHS risk standards (e.g. emission/exposure 
levels) for various categories of NM, whilst not under-estimating the challenges in this task. 
As a nano manufacturer pointed out to me:  
“We can make three different types of the same NM in a morning and they will 
have different functionalities. So, what is safe? Am I worried about the safety of 
NM?  No, I am not” (Interview 35. 16th August 2014)  
However, others argued that this technology must achieve a greater level of maturity 
before such judgements are made. What is clear from the above quote (interview 35) is the 
need to understand that changing one or more intrinsic physico-chemical parameters (size, 
shape, electrical charge etc.) on the same NM composition (e.g. metals, metal oxides) may 
potentially impact positively or negatively on its toxicity. This poses the question whether 
there have been exaggerated concerns regarding nano-safety when there are no 
authoritative indicators of long-term risks, which may take many years to emerge, if at all 
(European Risk Forum 2015; Boyd 2015; Hansen 2015; Willetts 2012; De Mauley 2013; 
Lofstedt 2013). This led an EC administrator respondent to observe:   
“I think we have a good understanding of the hazards posed by NM , but we are 
still lacking an understanding of the drivers of toxicity – especially nano-specific 
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toxicity – and whether the argument on bio –accumulation holds, or it doesn’t”  
(Interview 23. 1st April 2014).  
From this respondent’s perspective, therefore, it seems that whilst significant nano-safety 
issues are unresolved, there is no clear evidence of exceptional or specific toxicity from NM   
and their products. This supports the criticism against alleged nano-specific toxicity 
highlighted in the literature (Donaldson and Poland 2013), as the toxicity response may be 
identical to its macro version i.e. indistinguishable, except to possibly magnify the negative 
phenotypic (biological) responses. Nonetheless, there are systemic knowledge gaps that 
can be costly for industry who regard the defining of regulatory acceptable risk levels for 
NM  as crucial to their business performance. By this they mean the referencing of 
approved prescriptive standards (e.g. emission/exposures levels) as a necessity for 
achieving essential pre-marketing legal compliance. Such companies want to be in a 
position where they can achieve chemical safety compliance against validated and 
acceptable legal standards, without the concerns that they will retain the long-term 
responsibility for future liabilities for their products. This puts EU regulators in a difficult 
position as they endeavour to manage the current complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity 
associated with nano-safety over the entire product lifecycle. Prevailing political 
considerations emphasise the socio-economic benefits of nanoscience and technology; yet 
as the respondents above emphasise, this downplays the considerable uncertainties of 
determining acceptable levels of risk ( Jasanoff 2016; Bennet 2014; Maynard 2014).  An 
environmental lawyer stated the industry position to me very succinctly: 
“What industry says it needs is an agreed, reliable, widely recognised evaluation 
system which provides a high degree of assurance regarding the safety of NM and 
their commercialized products” (Interview 18. 20th February 2014) 
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This statement highlights that this industry aspiration has not been achieved, casting doubt 
on the validity of EC Objective 1 and consequently on Proposition 1. However, these 
comments also suggest that expert opinion does not believe NM pose any greater hazards 
than other chemical substances (German Action Plan for Nanotechnology 2020; NanoReG2 
http://www.nanoreg.eu/; COM (2012) 572 Final). Moreover, there are other important 
factors that must be considered before such a definitive conclusion can be drawn. These 
include interviewees perspectives on how EU risk policy for NM interleaves with EU 
environmental policy principles, more generally, and their views of the efficacy of the 
current regulatory instruments for chemical safety – namely REACH – in handling NM. I 
consider these points next.  
5.3.2 Nanomaterials-an over-reliance on the Precautionary 
Principle? 
Beck (1992) asserts that in our contemporary “risk society”, science and innovation co-
produce risks. Likewise, Jasanoff (2016) notes growing recognition that contemporary 
approaches to risk management require social-technical, as much as techno-scientific 
understandings. For example, there is no universal definition of risks from emerging 
technologies that can inform policy makers and regulators in responding to new and 
evolving risks and their management (Mazri 2017). This is particularly true of 
nanotechnology, where the evaluation of risks is riven by uncertainty, complexity and 
ambiguity, to an extent that NM are considered to spill over conventional regulatory 
boundaries (Vaughan 2014; Stokes 2012; Stokes and Bowman 2012, Som et al. 2010). 
Bowman (2017) asserts that the rapid trajectories of nano innovation that are outpacing  
nano-specific regulation is, as a consequence, likely to play only a small part in evolving 
patterns of its governance. That is, nanotechnology does not fit easily into existing political-
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administrative responsibilities, because it is a fluid technology with applications spread 
across diverse socio-technological regimes from the supra-national to the local scale (see 
Figure 1.1, Chapter 1). An EC Administrator summarised the current situation for me as 
follows: 
‘Traditionally, it is the public authorities who take responsibility for evaluating the 
risk. This cannot continue with the emerging technologies’ (Interview 53. 8th March 
2016)   
This comment highlights a critical issue for consideration, namely, what will be the future 
division of labour between industry, government, regulators, academia and society for 
articulating an acceptable level of ‘risk’ from NM? The starting point here is that there is no 
generally adopted definition of acceptable risk by the EU (SCHER 2013). Neither is there an 
EU specific risk paradigm to test risk levels for natural and novel engineered NM (SCENIHR 
2009). The EC has indicated that it expects solutions to come from the scientific community 
with its enormous policy commitment and financial  investment by the  EU in nano-safety 
funded research projects > €200m to date  (NanoSafetyCluster https://www.nano-
safetycluster.eu/)  
 The EU’s default position has been to rely on the Precautionary Principle (PP) as its main 
tool for controlling incertitude for risks from chemicals to human health and the 
environment (EHS). The purpose of the PP is to be actionable to promote proportionate 
measures to resolve threats to prevent significant or irreversible EHS damage (Reber 2018). 
However, an EC briefing to the EU Parliament Environment, Public Health and Food Safety 
Committee, in September 2018, describes the PP as encouraging conservatism with an 
over-emphasis on intrinsic hazard rather than evidence-based risk; and that the PP needs 
to be applied sensibly, rationally and wisely (Committee Briefing on Plant Protection 
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Products 18th September 2018).  According to the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the PP is meant 
to be applied where preliminary objective scientific evaluation indicates there are 
reasonable grounds for concern that potentially dangerous effects on the environment, 
human, animal or plant health may arise that are inconsistent with the high level of 
environmental protection required under Community law [TEU 1992]. This provides the 
rationale for applying the PP, given it is deployed in a proportionate manner (von 
Schomberg 2006).   
The development and international governmental acceptance of the PP approach has had 
a high-profile international genesis (e.g. Rio Declaration 1992). It seeks to build a common 
understanding of how to assess, appraise, manage and communicate risks that science is 
not yet able to evaluate fully (EC Communication on the Precautionary Principle, COM 
2000). The importance of this principle is emphasised by the fact it is highlighted within 
three EU treaties (as detailed in Chapter 3). All of them stress its importance in delivering 
a high level of human health and environmental protection within the European 
Community. PP is normatively defined, in that it applies the Analytical-Deliberative 
framework in its balance of evidence decision-making, by combining scientific evidence 
with deliberative consultation outcomes (von Schomberg 2006; COM2000). Its purpose is 
to identify provisional precautionary measures until further technoscientific, and cost-
benefit analysis has been conducted (Holbrook and Briggle 2014; Von Schomberg 2012, 
2006). Crucially, it is also enshrined within REACH (Article 3), which places a legal obligation 
on chemical manufacturers and importers not to adversely affect human health or the 
environment, with this provision expressly underpinned by requiring the application of the 
PP. 
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Nonetheless, there has been much academic and public debate on the PP’s inappropriate 
application of the PP as a broad hazard- based approach, rather than the scientific, 
evidence -based risk management basis specified in the EC Communication on PP (see for 
example European Risk Forum 2015; Boyd 2015; Hansen 2015; De Mauley 2013; Lofstedt 
2013; Willetts 2012; EC Communication on the Precautionary Principle 2000). Certainly, 
this viewpoint has support amongst nano-industry respondents and interviewees from 
among the chemical industry associations. These respondents believe that the 
overemphasis on ‘precaution’ is detrimental to the EU innovation trajectories for 
nanoscience and technology. Thus, one interviewee from an international chemical 
industry association complained: 
“You are pushing [nano] technology backwards if the concerns are not fully 
understood in terms of their [NM] development. There is too much emphasis on 
the uncertainty and the application of the precautionary approach” (Interview 40. 
13th November 2014) 
This alleged overemphasis on precaution within the EU (see Chapter 2) is shared by other 
sectoral actors as well. This was summarised by industry respondents as an incorrect 
application of the PP, with too much importance attached to speculative hazards (lacking a 
scientific basis), rather than being applied with a scientific evidence base to specifically 
identified endpoints of risk e.g. carcinogenic, mutagenic, reprotoxic (Maynard 2014; COM 
2000). Exemplary of this was one nano manufacturer’s comment that: 
“the main limitation of the PP is that it acts in a merely defensive manner and is 
not capable of providing us with a model of anticipation” (Interview 2. 13th 
February 2013). 
Another industry respondent vented their annoyance to me as follows: 
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“You are pushing technology backwards in terms of development if there is too 
much uncertainty and the application of the PP [is followed unreflectively]“ 
(Interview 14. 2nd October 2013) 
These comments offer important insights into the frustration of industry respondents over 
how the PP is interpreted and applied within the EU. The perception is that it is utilized as 
a ‘stopping’ mechanism, rather than its original purpose which was to establish a ‘holding’ 
position within the continuum of innovation, pending problem resolution (Stirling 2016a; 
Defra Chief Scientific Adviser 2015; UK Chief Scientific Advisor 2014; Pollard and Rocks 
2014). Critics thus allege that hazard avoidance becomes the main concern for the EU, 
rather than the normative qualifier of evidence-based risk concerns (Defra Chief Scientific 
Officer 2015).  
Hemphill (2017) asserts that the PP should not be a stand-alone model; instead, it should 
adopt an ‘anticipatory’ role. The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘precautionary’ using 
such terms as ‘preventative, protective, safety’, but for ‘anticipation’ there is a different 
inference of ‘expectation, prediction, and forecasting’. So, is there a potential for 
‘precaution’ to be modelled more on the lines of ‘anticipation’?  I examine the prospects 
for this in Chapters 6 and 7, where I challenge the perceived shortcomings of the current 
policy which focuses on hazard-based applications of PP, by developing a more anticipatory 
governance approach, which accommodates its deliberative role. Such an approach might 
underpin EC Objective 1 more effectively than current arrangements.   
So far, the discussion identifies significant shortcomings and industry frustrations in the 
manner of the current application of PP within the EU (Interviews 2, 14, and 40). It identifies 
a need for progression from precaution to anticipation in its application, which is 
considered further in subsequent Chapters. But there remains an important preliminary 
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issue that needs examination first. That is, if there is a recognition of a negative over-
application of PP, this may be in response to and symptomatic of a poorly functioning EU 
risk governance and regulatory system for NM. Consequently, this requires the evaluation 
of the current EU regulations in respect of their role and efficacy in providing assurances 
for nano-safety. This demands examination of the role of REACH as the principal EU 
chemical regulatory framework. The key question to be addressed is whether REACH is 
currently structured to provide assurance in NM safety decision-making as required by 
Proposition 1.  
5.3.3 Nanomaterials and REACH 
Applying regulatory-based limitations of one sort or another is the traditional means for 
legislative states to control/restrict innovation practices and minimise risks (Calster and 
Bowman 2002). EC Strategy Objective 1 aims to retro-fit generic chemical safety regulation 
to NM via REACH (COM (2004) 338). However, given that it was not designed to 
accommodate their unique biophysicochemical properties (Vaughan 2014; Stokes 2012; 
Stokes and Bowman 2012, Som et al. 2010), a key question arises as to whether NM exceed 
the boundaries of the REACH regulatory regime? Certainly, there are contentious issues 
with this policy, with the EC Definition of NM a primary example. The current EU definition 
for NM confines their size within the 1-100nm range (2011/696/EU). In their interview, one 
academic explained that the definition is contested due to cellular inability to differentiate 
between minute variations in nanoscale, which undermines current regulatory efficacy.  
“Can biological systems distinguish between 100nmn and 101nm? No! Industry 
will move its particle size if it can get the same functionality from 100nm to 
101nm” (Interview 18, Academic. 5th May 2014). 
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The techno-scientific capability to modify the NM size and size distribution was confirmed 
by one nano manufacturer (interview 35 above), who confided to me that it is 
technologically easy to produce different size variations of the same NM. This means that 
technically manufacturers can deliberately produce particles that evade categorisation as 
NM. To the outsider, this may seem to be a minor matter, but it is important to policy 
makers, researchers, regulators and industry seeking legal clarity and policy coherence.  
The reason is that the manufacturer is the formal REACH registrant who, by experimental 
or other means, determines the physico-chemical properties that are identified in any 
chemical safety dossier submitted for REACH compliance (REACH, Article 14). 
Consequently, it will be the REACH registrant who determines, in advance, whether the 
chemical substance meets or exceeds the EU definition criteria (e.g. whether it is 100nm or 
101nm in size). In interview an EC administrator noted that:  
“The biggest issue for us as regulators is that it is enforceable. We need something 
that is authoritative for the courts” (Interview 27. 10th April 2014)  
 The EC science portal, the Joint Research Centre (JRC), recognises that this metrical 
measurement deficiency needed to be overcome (NanoDefine 2017; JRC 2015). However, 
the latest  word on this comes from a recent paper in Nature Nanotechnology (Vol 14 March 
2019) which provides another strong criticism of the current situation.  It finds that ‘the 
current EU definitions for NM are ill-defined… and pose major and unsolved analytical 
challenges that make it nearly impossible to classify NM  according to EU regulatory 
requirements’ ( Miernicki et al. 2019.p1) 
However, important as this outstanding problem is, there is another more contentious 
issue raised by interviewees, namely REACH’s lack of nano-specific toxicological tests for 
risk assessment.  Without doubt, this was the most significant hindrance raised by 
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interviewees in assuring for public environmental health and safety required to enable EC 
Objective 1.  In fact, this singular deficit has been publicly recognised by the EC (COM (2012) 
572 Final), with further strong criticism driven by the European Parliament that NM safety 
issues are not being fully addressed within the REACH dossiers (COM (2013) 49). 
Surprisingly, considering the time lapse since REACH enactment in 2007, only in October 
2017 were new draft guidelines for scientific testing protocols adapted for NM published, 
even those will not be  enacted until 1st January 2020 (EC DO 56122/02).  
This revision of REACH, coming 10 years after it was enacted, could thus be described as 
dilatory, especially given the strong steers to the EC from public authorities in Germany, 
Austria, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg (Vienna Declaration March 2017).  In 
March 2018, the EC made a further announcement on NM, in its latest review of REACH 
that: 
“While REACH is able to address emerging issues such as the risks from nanoforms 
of substances, the lack of specific information about nanoforms covered by 
REACH registration dossiers remains an issue……..some scientific gaps remain as 
to the suitability of test methods for nanoforms of substances and these are 
addressed in the OECD test guidelines programme” (Commission Staff working 
document accompanying {COM(2018) 116 final}  5th March 2018. p42) 
One might think this further formal acknowledgement of the continuing inadequacies of 
REACH to address NM safety would have led to calls for new nano-specific regulation from 
interviewees. However, my research revealed the opposite. Despite these shortcomings, 
previously recognised by the EC in its ‘Second Regulatory Review of Nanomaterials ‘[COM 
(2012) 572 Final], all the interviewees were unanimous in indicating that none wanted new 
117 
 
nano-specific regulation enacted to supersede REACH. An environmental lawyer explained 
the legal and scientific deficits relating to current NM risk analysis: 
’So, I am anti-new regulation where an existing general framework is capable of 
managing the chemical assessments. There are also problems in that there is no 
gold standard for the reproducibility of the NM, there is a lack of accepted 
ecotoxicological data, lack of professional expertise to advise companies and 
regulators of the possible safety issues from the NM (Interview 17. 11th February 
2014)  
An EC Administrator also underlined for me the responsibility of and difficulty for  industry, 
as REACH registrants, in identifying NM from other macro variants of the same chemical 
substance:   
‘It is very difficult for companies to say which [particles] are nano and which are 
not NM. So, at the moment, conventional methodologies apply. This leaves a very 
large grey area when the registrant wants to say whether it is nano or not. So, 
there have not been very many companies registering for nano substances’ 
(Interview 32. 25th July 2014) 
In fact, only 29 nanoform dossiers were submitted for REACH registration in the period 
2008-18 (Nanotechnology Industry Association 2018). The “very large grey area” the 
respondent mentions here refers to concerns that nano manufacturers may be deliberately 
classifying their chemical form as non-nano so as to avoid the extra resource demands it 
might entail if they declare an NM. An NGO respondent also provides an opinion on this 
matter:  
“The number of NM that have been registered [ for REACH] is low, and the quality 
of the information on those nanoforms is poor” (Interview 55. 7th April 2017) 
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What emerged from these interviews with industry respondents was anecdotal evidence 
of a tacit approach by some small to medium size enterprises (SME) nano manufacturers 
to evade the legal requirements set out in REACH. This is achieved by keeping annual 
production at levels below the legally defined REACH trigger levels for compulsory 
registration (e.g. 1 tonne per annum), so as to avoid invoking this legislative responsibility, 
and also by the possibility of manipulating NM size. This attitude has not been reported in 
other studies in the literature, and it should be noted that this finding is based on a 
relatively small sample size. Nevertheless, such an approach by industry would have a clear 
commercial purpose: namely, to avoid the significant overhead testing costs and delays 
that can result from REACH compulsory testing prior to getting products to market (the 
importance of this issue will be illustrated in Chapter 6). Indicative of this issue are the 
remarks of a SME manufacturer of NPs: 
‘I have kept production levels below the REACH trigger levels so that we are not 
obliged to access REACH. It is complicated and expensive for SMEs. Strangely, the 
prize for growing your company is that it will have to comply with REACH’ (Interview 
35. 16th August 2014). 
The concomitant advantage for industry is that if they follow the REACH testing procedures 
then they are fully compliant with their legal obligation requirement for trading in the EU 
Single Market. However, if their production levels are less than 1 tonne per annum, the 
business and its nanoproducts are exempt from the REACH provisions, but still able to trade 
without hindrance, unless it is a substance of very high concern (REACH, regulation 58). 
Both the Centre for European Policy Studies (2012) and Scruggs et al. (2014) have 
highlighted the disproportionate financial and technical demands on SMEs to achieve 
REACH registration  compared to that for larger industrial concerns. In respect of this study, 
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none of the five SME nano manufacturers interviewed had an annual production level that 
exceeded one tonne per annum. Consequently, none had to bear the expense of submitting 
a REACH registration dossier.  
A related question is whether the unique biophysicochemical characteristics displayed by 
some NM can currently be adequately analysed using REACH protocols. The publication of 
EC draft amendments to the REACH Annexes (September 2017), for nano-specific testing, 
confirms my findings from interviewees’ expressed concerns regarding the lack of efficacy 
of REACH in respect of NM (EC DO 56122/02). As mentioned above, further confirmation 
of this finding is  given in the Commission Staff Working document attached to the EC 
General Report on the Operation of REACH (COM(2018) 116 final), in March 2018, for the 
European Parliament and European Council. ECHA has provided new guidance which 
argues that the REACH Annexe amendments will enable sectoral actors to better 
understand the risk characteristics of NM, how they are used, handled safely, and the 
potential risks to EHS and their management and control (ECHA /NR/18/23).  
Nonetheless, even with the release of new nano-specific guidelines, the fast-pace 
trajectories of nano innovation may result in these new measures not providing timely 
regulatory assurance of nano-safety as required by Proposition 1 i.e. the ‘pacing ‘ problem 
discussed in Chapter 3 (Marchant et al. 2011b). In this context, Jasanoff (2016) poses a 
critical question: how does regulation keep up at the expanding frontiers of science? 
Stirling (2016b) argues that, in these circumstances, any decision-making regarding risk 
levels can only be probabilistic due to the incertitude of current scientific knowledge. This 
was echoed by one EC administrator in interview as follows: 
“The first part is dealing with the uncertainties on the hazard side, such as [NM risk] 
characterization and toxicity testing, then in-vivo and in-vitro[testing], which is part 
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of the risk equation. The second part is exposure, over a long time. The third part 
is to multiply these two, and you obtain the probabilistic risk, then the uncertainties 
can become high” (Interview 19. 21st February 2014) 
Certainly,  the inadequacies in REACH had not gone unnoticed in EU Member States. Also, 
the lack of meaningful responses by industry to the EC Nanocode (2008) for a voluntary 
register of NM highlighted a gap. Prior to the Vienna Declaration (2017), unilateral action 
was taken by some member states to implement an alternative solution to fill the ‘hard 
law’ gaps with National Registers for NM (discussed in detail in Chapter 2). Asked in 
interview about the reasons behind unilateral action of this sort, an EC administrator 
observed: 
“I think it is a combination of the fact that the regulatory process is so slow … and 
the French scheme resulted from them being annoyed that they saw nothing 
happening in Europe… so the Registers have been seen as a way to collect all sorts 
of information without opening the REACH discussions. Nobody wants to open the 
debate on REACH!” (Interview 22. 25th March 2014) 
Not surprisingly, the view among industry respondents was different. All my industry 
interviewees condemned unilateral action by EU member states as expensive for 
companies from a compliance perspective, and laborious and repetitive in terms of data 
collection. In addition, the EC have rejected setting up an EU wide nano register due to its 
high costs (projected at EUR 2.5 billion annually; CASG-Nano Meeting 16th March 2016). 
Instead it has now established an EU Observatory for NM facilitated by ECHA (EU-ON 
7.12.2016), and  operative from 14th June 2017 (ECHA/PR/17/11). The EU Observatory 
offers a web-based portal to curate scientific information on NM which will be an open 
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access platform. However, in interview one NGO respondent expressed doubts to me as to 
its real value:  
“I am not saying it is completely useless, but it is a compilation of existing 
information. The premise is that the what, how much, and where, do not exist and 
are not available. So, the Observatory will not answer any of these questions, nor 
ask any new questions”. (Interview 55. 7th April 2017) 
The implication here is that the EC’s policy response is chiefly about meeting the political 
frustrations of its Member States, rather than enhancing regulatory efficacy. Amongst 
Members States there is disagreement over whether to introduce further national registers 
or support the EU Observatory.  This has had an undermining effect and provides evidence 
of continuing member state disarray on this subject.  This disharmony also evinces a distinct 
lack of confidence in the current EU risk governance instruments and processes for NM 
safety.  It certainly undermines Proposition 1 that those instruments provide a necessary 
assurance of nano-safety. Yet given the trajectories of nano innovation the question 
remains as to how the EU will address risk issues arising from the predicted 2nd, 3rd and 4th 
generation NM (Roco 2005), which will be essential components in the convergence and 
fusion of new technologies predicted for the 4th Industrial revolution (World Economic 
Council 2015) e.g. nanobiotechnology. The policy view within the EC is that REACH will still 
be appropriate (excepting for specialist regimes such as pharma and pesticides), provided 
that the underpinning science supporting the REACH regulation is agreed upon.  On this 
point, an EC administrator respondent commented in interview that: 
“Instinctively, I would think REACH would cover those issues. The reason I say that 
is that whatever the technologies are REACH is technology neutral. The reason is 
that REACH is looking at the products of various technologies. This is always a 
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[biophysicochemical] property-based approach, so when we ask about properties 
of new materials then the features in REACH, the principles of legal obligations, the 
legal process, they apply whatsoever” (Interview 32. 27th  May 2014) 
This could be taken as an overconfident – even complacent – statement, given the many 
criticisms of REACH to date; with the continuing technical and scientific uncertainties in 
respect of the biophysicochemical composition and functional properties of future 
engineered NM. 
Summarising the first part of this Chapter in relation to proposition 1, a number of 
important findings emerge from this analysis of the current NM regulatory landscape.  The 
first point is a fundamental issue of regulatory classification: what is/is not a NM under 
REACH? Although this critical outstanding legal issue is subject to significant research 
investment (e.g. FP7 project NanoDefinehttp://www.nanodefine.eu/), there continues to 
be a lack of applicable metrology and quantifiable metrics for sizing and defining NM 
essential for scientific standardization and regulatory enforcement (Miernicki et al. 2019). 
This metrical difficulty may be a contributory factor for the criticisms regarding the low 
number of classified NM within REACH registrations (interview 55). However, I have found 
anecdotal evidence of deliberate REACH avoidance by some nano manufacturers 
(interview 35 an example). Clearly both these factors undermine the basis of Proposition 1, 
and the fulfilment of EC Objective 1. Secondly, to some extent, this is compounded by the 
‘delayed capture’ of NM within REACH provisions. The regulations have neither captured 
NM efficiently i.e. all NM  in use within the EU ambit, or effectively i.e. evinced validated 
nano risk assessment results for regulatory decision-making (interview 19).  
Yet, it is important to point out here that, with little exception, the respondents were 
opposed to replacing REACH with new nano-specific regulation. Their dispute is not with 
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the principle of nano capture within a  single overarching EU chemical safety regime per se; 
rather, it is centred on their lack of confidence in the current application of REACH to be 
able to provide the necessary assurances for EHS safety. This is an important policy and 
regulatory issue in respect of the ‘rightness’ of drafting EC Objective 1 to require the 
retrofitting of legislation to NM.  This viewpoint again  undermines Proposition 1.  
Thirdly, there is the potential for some NM to be vetted by vertical regulations (regulations 
for food and feed, cosmetics, biocides, pharma etc.) rather than being covered by the 
REACH umbrella. If there is active REACH avoidance by nano-manufacturers (interview 35), 
then within the Taxonomy of Regulation, the higher levels of hard law compliance are also 
undermined, weakening overall prescriptive performance standards (e.g. limiting 
emissions/toxicological exposure levels). Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that 
there has been an unwitting reliance on the PP and the soft law components of the 
Taxonomy ( e.g. self -regulation) to achieve the acceptable risk standards for safe use.  
I conclude from this analysis that, in this post-normal era (Funtowicz and Ravetz  1993), risk 
governance for NM safety will need to look beyond traditional ‘black letter’ regulatory 
measures to ensure effective long-term solutions for nano-safety. This entails further 
exploration of ‘soft law’ approaches (including responsible innovation) as a means of 
addressing the fast trajectories of nano-innovation. In turn, this signposts a move away 
from reliance on traditional top down ‘command and control’ to hybrid forms of ‘hard and 
soft law’ governance (Bowman 2017; Hemphill 2017; Vaughan 2015) as foreseen in the 
Taxonomy of Regulation (Chapter 3,Figure 3.1). This supports Bowman and Hodges (2008. 
p484) contention whereby they argue ‘that nano-specific state regulation is likely to play 
only a small part in risk governance for NM (this is subject to further detailed discussions 
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in Chapter 6). Collectively, I submit that these findings confirm that Proposition 1 cannot 
be efficacious at this time.  
If Proposition 1 cannot be supported, then this demands consideration of the potential role 
to be played by EC Objective 2 for the safe and responsible development of NM. To do so, 
I shall utilize Proposition 2 in the next section to analyse interviewees’ viewpoints on 
whether Objective 2 of the EC Nano Strategy has been fulfilled: namely that “existing 
parameters for EHS chemical safety testing may not be appropriate for the unique 
properties of NM, requiring new methods and tools for risk assessment, and refinement of 
nano scale metrology and standardisation activities”.  
 Evaluating EC Objective 2  
5.4.1 New regulatory spaces: novel nanogovernance to support 
future industry and regulatory safety decision-making  
EC Objective 2 recognises the necessity for new science for EHS chemical safety testing for 
NM due to their unique quantum properties. Thus, Fadeel et al. (2018) clarify the 
continuing major environmental nanoscience challenges relating to the laborious process 
of generating dose-response data for multiple toxicity end-points. Difficulties also arise in 
correlating these results to actual exposure levels within manifold settings e.g. 
occupational, consumer and ecological exposures. This requires investment in the 
experimental development of new risk assessment testing protocols and other 
methodological tools (COMM (2004)338). Substantial scientific financial investment has 
been made by the EC since 2004 into nano safety research projects, but the development 
of these new tools, for measurement and modelling, is still incomplete (NanoSafetyCluster 
Winter Newsletter 2018). The intention is that these novel models for predictive 
toxicological and exposure-based decision-making can provide solutions to the on-going 
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debate as to how ‘acceptable risk’ from NM can be  scientifically articulated and evaluated. 
In addition, the new testing methods could provide for early warnings, requested by the 
European Environment Agency (EEA 2013), which are faster, more economical and ethically 
sounder than current traditional animal testing (e.g. OECD (2018c) Test 413: sub-chronic 
toxicity: 90-day inhalation mammalian testing).  
Currently, there is no EU definition of risk from NM (SCHER 2013).  As significant, there is 
no specific risk paradigm to test natural and emerging engineered NM (SCENIHR 2009). 
Consequently, the default approach used across the EU is to consider each nano risk profile 
separately, and to design bespoke scientifically complex toxicological testing scenarios. This 
is costly in time and resources e.g. OECD (2018c) Test 413 and relies on the ethically 
doubtful traditional animal testing. As one SME nano manufacturer commented to me:  
‘Current toxicological testing is not fit for purpose. [It is just] too time 
consuming and expensive’ (Interview 24. 16th August 2014) 
Among my interviewees, there was a cross-sectoral consensus that a new approach to 
toxicological testing is now essential. Not only because of excessive resource and time 
costs, but for the ethical benefit of reducing vertebrates testing in accordance with REACH 
(Regulation 33), and the EU ‘3Rs’ policy (Directive 2010/63/EC). However, providing new 
scientific based Integrated Alternative Testing Strategies (IATS), that address the industry 
frustrations articulated above (interview 24), requires a robust analytical framework that 
can evaluate evidence-based risk to determine EHS threats (Rodricks and Levy 2013). 
Additionally, all new tests must undergo an extensive process under the auspices of EU 
Reference Laboratory for Alternatives to Animal Testing ( EURL ECVAM 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/eurl/ecvam). The parameters for this framework must 
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incorporate the context of the risk, the inherent risk characteristics of the toxicant, and the 
exposure levels to that vulnerable agent (OECD 2003).  
The extant literature also identifies that any new approach must address substantive, 
procedural and interpretive aspects of risk analysis. Only then can the ‘weight of evidence’ 
be provided to strengthen the results-based legitimacy for risk management of NM 
(Gottardo et al. 2017; Jahnel 2015b; Hristozov et al. 2014; SCENIHR 2012). Crucially, this 
would address the fundamental test set by Jasanoff (2016) that any aggregation of harms 
must remain within socially tolerable boundaries.  
Taking these issues together provided the basis for the second Proposition examined in this 
Chapter which is that “Novel risk analysis paradigm(s) can provide high levels of public 
confidence in nano-safety for industry, regulators and civil society, now and into the 
future’. 
I draw upon interviews to assess the prospects for the development and application of 
these prospective novel solutions, to replace the existing testing regimes, in the following 
sections. 
5.4.2 The prospect for novel risk assessment paradigms to replace 
traditional regulatory decision-making tools 
In interviews, respondents acknowledged that there is a lack of confidence in the current 
format for traditional toxicological testing for NM and were receptive to the idea of finding 
viable alternative options. This was evident in the consensus across sectoral groups that 
future nano risk assessment lies within novel paradigms for toxicological testing derived 
from new life science discoveries (e.g. Systems Biology, Omics). The aim behind these 
approaches is that traditional laboratory observational testing on vertebrates and lower 
level organisms can be minimized or eliminated. The IATS procedures could replace animal 
127 
 
testing with predictive profiling of cellular nanotoxicity using high throughput mechanised 
testing of NM inoculated cell lines (JRC 2014; Oomen et al. 2014; Whelan 2014). If 
successful, this process would enable identification of disruptive cellular metabolic Adverse 
Outcome Pathways (AOP), with their causal observable and measurable Mode(s) of Action 
(MoD) (Stone et al. 2017; JRC 2014; OECD 2013; WHO 2009). The goal of using these new 
procedures would be to extrapolate the measured outcomes to determine risks to human 
and environmental health (Rovida et al. 2014; SCHER 2013). Hence, AOPs offer a new 
methodology for describing toxicological hazards, based on mechanistic profiling, rather 
than an association with traditional pathological endpoints (e.g. carcinogenic, mutagenic, 
reprotoxic). Additionally, it relies on nanoinformatics and modelling approaches whereby 
the toxicity profile of an unknown NM can be predicted from the existing data on other 
NM, via, for example, quantitative structured activity relationships (Q)SARS) or artificial 
intelligence approaches. 
Interviewees provided a variety of responses, on whether such an approach might provide 
enhanced predictive accuracy for nano risk decision-making and contribute to the 
fulfilment of Proposition 2. To frame my discussion with selective respondents, I chose an 
exemplar toxicological paradigm (Figure 5.1 below), previously seen and discussed in detail 
in Chapter 2, which proved to be a successful prompt for our discussions. My purpose was 
to canvas expert views on its future value as a tiered sequencing predictive tool, with a 
view to replacing traditional animal based observational toxicology utilizing current OECD 
risk assessment protocols. In summary, the purpose of this novel toxicological model is to 
provide a systematic and measured approach for the tiering of potential hazard levels (low-
medium-high).  
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 I will  briefly recap that the starting point is curated nano safety and nanoinformatics tools 
which leverage these datasets, and which assist in the design of mechanistic cellular testing 
of different concentrations of NM. This would enable detection of potential AOPs, and their 
causal MoDs due to toxicant effects from NM. The data sets would then be analysed in-
silico for decision-making as to predictive hazard levels( low-medium-high). Models and 
tools of this nature are currently under development in a number of H2020 projects 
including: 
NanoDefinehttp://www.nanodefine.eu/,SmartNanoToxhttp://www.smartnanotox.eu/),N
anoGenToolshttp://www3.ubu.es/nanogentools/),NanoCommons(https://www.nanocom
mons.eu/). Similar predictive models on release and exposure are currently under 
development e.g. FP7 projects GUIDEnano http://www.guidenano.eu/, and H2020 projects 
CaliBRATE http://www.nanocalibrate.eu/home, and NanoFASE http://nanofase.eu/. 
Further decisions can then be made and actioned as to whether lower level sentinel 
organisms or even vertebrate testing becomes necessary, leading to the initiation of a 
higher tier testing of the NM.  
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Figure 5.1. Implementation of toxicological profiling using a tiered approach for risk identification 
and characterization: source Nel et al.. 2013 
 
 
The scientific issues for this model have been discussed in detail earlier (see Chapter 2). 
Importantly, the regulatory groundwork for the incorporation of such integrated 
alternative toxicological testing protocols into EU legislation is already in place within the 
REACH regulations; whereby the offer for alternative testing protocols to be submitted for 
approval is mentioned in a number of occasions within the regulations including REACH 
Articles 1 & 13. However, to date a full  consideration of this approach has not yet been 
made by a cross-section of industry, regulatory and academic stakeholders, which is what 
I undertake in the following section.  
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5.4.3 Policy, regulatory and industry attitudes to novel risk 
assessment paradigms for nano-safety 
Article 13 (1) of REACH states that any scientific information generated for human toxicity 
should be generated, whenever possible, by means other than vertebrate animal tests - for 
example, using in vitro methods or qualitative or computer generated Quantitative 
Structured Activity Relationships (QSAR models).  An interviewee from a national chemicals 
industry organisation voiced support for this approach as follows:  
‘We support the 3Rs work, which you may be familiar with. Very much so. We must 
reduce the number of animals tested and reduce animal testing.  We need to use 
animals sparingly and not just when we need to obtain [regulatory] testing. They 
apply the “Crack-it” approach to set a hypothesis and then solve the problem 
without animal testing strategies. A lot of it is about validation testing. Even with 
high throughput screening there is a need for much validation still to be done’ 
(Interview 12. 2nd October 2013) 
The group testing of chemicals, with similar biophysicochemical properties/ structures 
shows promising possibilities for NM, which could result in improved financial and 
temporal economy for risk decision-making and moving away from animal testing as 
proposed by interviewee 12). The NM need to display a common system of 
biophysicochemical characteristics, such as shape, size surface charge (intrinsic factors), 
and/or solubility, agglomeration/aggregation (extrinsic factors); a common set of exposure 
scenarios, or applications within a specific type of consumer product e.g.  cosmetics. (ECHA 
2017; Stone et al. 2017; Jahnel 2015a, 2015b; Oomen 2013; Stone et al. 2013). Such an 
approach is supported within the EC and the JRC; thus, a senior EC Administrator explained 
their position: 
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‘So, we are now moving towards an artificial grouping of NM. This is a response to 
problems which have not yet appeared. We are trying to find a reply to a problem 
which we have not yet seen‘  (Interview 19. 21st February 2014) 
However, it was evident that other Commission interviewees had reservations concerning 
reliance on these novel experimental techniques to inform regulatory practice:  
‘We don’t have problem with Grouping or Categorization of materials or Read- 
Across. What we do have a problem with is if you jump too fast ahead, with some 
of these approaches when you do not have the evidence base, then we have a 
concern.  As you might simply be paying lip service to the safety issues of the NM. 
That industry will use any data that they have and claim it. We do not believe that 
industry have taken all the opportunities that they might have done so. We believe 
that they could have put more effort into gathering evidence which would give 
much more comfort regarding [Grouping] and READ Across’. (Interview 22. 25th 
March 2014) 
Interestingly, this caution is evident in the guidance published by ECHA (2017), which 
restricts  the Grouping approach to nanoform variants of the same chemical substance (e.g. 
copper, titanium, or zinc nano variants). ECHA does not yet support applying this concept 
to such a mixture of these different substances for chemical safety testing utilizing the 
QSAR, Grouping and Read-across methodologies (ECHA/NA/17/12). Nevertheless, REACH 
aspires to avoid animal testing, with vertebrate testing as the last , not the first, resort ( 
Article 25(1). It already has a European Parliamentary approved regulatory mechanism 
within which new risk analysis paradigms can be adopted and implemented (REACH Article 
1(1) and Article 13(1)). But there is still the crucial caveat that policy, scientific and 
regulatory barriers still need to be overcome in terms of ‘proof of concept’ for regulatory 
acceptance, legal compliance and industry adoption.   
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I found that there was strong support for this new paradigm of predictive toxicology from 
all interviewees in the environmental nanoscience sphere. For example, one environmental 
nanoscientist noted that:   
“There is currently a drive to optimise nanotoxicity testing methodologies, to avoid 
poor practices, such as overdosing in animal experiments. Furthermore, novel 
approaches that enable, for example, fast, parallel, in vitro- testing high throughput 
screening are becoming widely used” (Interview 43. 21st November 2014).  
However, without exception, those most familiar with the new techniques opined that the 
new assays and models  need proofing by further scientific experimentation, assessment 
of predictive capability relative to in-vivo studies, and validation via inter-laboratory 
comparison before it can be said to be able to provide authoritative and, critically, 
reproducible answers for industry and regulators. The most important deficit is the lack of 
validated data sets to provide the required confidence for regulatory certainty in risk 
assessment (Lynch 2017). This new toxicological model is predicated on being able to 
identify the AOPs for specific NM and their causal MoA which contributes to the 
biochemical failure of cells (JRC 2014; Vinken et al. 2014; OECD 2013, 2012c). Scientific 
confidence needs to become much higher to be accepted by ECHA. Thus, an industry 
respondent, whose global chemicals company had spent 3 million euros on alternative 
testing to animal studies, explained to me the important issues of predictive accuracy, and 
the conservatism of ECHA towards them: 
“We consider that in-vivo studies are 90% accurate for human prediction effect.  
We see that in-vitro [assays] are as least as good in respect of predictivity, but it is 
not that good for looking at the data and seeing that it is clear cut. Perhaps no 
better than 80%, at its very best……. The regulators, in the end, such as ECHA, if 
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they take the results of the animal study, they are covered.  If they take something 
new, then they take all risks” (Interview 47, 3rd December 2014).  
This statement neatly summarises the dilemma currently facing EU regulators. This novel 
but not fully proven paradigm has exciting predictive potential. Yet, civil society expects 
that ECHA must have confidence beyond reasonable doubt (criminal evidential test) before 
they would accept and then approve new chemical safety testing protocols for 
incorporation into the REACH process. In respect of Proposition 2, it can be concluded that 
regulatory confidence for enhanced predictive capacity does not yet exist.  Interviewee 47 
above makes this critical point that if EHS harms emerge due to inadequately accurate 
testing protocols, then the regulators will have to take their share of blame too. Not 
surprisingly, their stance is one of conservatism until substantive proof of concept and 
validation through the standard processes is available to them.  
In conclusion, this highly significant new scientific model has the potential for a paradigm 
shift in toxicological testing for NM. It has the potential to address directly the pragmatic 
issues raised under EC Objective 2 in a novel manner which has a prospective future for, as 
yet, unheralded techno-scientific advances in nanoscience and technology.  As I have 
shown, it has the potential to trigger a cognitive transition from concerns of vague 
unspecified potential hazards to more specific EHS risk scenarios and/or endpoints i.e. to 
move from vague speculative risks to specific plausible risks (Sutcliffe 2015, Maynard 2014). 
There continues to be substantial EC investment in necessary scientific experimentation to 
underpin these novel approaches, with substantive advances in underpinning systemic 
knowledge for these new methodologies for nano risk assessment (NanoSafetyCluster 
Winter Newsletter 2018 https://www.nano-safetycluster.eu/).  
134 
 
Nonetheless, I detected a palpable sense of anticipation, amongst industry actors, that 
these emergent scientific techniques can better inform future nano risk and regulatory 
decisions. This is intended to be achieved by offering to industry enhanced regulatory 
flexibility, agility and greater predictive certainty than the existing REACH protocols. For 
example, the experimental development of mechanised cellular testing techniques has the 
potential to provide more responsive, accurate and cost-effective answers both for 
industry and their regulators. This could provide much earlier warnings of product failure 
before technological lock-in occurs. There is also the added deontic benefit of reducing 
animal testing as promoted within EU policy and regulation [EC Directive 2010/63/EC; 
REACH Articles 13(1) & 25(1)].   
Nonetheless, the challenges for these new techniques, which are still scientifically and 
temporally distant, is how the high throughput datasets can be integrated into routine risk 
assessment and regulation.  Consequently, the conclusion I draw is that Proposition 2 is not 
fulfilled, and that the intent of EC Objective 2, for new validated risk assessment methods 
and tools, has not yet been achieved. This is despite the significant research investment 
and scientific progress made recently, which does, however, promise much for the future. 
On this last point, I offer a final comment from a  nano manufacturer:  
‘They are looking at a different paradigm which is far more logical and will lead to 
a result which we can use; rather, than the response that we must use the 
traditional methods and it will be £5m and 5 years to complete. Anything that has 
a faster throughput process, faster screening process, and allows me, as a NM 
producer, to assess 43 different choices, and allows me to identify the best choice 
to focus my attention is the right way forward’ (interview 35. 16th August 2014). 
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 Conclusions  
In this Chapter, based on exhaustive discussions with interviewees, particularly from 
industry, regulatory and academic backgrounds, I have sought to develop plausible means 
for moving regulation, and its supportive sciences, forward to resolve the critical issues 
identified in relation to current and future public environmental health risk management 
for NM. My analysis has resulted in a number of key findings.  
First is the general dissatisfaction with the current structure and application of REACH in 
respect of ensuring nano-safety, with its questionable ability for accurate exposure-driven 
risk analysis. Symptomatic of the current dissatisfaction, is the criticism of a compensatory 
over-application of the PP, as a ’stopping’ rather than ‘holding’ mechanism in nano 
innovation, in response to this regulatory deficit. An industry respondent (interview 2) 
claims that it acts in a merely defensive manner and is not capable of providing us with a 
model of anticipation. In response, I argue that there is a possibility for a movement along  
the ‘precaution to anticipation’ spectrum which I develop further in Chapter 6. This 
proposal  can address the current  criticism of PP and would allow it to revert to its original 
purpose as an analytical-deliberative driven ’holding’ mechanism when risk uncertainly is 
detected.   
The second important finding is paradoxical in that it seems to contradict this first finding.  
Thus, interviewees from all backgrounds were unanimous that there should not be any new 
nano-specific regulations to resolve the current dissonance concerning REACH and NM. 
This finding is explained by an environmental lawyer (interview 17) who summarised 
opposition to new nano regulation on the grounds that the existing general EU chemical 
safety framework should more adaptive and integrative in its capability for nano risk 
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assessment. This key research finding is now reflected in the policy amendments proposed 
by the EC publication in its draft revised REACH Annexes for nano-testing (EC DO 56122/02). 
Even more recently, the EC General Report on the Operation of REACH (March 2018) 
concluded that there are some scientific gaps remain as to the suitability of test methods 
for nanoforms of substances, and these are being  addressed in the OECD test guidelines 
programme. 
An EC interviewee clarified this position (see interview 32 above), noting that the EC 
believes that REACH is technologically neutral and can be adapted to any future relevant 
biophysicochemical developments in science and technology. The effect intended by the 
amended REACH Annexes is that REACH will be structured to more accurately assess 
potential risks from NM and, by doing so, will meet the requirements of Proposition 1 at 
some time in the near future.  
A third important policy issue presented in this Chapter is that there is cross -sectoral 
consensus from respondents that current traditional animal based observational 
toxicological testing regimes are no longer appropriate and need to be phased out. This 
position is not only in response to long standing ethical issues, as found in the EU 3Rs policy, 
but due to emerging scientific doubts that the single probabilistic test results may be flawed 
in predicting long term nano risks and nano-enabled products, due to incorrect scientific 
assumptions and epistemic gaps (Stirling 2016a, Jahnel 2015b). So, what is proposed to 
address anticipated nanoforms emerging to future markets, is the development of novel 
predictive risk analysis regimes. These IATS predictive methods replace traditional single 
probabilistic testing regimes by utilizing multiple data sources (Linkov 2007) and provide a 
‘weight of evidence’ for decision-making (EFSA 2018; Gottardo et al. 2017; Jahnel 2015b; 
Hristozov et al. 2014; SCENIHR 2012). This new approach was endorsed by one 
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environmental nanoscientist (interview 43), who predicts that future risk assessments will 
be by fast, in-parallel, in-vitro testing utilizing high throughput cellular screening, rather 
than traditional in-vivo testing. This will also have the additional deontic benefit that higher 
order vertebrate testing becomes a last resort and not the first (European Chemicals 
Agency 2017; Rauscher et al. 2017; Oomen et al. 2015; Valsami-Jones and Lynch 2015; JRC 
2014). This chimes with the aspirations incorporated within the REACH regulations (Articles 
13(1) and 25(1)) and confirms that there are no legislative barriers to prevent progress 
towards integration of these initiatives into current regulations. 
These prospective paradigm(s) changes (see Figure 5.1) promise a future of faster, flexible 
and more economic risk assessment tools and techniques. This is founded on the ‘weight 
of evidence approach’, which will be accessible to researchers, industry and regulators. In 
addition, it will allow the new scientific techniques of ‘Grouping’ and ‘Read-across’ with in-
silico decision-making to be applied to NM. This will be subject to specific criteria, as a 
supplementary methodology, to hasten the risk assessment process and aid the 
acceleration from discovery to market. This promise of ‘Grouping’ NM together for risk 
analysis, is recognised by an Industry respondent (interview 12) and supported by EC policy 
makers (interview 19 & 22). Though, as yet, with a restricted application by ECHA to 
variants of single nanoforms rather than mixtures of NM (ECHA/NA/17/12).  
These new approaches with their ‘low cost risk-analysis’ advocated by Maynard (2015. 
p200), can also have the effect of encouraging new investment in novel NM and their 
applications with the promotion of nano-entrepreneurship. This can further assist in 
avoiding the Collingridge dilemma (1980) of implementing policy controls which stifles 
investment with the potential loss of genuine techno-societal benefits. I also believe that 
the predictive potential of this new paradigm provides an opportunity to offer a more 
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anticipatory approach in future proofing nano-safety than is currently reflected in the 
current EU precautionary culture. Consequently, these new paradigm(s) can be viewed as 
positive steps in supporting both Propositions 1 and 2. But it has to be remembered that 
this is disruptive and ground -breaking regulatory science sitting at the edge of the frontiers 
of nanoscience and technology knowledge and understanding. So, such approaches may 
have their frailties in achieving proof of concept in ensuring that regulation is keeping pace 
with rapid nanotechnology trajectories. The consequence of a lack of validated alternative 
testing approaches was pointed out by an industry respondent (interview 47), who 
expressed the view that ECHA will, therefore, continue to rely on animal studies until this 
further proving is achieved. The same respondent explains that this is due to the fact that 
this long-established ECHA modus operandi provides the least organisational exposure for 
them to public censor of their regulatory decision-making.  
So, the reliance on the single probabilistic testing methodologies is likely to continue for 
the time being, even with the doubts as to whether such tests realistically provide safety 
assurance for the whole of the (un)anticipated NM product lifecycle. Consequently, based 
on the discussion in this Chapter, I present in Figure 5.2 below, an outline schematic for a 
tiered novel predictive risk analysis methodology, which has emerged from the discussions 
above, showing how it might be incorporated within regulatory decision-making. 
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Figure 5.2. A potential approach for applying novel predictive sciences for industry hazard and  
exposure risk analysis and regulatory decision-making 
In essence, Figure 5.2 summarises visually the findings from this Chapter, as derived from 
the empirical data extracted from my cross-sectoral expert interviews. It illustrates the 
sequential approach for nano safety testing that is being proposed in the new toxicological 
paradigm. The first step is the evaluation of current scientific and safety-related knowledge 
by accessing curated nanoinformatics and, at this stage, it may be possible to eliminate any 
potential threats from the NM. If not, then the sequence of testing described in Figure 5.1 
above is undertaken. At each stage, an evaluation is undertaken as to whether safety 
questions have been answered satisfactorily, or further testing is needed or justified with 
animal subjects. The consequent risk analytics from the testing will provide datasets on 
which industry risk management and EU regulatory decision-making can be based. This may 
require further R&D responses by the manufacturer and/or action by regulator, or the 
information is archived for future referencing.  
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The analysis in this Chapter has thus covered the ground relating to the current EU risk 
governance framework for NM, its shortfall in addressing EHS gaps, and potential novel 
scientific analytical solutions for a faster and more robust determination of the risk and 
regulatory decision-making. I have demonstrated that the criticisms of REACH, and its PP 
underpinning, indicate that it does not yet satisfy Proposition 1 in providing assurances for 
nano-safety though there are now EC proposals tabled for its fulfilment from 1st January 
2020 (with scientific efforts to ensure the availability of validated test guidelines and 
guidance currently underway e.g. Malta Project https://www.nano-
safetycluster.eu/news/324/15/The-Malta-Initiative.html). I have also discussed the 
criticism that the PP is used too defensively within the EU and is not deployed in an 
anticipatory role. Following this conclusion, I suggest that there is the potential to progress 
‘precaution’ approaches along the spectrum towards ‘anticipatory’ actions, which  I will 
develop further in Chapter 6.  
I have discussed in detail the novel toxicological paradigm for NM predictive risk analysis 
and concluding that there is a genuine potential to replace single probabilistic animal 
toxicological testing with a ‘weight of evidence’ approach. This indicates that Proposition 2 
is currently unfulfilled as the novel paradigm(s) must provide high levels of public 
confidence in nano-safety for industry, regulators and civil society, now and into the future. 
This is not yet forthcoming but, nevertheless, I believe a paradigm shift in the modus 
operandi for NM regulatory sciences, based on these novel tools and techniques, is the  
future. Once achieved, it will provide impetus for REACH to progress to meet the industry 
aspiration (interview 18) for an agreed, reliable, widely recognised evaluation system with 
a high degree of assurance for nano-safety. 
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In the meantime, there will continue to be a reliance on industry acting in a voluntary  
responsible manner towards nano-innovation i.e. at the lowest level in the hierarchy of the  
Taxonomy of Regulation. In the next Chapter, I discuss how this reliance could be 
transformed into a more formal industry commitment to regulators and civil society by 
promoting  Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) within a Safety by Design (SbD) style 
process, and their integration into the  product development process and regulatory 
framework. 
 
 
142 
 
Chapter 6: Taking forward the anticipatory 
governance approaches for nanomaterial 
innovation  
 Introduction 
Building on from Chapter 5, here I examine how the governance gaps identified in the 
preceding analysis of EU nano risk policy might be bridged. This Chapter’s starting point is 
that whilst there was widespread consensus amongst stakeholders on the need for safe 
innovation of NM, that pose no or tolerable risk to public health and the environment, 
innovating responsibly is likely to be much more controversial because of its socially 
constructed nature.  Consequently, here I undertake an examination of the possibilities for 
decision-making on nano innovation changing from reliance on traditional risk calculations 
made by experts, to additionally incorporating the risk perceptions of publics in the final 
decision-taking (Rozell 2018).  
I do so first by presenting empirical evidence from the cross-sectoral interview sample on 
obstacles and barriers to realising EC Objective 3 of the EC NanoStrategy.  Importantly, these 
interviews covered not only how the PP might be augmented, to address the need for high 
levels of public health protection, but also discussed how the ethical dimensions of the 
innovation and development of NM could be tackled. Based on interviewee responses, I then 
seek to develop a policy approach capable of addressing EHS concerns and embedding socio- 
ethical values within EU NM innovation and development. The intention is to align these 
processes more closely with the values, needs and expectations of civil society (cf. Rome 
Declaration 2014).   
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Consequently, I identify the Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) concept as a 
cornerstone for elaborating my proposed approach to EU risk governance. The growing 
importance of RRI was confirmed by its formal adoption by the EU  first in Horizon 2020 and 
then in the Rome Declaration (2014). Whilst there are a number of policy, academic and 
industry definitions of RRI extant in the literature (e.g. Owen et al. 2013; Stilgoe et al. 2013; 
Von Schomberg 2013; European Industrial Research Management Association 2015), here I 
adopt the Rome Declaration (2014.p1) definition as : 
 “Societal actors work together during the whole research and innovation process 
in order to better align both the process and its outcomes with the values, needs 
and expectations of European Society” (cf. European Commission 2012b).  
Mertens (2018) sets out three reasons why RRI can be an effective tool for intervening in 
product innovation. First is that it can address radical novelty and unpredictability which 
requires early assessment; secondly, this early assessment can influence and amend 
innovation trajectories; and, finally, anticipation of unknowns prepares for unpredictable 
futures. Reber (2018) describes RRI as being driven by technology mediated interactions 
with stakeholders. Notwithstanding these possibilities, the main barrier to applying RRI in 
an industry setting is that it does not have a recognised policy mechanism for 
implementation (Burget et al. 2017; Goujon 2016, Antelo 2016; Blok and Lemmens 2015; 
Wickson and Carew 2014). Consequently, this Chapter seeks to develop a practical 
mechanism to implement RRI within a holistic Analytical-Deliberative model for NM 
development (see Figure 6.6).  I do this in steps in this Chapter by synthesising insights from 
RRI with other decision-making models.   
The PP plays an important role in developing the Chapter’s argument as it underpinned RRI’s 
origins and emergence (cf. Reber 2018, Genus and Iskandarova 2018, Von Schomberg 2013), 
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as both PP and RRI are designed to be both precautionary and anticipatory. As I show later, 
both are also suited to inclusive multi-level stakeholder participation. Related work by 
Gottardo et al. (2017), Kraegeloh et al. (2018) and Suarez-Marino et al. (2017) also identifies 
the PP as a precursor to the closely related ‘Safety by Design’ (SbD) concept that seeks to 
eliminate (and if not eliminate to control) EHS risks at the design stage of products. 
Importantly, these authors assert that SbD provides an exemplary platform for the timely 
identification of nano-innovation uncertainties and risks (Jantunen et al. 2018).   
In developing this conceptual model from work set out in the previous Chapter, I argue that 
as PP is the critical EU treaty bounded principle for preventative health and environmental 
protection, and is closely related to the evolution of both RRI and SbD concepts, it offers a 
powerful high-profile policy instrument for harnessing RRI and SbD in tandem to address the 
stated  goals of the EC NanoStrategy. Therefore, in this Chapter, I propose an 
implementation model that combines these conceptual approaches to enhance anticipatory 
action to modulate EU NM innovation and development (Fisher et al. 2006), but with more 
clearly defined democratic processes (Kraegeloh et al. 2018; Flipse et al. 2018). By doing so, 
it sets out the foundations for a co-sharing of responsibility for nano innovation ( van de Poel 
and Robaey 2017). It further reinforces that responsibility role by ensuring that all 
reasonable means are applied to gain knowledge on potential risks before the  technology 
is introduced to market ( van de Poel 2016). 
As discussed in Chapter 4, I derived from each EC policy objective a corresponding research 
proposition, which I use here to establish the inter-relations between the aspirational 
normative standards for EU nano policy as set out in the Strategy, and the current on-the-
ground empirical reality of risk governance of NM as perceived by leading stakeholders. Here 
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I compare and contrast EC Objective 3, and its corresponding research proposition, with 
interview responses to enable my empirical analysis.  The third proposition is as follows: 
Proposition 3 [derived from EC Objective 3]- ‘RRI can act as an anticipatory governance 
mechanism for embedding socio-ethical values for safe design  within  nano-innovation’.  
I examine the practical implications of this third proposition on NM development through 
in-depth consideration of interviewee responses drawn from the cross-sectoral survey to 
provide rich empirical analysis in a structured manner. The primary data shows that the 
application of RRI and SbD within nano innovation receives strong cross-sectoral support, 
though industry representatives were less enthusiastic. I identify reasons for this industry 
attitude, noting that these probably originate in the day-to-day technoscientific, financial 
and market driven pressures on SME nanomanufacturing businesses. The Chapter also 
highlights the contrasting socio-cultural norms over what is meant by acting ‘responsibly’ in 
the innovation context and considers the role of financial and other incentives as a policy 
response.   
I argue that a solution to this impasse may lie in recasting SbD as a policy mechanism to 
inculcate RRI into everyday business practice. Thus, rather than having a single normative 
‘safety’ function within NM product development (van de Poel and Robaey 2017), I propose 
the pragmatic deployment of SbD to engineer change in business management, reorient 
product development, and to encourage wider social learning among industry and 
regulatory actors.  I contend that this novel approach would also be assisted by introducing 
a systematic linear stage-gating process to help mitigate the traditionally ‘messy’ business 
process for nano-innovation (Gottardo et al. 2017; NanoReG2 http://www.nanoreg.eu/; 
Cooper 2001). While EU funded research projects present SbD as an undifferentiated 
procedure based solely on regulatory ‘safety’ (NanoReG2 http://www.nanoreg.eu/;ProSAFE 
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http://www.h202-prosafe.eu/), I argue that this misunderstands the potential opportunity 
for harnessing RRI and SbD in tandem to develop a normatively driven ‘design’ profile for 
NM , co-produced with civil society, and conterminously with a more traditional ‘safety’ 
profile. This approach would be driven practically by PP, RRI and SbD acting in combination. 
I designate the novel outcome of this synthesis of approaches as ‘Safety by Social Design’ 
(SbSD).  
In the latter part of the Chapter, I argue SbSD would offer an adaptive and integrated multi-
modal approach, combining quantitative experimental risk analysis data with qualitative 
data derived from deliberative processes. It foregrounds RRI’s role in industry, by taking it 
from a position of being relatively invisible to operationalizing it within the SbSD process. In 
turn, this provides a foundation for fulfilling the expectations for RRI to shape ‘design 
strategy’ for nano-innovation, as envisioned by von Schomberg (2013). SbSD could thus 
facilitate meaningful engagement of socio-ethical values for ‘safe design’ into nano-
innovation as a means of fulfilling EC Objective 3.  The starting point for this new conceptual 
and practical approach is the empirical analysis of cross-sectoral interview data, and the 
framework for this is described in the next section.  
 Proposition and conceptual basis for analysing the 
empirical data 
As in Chapter 5, here I examine qualitative interview materials drawing on the relevant 
literature and conceptual models identified in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.  To do so, the patterns 
and relationships between the secondary data and my study goals have been formulated 
into Proposition 3. In review, this states ‘RRI can act as an anticipatory governance 
mechanism for embedding socio-ethical values for safe design within nano-innovation. I 
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define anticipatory governance as ‘a broad-based capacity extended through society that 
can act on a variety of inputs to manage emerging knowledge-based technologies while such 
management is still possible’ (Guston 2014. p225). This process includes ideas in anticipatory 
ethics, future-oriented responsibility, upstream public engagement and deliberation (Hester 
et al. 2015).   
The Rome Declaration(2014) notes RRI is a procedure that could potentially play an 
important role in EU policymaking on innovation in cutting-edge technologies such as NM. 
The Declaration proposes the encouragement of societal actors to share responsibility in the 
co-production of the processes and outcomes of innovation R&D. Thus, in my cross-sectoral 
interviews, I explored with respondents what role RRI might play in inculcating normative 
values into the nano-innovation process for safe design outcomes. On the basis of their 
responses, I then explore potential policy mechanisms for enacting RRI for that safe design. 
By examining Proposition 3, I also seek to critically examine the capability of RRI to instil a 
more anticipatory approach to EU nano risk governance than is currently offered in the 
manner in which  PP is utilized. Specifically, this would focus upon co-produced evaluations 
of the social value and utility of the outputs of nano-innovation. By this means, the Chapter 
investigates whether current EU regulatory-driven risk governance, when modified by an RRI 
component, can achieve the fulfilment of EC Objective 3. 
I begin this Chapter’s analysis by examining the underlining tensions and barriers 
experienced by industry actors engaged in the nano- innovation process. Initially, I 
underestimated the depth of feeling amongst them of these daily tensions, and the 
relational influences and pressures caused by the pursuit of divergent business objectives 
(Reichow 2016). These tensions were most definitely on display as I conducted the industry 
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respondent interviews, particularly those arising from the financial, technical, marketing 
activities and social engagement of SME nano manufacturers.  
 Obstacles and barriers shaping nano-innovation at the 
business level   
Policy statements published by international and national chemical industry organisations, 
such as the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA https://www.icca-
chem.org/) and the European Chemicals Industry Council (Cefic https://cefic.org/), 
foreground their support for the concept of ‘responsible care’ within the industries they 
represent. This industry commitment seems strongest among multi-national chemical 
manufacturers, with less evidence of adoption amongst SMEs (van de Poel et al. 2017). 
However, multi-nationals may focus on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policy and 
brand image rather more than the principles for RRI (Hemphill 2017; van de Poel et al. 2017; 
Owen et al. 2012). In fact, van de Poel et al. ( 2017) identifies that few companies have 
developed and adopted explicit RRI strategies within their corporate plans. In interviews I 
sought to gauge the scale of industry ‘buy-in’ for the  responsible research and innovation 
concept for nano SMEs. Importantly, this issue was regarded by industry respondents as 
often opaque, with its implementation depending on corporate culture (e.g. business values, 
norms, attitudes and behaviours) that defines the identity and mode of operation of firms 
(Herzog 2011; Schien 2009,2006). Industry interviewees acknowledged that innovation 
cannot occur in isolation, and that this organic process always required interaction with 
other organisations and actors (Ruggui 2015, UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser 2014; 
European Science Foundation 2013; Von Schomberg 2013; Rip 2012; Deuten and Rip 1997), 
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but RRI did not appear within their list of business priorities as a means to engage outside 
the traditional group of innovation actors.  
Despite, interview 53, noting that multiple actors are involved in NM production, 
manufacture and marketing. To this matrix of influences, we can add investors, insurers, 
government funders and regulatory agencies. On top of this can be layered the potential for 
a high likelihood of product failure, product functional under-performance, problematic 
manufacturing in product scaling-up, decreasing technological relevance and lack of market 
appeal (Christensen 1997). One academic respondent emphasised that NM innovation is a 
multifaceted progression, requiring businesses to manage both techno-scientific complexity 
and the diversity of actors within the structure of the innovation process itself:  
‘[Innovation] complexity tells us that there are lots of interactions and feedback 
loops. The eventual outcomes in terms of its shape and its success are not 
dependent on any single actor for its success, but in the series to be found in the 
whole chain and its lateral connections’ (Interview 48. 12th December 2014). 
This complexity was explained to me by a leading nano manufacturer in their description of 
the EU market for NM as follows (see Case Example). 
Case Example: Nano entrepreneur describing the complexity found in nano-manufacturing.  
‘There are four different applications of nanomaterials. First is as a replacement 
technology -  I use micron today, but I will now use nano tomorrow.  Secondly, as 
a little drop of nano does you good - nano used to enhance an existing product, 
for example to strengthen a coating (I call it pixie dust!). Thirdly, is to use nano as 
a carrier for a different functionality; one example would be as a drug carrier. 
Finally, as a brand-new application from a new discovery – whether this is to 
develop a new market or into an existing market does not really matter. If it is to 
replace a micron material with a nanomaterial, then it is difficult to enter the 
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micron market unless you make the right connections. In fact, this is the dominant 
thread. It is about making the link between your capabilities and what their 
application requirements are…. In my experience, it takes about seven years from 
discovery of a new [nano] material to the time it is being used. It is very difficult 
to keep yourself [financially] alive during this period and you need a good product 
that will keep the funders investing’ (Interview 35.16th August 2014). 
This brief case example illustrates the complexities of identifying the correct application for 
the NM, and the demanding nature of business survival. Industry managers require an astute 
understanding of market conditions, a capability to seize new market opportunities, and a 
determination to maintain business stability in trying market conditions while new products 
are marketed. The final crucial point in interview 35 is the need to keep the business “alive” 
during product development and marketing.  This is known colloquially as traversing the 
‘Valley of Death’. It is illustrated in Figure 6.1 below as the ‘GAP’ above the innovation value 
chain 
  
 
Figure 6.1. Bridging the capital investment funding gap in the Nanomanufacturing Innovation 
Value Chain. Source:  USA Government Accountability Office ( 2014) 
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Significant numbers of SMEs fail to successfully traverse this ‘gap’ before their product gets 
to market (D/G Research and Innovation 2017; USA Government Accountability Office 
2014).  Another important point made in the case example is the difficulty of technology 
transition. This was supported by a global aerospace respondent who offered their 
experience of the difficulties and barriers to overcome when innovating new products:  
‘A key aspect in … [named company]….is the technology transition.  The company 
set up a group to look at all the lab scale technologies and then identify the path 
from transition to manufacture or high-volume scaling. The key challenge is with 
the marketplace. There is a cost to production of the materials (for example 
foundry capital costs, or growth chambers for carbon nanotubes). So, this costs a 
lot of money. Then to upscale to the implementation to full scale production. It 
may not be marketable in a relatively small-scale marketplace which may only 
have a volume of thousands of units instead of the millions needed to make it 
financially viable’ (Interview 13. 13th October 2013). 
These failures often arise because of the inability to make the transition of high -
performance NM from the lab bench to profitable industrial scale processes. In fact, this is 
where a significant number of nano innovations fail (Directorate-General Research and 
Innovation 2017; USA Government Accountability Office 2014). This is a well-recognised 
phenomenon that often contributes to investor risk aversion to disruptive technology 
projects, including nanotechnology. Rip (2012) makes the point that this is a substantial 
challenge even for large well-founded companies, which often prefer these early risks to be 
taken by SMEs. An NGO respondent concurs with Rip’s observation:  
“They [multi-nationals] say to me that innovation works best at the smallest level 
and to let them [SMEs] do the dirty work and [they] only pick up the product once 
it is in a more marketable form” (Interview 49. 5th May 2015). 
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This apparent risk aversion was supported by an interviewee from another global aerospace 
manufacturer: 
‘The biggest problem is identifying funding streams (within our company).  If we 
are lucky 1 in 10 or even 1 in 20 will spark further interest to take it further.  It is 
often down to the enthusiasm of the staff member’ (interview 14. 12th November 
2014). 
While larger financially-sound manufacturers are reluctant to invest in novel technology, the 
difficulties faced by SMEs in the innovation of nanoproducts was explained to me by a 
representative from a UK government sponsored technology hub: 
“We give SMEs the opportunity to takes risks. ….. If they fail, they can pick up the 
pieces quietly and start over again. …. but having [already] been through the 
process of product maturation where we have been incubating companies 
through the Valley of Death… for investors, the problem is one of technical risk 
aversion where if you back the wrong technology it can break your company…. I 
have seen good companies slowly lose their investors and go under as they simply 
did not understand what is needed to be done to make their company successful” 
(Interview 25. 7th April 2014). 
A SME nano-manufacturer provided a further insight into the continuous demands placed 
on businesses from his own personal experience: 
‘What happens is that technology that you could integrate your materials into 
disappears as the landscape changes year on year … we knew enough about 
developing the new technology, but we did not know enough about 
commercializing it.’ (Interview 8. 22nd August 2014). 
The key finding from these interviews is that innovation is a highly unpredictable set of 
processes that can unleash changes that threaten company survival. Thus, industry 
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interviewees persistently returned to the financial, technology and marketing pressures 
facing SMEs.  These include the need for constant technological fixes, upscaling production 
to match market volumes, and commercializing their products in crowded marketplaces.  
Crucially, these business challenges are often overlooked in the literatures on the business 
application of RRI. This oversight has led, in my view, to an unbalanced view of the 
commercial perspective of the nano-innovation process. There is also a lack of awareness of 
the parlous financial state for many SMEs as illustrated above. I think it is reasonable to 
conclude from the above interviews that constant techno-economic pressures side-line the 
adoption of RRI by SMEs. Indeed, it is quite possible that SMEs consider that they have no 
other choice but to offload that responsibility and product liability to an unknown future (cf. 
Gee 2015; Owen 2015a; Beck 1995).  
Packaging responsible innovation as a value-adding driver for business and economic 
success is a daunting challenge in these competitive business environments. The framing of 
RRI as contributing to product competitive advantage, generating market share, or 
enhancing shareholder value, may be one answer. But this overlooks the implicit goal of 
many industry respondents which was to ‘aim low’ to secure business survival via minimum 
legal compliance. Moreover, an academic with regulatory experience underlines how little 
regulation supports commercialization: 
‘In no way does the regulatory framework help the passage through the ‘Valley of 
Death’. There are a number of factors including how the product is designed, and 
a number of other issues to do with the economy and commercialization of that 
product which regulation does not influence at all’ (Interview 36.  16th September 
2014) 
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In summary, the commercial nano innovation space appears fraught with potentially fatal 
business pitfalls irrespective of company size, but particularly so for SMEs.  In turn, this poses 
challenges for framing the introduction of more regulation as a positive influence on NM 
innovation and commercialization. Macnagthen et al (2016) believe that the current 
pragmatic or consequentialist risk-based approach for EU regulation has limited impact on 
shaping the outcomes of the R&D process. A general impression that I gained from nano-
manufacturer respondents is that regulatory compliance (REACH) is just another obstacle to 
progressing novel NM to market, and one to be avoided if at all possible (see Chapter 5). If 
their prime motivation is to develop then sell their nano innovation to a larger company, 
they want to achieve that before they have to invest in expensive testing regimes. This 
prompts the question of whether and how EU regulation and RRI could be harnessed 
together to positively influence nano innovation outcomes to address EC Objective 3.  If so, 
then they must both move from being regarded as obstacles to innovation to being crucial 
contributors in enhancing business survival and profitability. I now discuss how the 
empowerment of RRI as a deliberative process within nano R&D might achieve this. 
 Responsible Research and Innovation and nanomaterial 
product development: a way forward?  
As discussed in Chapter 5, recent EC policy pronouncements on REACH confirm that NM will 
be further regulated following adoption of the revised testing Annexes from 1st January 2020 
(EC DO 56122/02). Nevertheless, the yawning gap between rapid nano techno-scientific 
advances and their ethical and regulatory oversight through legal and public policy means is 
growing – what is described as a ‘pacing’ problem for regulators (Bowman 2017; Reichow 
2016; Marchant et al 2011; Owen et al 2009). With no new EC policy solutions to the pacing 
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problem emerging, Hemphill (2017) argues that a new form of ‘hybrid’ public-private 
governance framework should be implemented to fill this gap. Hemphill uses the term 
‘public governance’ to refer to EC public policy, regulation, and EHS standards for risk 
management that together underpin public research, manufacturing and consumer safety 
controls (cf. Hemphill 2017; Hemphill 1992). ‘Private governance’ is self-regulation by actors 
that comprises a mix of actions for responsible innovation, risk management and voluntary 
industry standards (cf. Hemphill 2017). The proposition does not go so far as to suggest that 
this is the perfect solution for mitigating EHS nano risks, but that it may be the best option 
at this time given the continuing uncertainty surrounding nano-safety. In this context, I take 
‘hybrid governance’ to mean ‘possible combinations of hard and soft law elements that 
complement each other, influencing day-to-day activities in the same sector to support the 
same end-goals’ (Vaughan 2015. p3). This hybrid governance can be viewed as a further 
iteration of the Taxonomy of Regulation (CEPS 2014) previously discussed. In this way, 
formal and informal norms may be ‘yoked’ together to provide an alternative policy solution 
to EC top-down hierarchical governance. There will, of course, be doubters on both sides of 
this argument.  Those who suggest that the emphasis on private governance will undermine 
the role of public governance and provide loopholes for the less scrupulous; whilst others 
may argue that public consultation is too costly in time and resources with little value adding 
benefit.  
While I agree with Hemphill (2017) that key components of private governance are 
responsible innovation, risk management, and voluntary industry codes, as the preceding 
analysis shows, I would argue the contextual industry sector circumstances are of equal 
importance. In particular, that NM applications will necessarily influence the actual selection 
of the policy and regulatory tools that are necessary for application to specific nano- enabled 
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products. The test for this hybrid governance model, if it is to be of value, is that it must 
emphasise foresight with both precaution and anticipation within adaptive systems (Wiek 
et al 2016). [Note: This mirrors the discussion in Chapter 5 regarding the correct application 
of the PP]. Both the public and private governance frameworks will need to be 
complementary and acting in synchronicity if they are to influence the relentless dynamic of 
nano- innovation.  Feitshans (2013) suggests that for governance models to be truly effective 
they need to be continuously adaptive to their contextual dynamics.  This theme of 
governance ‘adaptivity’ is a constant in the literatures from Klinke and Renn (2012) and 
others. Following the preceding discussion, if Proposition 3 is to be fulfilled, then the hybrid 
governance model must also be responsive to normative values and associated socio-ethical 
issues.  
This is where RRI (Rome Declaration 2014) can have a specific role to play as explained to 
me by an NGO representative: 
‘RRI definitely is a valuable approach.  But the one thing that I find very interesting 
in that approach is that it provides something of a systemic change in the R&D 
process to provide safer, more socially beneficial products.  The other side of the 
coin, in that discussion, is that all systemic changes must meet systemic 
obstacles……… [Named companies] are operating in an economy and within a 
regulatory system which does not reward this approach’. (Interview 55. 7th April 
2017).  
The lack of regulatory incentives or tangible support for companies to incorporate RRI into 
its business processes is a critical issue raised by this respondent, which I will discuss later in 
this Chapter.  But for now, having discussed the business section meters for implementing a 
viable RRI approach, I will now examine the specific benefits and constraints raised by 
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interviewees regarding the utility of RRI to meet the requirements of Proposition 3 i.e. as an 
anticipatory governance mechanism to embed socio-ethical values into the EU nano-
innovation process. 
 Aligning RRI with nanomaterial innovation and 
development 
As previously mention in Section 6.1 , Mertens (2018) offers three reasons why RRI can act 
effectively in NM product innovation. These are its ability to promote early assessment of 
radical novelty and unpredictability; secondly, this early assessment influences the  
amendment innovation trajectories; and finally, it assists in the anticipation of unknowns 
and prepares for unpredictable futures. All three capabilities can then be applied for RRI in 
its technology mediated interactions with stakeholders (Reber 2018). Notwithstanding these 
possibilities, Stilgoe et al (2013) comment there are major limitations in applying RRI if it 
does not develop the capacity for adaptive foresight. Nordmann (2014) summarises this 
position succinctly by stating that anticipation is the cornerstone of responsible innovation.  
However, Torgersen and Fuchs (2017) argue anticipation requires upstream debates that 
avoid assumptions that emerging technologies, such as nanotechnology, are simply 
derivatives of established parent chemicals and technologies. This important point was 
illustrated by comments made in an interview I conducted with a science philosopher:  
‘We should avoid that the RRI model becomes only a new way to merely confirm 
the existing arrangements’ (Interview 52. 22nd February 2016) 
To avoid such a scenario, Jahnel (2015b) suggests that RRI must become a central 
component of EU nano risk governance policy. There are two strong arguments in support 
of this.  First Reber (2018) and others argue that RRI is an inheritor of the mantle of PP, as 
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they are both designed to be safety concerned, yet futures facing by incorporating 
deliberative action. Consequently, this highlights the ‘precaution’ element in its formal 
application. Secondly, Macnaghten and Chilvers (2014) propose that responsible innovation 
is essentially ‘anticipatory’ in nature. In that, it takes the debate on risk governance beyond 
the current narrow consequentialist framing of EHS, to emphasise upstream questions such 
as why NM products are being developed, and what societal aspirations these novel 
products might meet. This blend of precaution and anticipation provides the necessary 
downstream knowledge for decisions on the hard and soft impacts of innovation (Mahapatra 
2016).   
Nevertheless, persuading industry actors that RRI is more than a ‘moral notion’ ( e.g. aspiring 
to a rightness of behaviour), and has a practical and beneficial purpose is a challenging EU 
policy hurdle. RRI will require careful elaboration, in a manner sensitive to the complexities 
of nano-innovation, if it is to become a focus of meaningful co-design and decision-making 
(Grunwald 2017; Gianni 2016; Pelle 2016, Greenbaum and Groves 2013; Bessant 2013, Sykes 
and Macnaghten 2013). Torgersen and Fuchs’s (2017) study of upstream participation shows 
how expert practices can be shaped by specific socio-ethical contexts, thereby aligning R&D 
outcomes more closely with societal values.  However, I argue the case also needs to be 
made to businesses that incorporating socio-ethical considerations within nano-innovation 
is more than a moral imperative and has a capability to enhance business value and 
outcomes too.  This viewpoint is extensively supported within EU and national governmental 
policy publications which directly address the purpose and outcomes for beneficial 
commercial nano exploitation (cf.EC NanoCode 2008, UK Nanotechnology Strategy 2010, 
USA National Nanotechnology Initiative 2014, 2016 & 2019; German Nanotechnology 
Strategy 2020, EU Horizon 2020).   
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Foley et al (2016) believe that by this means the nano-innovation regulatory process could 
move beyond its current largely negative perception that ‘precaution’ is applied as a ‘brake’ 
to innovation and the development of novel NM. As discussed in the previous section, this 
has resulted in SMEs not engaging with RRI as it is thought that it stifles innovation practices 
or lacks business relevance. Indeed, Macnagthen and Chilvers (2014) consider that short 
term commercial pressures are trumping longer term societal and ethical concerns.  On this 
issue one NGO respondent stated to me that: 
‘I am genuinely interested in any ideas as to how we can include [RRI] within the 
governance framework section (for business) which reflect opinions and issues 
relating to the socio-economic environment.  The problem is, that no-one is 
coming forward with any views on how we might do this’. (Interview 49. 5th May 
2015).  
Whilst an academic interviewee suggested that: 
‘[RRI] must be broken down, clearly defined and context specific – otherwise it 
means nothing more than something we regard as ‘nice’ (Interview 31. 25th May 
2014) 
This statement acknowledges widespread criticism of RRI for, variously, lacking 
implementation guidelines and state backing (Macnaghten et al.2016), having no clear 
boundaries (van Outheusenden 2014), and instigating an open-ended process (Delvenne 
2017; Wickson and Carew 2014).  As interviewee 31 comments identify, that  addressing 
these challenges means developing an RRI model that offers individual interpretive flexibility 
to match specific business contexts. To me, this interpretive flexibility and contextual 
specificity are crucial issues,  if RRI is to have  any real relevance  whatsoever within the nano 
innovation process. Van de Poel et al ( 2017) make the point that little attention is given to 
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the business context such as the resources available and the type of market the company 
operates within.  Therefore, the crucial question then becomes:  how can RRI be 
implemented in a way to stimulate a cultural change among businesses, by effectively 
incorporating socio-ethical issues into NM innovation and development, yet be reflective of 
contextual issues? I focus on this question next. 
 ‘Strong’ RRI: driving social learning to change business 
culture 
Coenen and Grunwald (2017) describe the traditional innovation consultative arrangement 
in business as follows. An ‘expert’ group assesses the technology in a predominantly elite 
manner, posing questions that are to be answered by themselves or another expert body. 
These authors characterise this as a ‘weak’ RRI activity. On the basis of the preceding 
analysis, I argue what is now needed to strengthen RRI is formal participatory civil 
engagement to identify societal benefits and disbenefits arising from the innovation process. 
This reflects the intentions of Proposition 3 and EC Objective 3, by being inclusive of a wider 
range of civil society opinions. Coenen and Grunwald (2017) and Grunwald (2016) identify 
this ‘strong’ model for inclusive participation beyond the simple one-way communication of 
knowledge transfer. Applied to NM development, this implies active co-participation by civil 
society in nano product design and specification. This would not apply simply to a specific 
NM, but more generally across the sector to build trust in nanotechnology futures 
incrementally (cf. Deeker et al 2017, Reichow 2016).  One academic interviewee describes 
the setting needed for this to be achieved:  
‘Adaptive Governance is to do with an ongoing social learning process … we 
should not take the future and its technological implications as a kind of given 
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which we are trying to manage before they even exist! So, we need to work in real 
time, with social learning within the experimental mode.’ (Interview 50. 21st June 
2015) 
To achieve the aspirations of this interviewee, ‘strong’ RRI will need to be incorporated 
within an adaptive model of continuous collaborative social learning that includes multiple 
actors in the decision-making process (Murashov and Howard 2016; Rijke et al 2012). In its 
simplest form, social learning is learning by direct experience or from the experiences of 
others (Bandura and Walters 1977). Clark (2010) proposes that social learning in a 
technoscientific  environment, as referred to in interview 50 above, is strengthened between 
individuals and organisations, by connecting the actors from different expert networking 
communities, and increasingly entwining government and civil society through these 
procedural arrangements. Potentially, this approach could be extended to the adoption of 
the proposal from Van Wezel et al (2018) that business incubators (the high-performance 
technology hubs discussed in interview 25 above) are supplemented by ‘societal incubators’. 
The existing technology hubs could provide the spaces for such civil and technologist 
interactions. This is a proposal to implant scientific and normative outcomes, from 
experimentation and collective learning, early into the upstream process for developing 
nano-commercial products. Though to build industry confidence in this process will need 
careful planning for issues such as protecting commercial confidentiality.  
Another way forward is suggested by Van Wezel et al (2018) who propose that  a 
cornerstone for embedding wider societal norms and values within experimental research 
and technology projects, is to imbue this philosophy within higher education programmes 
for scientists and technologists.  In my interviews with academics, one respondent made this 
point: 
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‘We believe that education and training is the most significant way to change 
cultures, and that is why RRI is a key priority for the EPSRC and is include in the 
curriculum for the Centres for Doctoral Training’ (Interview 42. 21st November 
2014) 
‘Strong’ RRI thus requires broad societal engagement and also the means of enabling an 
adaptive social-learning process to encourage and cement longer-term productive 
relationships. Lee and Petts (2013) emphasise that to achieve productive and influential 
outcomes of this kind, means developing industry competencies and public engagement 
skills not readily available to SMEs.  In addition, Flipse and van de Loo (2018) note that non-
expert stakeholders may need to develop interactional capacity and greater technoscientific 
knowledge to engage meaningfully in their critically productive manner. By this means, such 
actors can become more trusted and valued by industry, not just for critical capacities but 
also for unexpected creative insights and perspectives (Fisher et al.2006). Such 
competencies will have to be acquired by all parties if well-informed and timely opinions are 
to be incorporated within the nano innovation decision-making.  
Notwithstanding the need to resolve this issue, I believe RRI can be beneficial in its 
anticipatory bridging role as posited in Proposition 3.  I discussed this point at length with an 
EC Administrator who flagged the frailties of current nano policy as follows: 
‘One failure of (EU) governance is that classically we have looked too much to the 
technological potential of that particular innovation, but we do not address it in 
the innovation context. So, the shift is in their development from responsible 
technology to responsible innovation that defines and incorporates socio-ethical 
values…. The essence is to move from a technological exploitation point of view 
to the innovation point of view but with social objectives. But this lesson is not 
well appreciated yet’ (Interview 53. 8th March 2016). 
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This statement is a good summation of the preceding discussion, and also of the views held 
by the EC administrative respondents. In EU terms, there is a lack of incentive operating 
within its political economy and current regulatory system to recognise the value of 
incorporating legitimate socio-ethical concerns into nano innovation. I believe that the lack 
of researcher and industry engagement with this adaptive and integrative approach would 
benefit from forms of industry incentivization. These incentives could raise nano-innovation 
practices beyond lowest common denominator issues, such as minimal legal compliance, to 
aim higher to incorporate wider societal aspiration and obligations.  The relevance of this 
proposal and the forms it might take are discussed next. 
 Incentivizing business uptake of RRI 
The dilemma for EU policy makers since RRI was first proposed in Science and Society (EU 
Horizon 2020) is to find the triggers for its adoption and implementation by businesses. As 
interviews with industry respondents confirm, there is strong evidence of the daily 
difficulties they face in the nano innovation space, and the absence of government initiatives 
to facilitate these.  An NGO respondent emphasised this point:  
‘(Company name) … (Company name) ... and SMEs and others are operating in an 
economy and within a regulatory system which does not reward this approach. 
Without addressing those issues, there is very little chance that these approaches 
can multiply and gain real traction at the appropriate scale, because the economic 
and legal incentives are going in exactly the opposite direction’ (Interview 55. 7th 
April 2017). 
However, whilst proposals for incentivization have an immediate attraction, we need to be 
mindful of Maynard’s (2015.p200) warning that responsible innovation needs to be 
integrated into business practices in a manner that does not “exacerbate the dilemmas 
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entrepreneurs face”.  Notwithstanding that cautious note, the lack of regulatory recognition 
for responsible innovatory approaches (Kraegeloh et al 2018) puts the onus on voluntary 
industry responses. Forms of incentivization that could encourage voluntary responses 
include financial incentives (e.g. encouraging/attracting new investors, reduction in 
insurance premiums) passporting through regulatory regimes (by demonstrating that key 
criteria have been met); reduction of potential risk of future liabilities (in relation to the EU 
Product Liability Directive); industry certification/accreditation; and a distinguishing 
‘Responsible innovation’ Charter-Mark and/or trade-mark for customer recognition in 
market branding (Kraegeloh et al 2018; Stone et al 2017; van de Poel et al 2017; Suarez- 
Merino 2017). In interview an EC administrator also commented on the importance of 
supporting incentives with other complimentary approaches:  
‘…. growing awareness of companies and their attitudes that if they are bound 
within certain [regulatory] ecosystems, they may be helped directly by funding 
local authorities or other incentives’ (Interview 53.  8th March 2016). 
Bush (2010) notes the use of these types of incentives constitute a form of hybrid 
governance in itself. Von Schomberg (2013) acknowledges that such a form of hybrid 
governance, correctly designed, can cover deficits in public governance with a market 
equivalent. He believes that the predicted volume of new nano processes/products to 
market are no longer manageable by government(regulatory) agencies alone. Thus, such 
incentives could become valued self-governing elements within the context of private 
governance discussed above. This conceptual approach can be developed as a meaningful, 
even powerful, contribution for embedding RRI which certainly deserves further exploration.  
Interviews with EC administrators, industry and academic representatives thus generated 
interesting and potentially valuable ideas with which to progress an integrative and adaptive 
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social learning model for nano-innovation.  As interviewees comments make clear, the basis 
of such a social learning model lies in its having interpretive flexibility appropriate to 
contextual socio-cultural and business settings. I recognise that this could be both a strength 
and a weakness, as it may generate competing or even contested choices in individual 
adoptive practice. These must inevitably run up against the pragmatic commercial drivers 
and alternative choices found in nano-manufacturing. This dilemma was highlighted for me 
by one SME nano manufacturer: 
‘The last thing I want to do is to develop a toxic material.  My preference is for 
benign, but I may use a material with some toxic effects to achieve functionality… 
if we think they have toxic potential, then we use them responsibly’. (Interview 
24. 16th August 2014). 
This statement takes us to the heart of the matter, which is the socio-cultural differences 
amongst cross-sectoral actors as to how ‘responsibility’ is framed. For industry, NM 
functionality for product utility may be paramount for driving product profitability, meaning 
responsibility is about  ‘acceptable/tolerable risk’ rather than ‘social desirability’. However, 
RRI, in its focused sense, is fundamentally concerned with anticipating problems within 
wider socio-cultural and ethical contexts, rather than restricted to risk/safety issues. 
Maynard (2014) makes the point that a major influence of RRI is in creating adaptable 
systems that respond to unexpected consequences, but, importantly, they must be based 
on plausible futures. If such outcomes are achieved, then it can be said to fit with Proposition 
3, with its capability to transform innovation discussions into a public dialogue (Stilgoe 
2011). Yet interviewee 24 above implies that ‘responsibility’ is narrowly defined around 
levels of toxicity potential rather than a value-led approach to nano innovation. Therein lies 
the major challenge for RRI, how to motivate a SME to move from unstructured and 
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internalized self-regulation to embedding a more formalized RRI procedure within its 
manufacturing process. An EC Administrator respondent summarised these barriers very 
neatly:  
‘SMEs struggle to incorporate RRI into their corporate space due to competing 
demands on technoscience progression, financial survival and investor resistance’ 
(Interview 53. 8th March  2016).  
Moreover, Solbu (2015) emphasises that any credible RRI model needs to go beyond a 
research/industry tacit understanding for what it means to act ‘responsibly’. However, 
finding a shared notion from amongst all the  interviewees as to  how this framework might 
work proved challenging. The fact is that for RRI to be implementable and effective it must 
be adaptable in dissimilar research and industry settings within differing R&D contexts.  How 
RRI may  be incorporated into business practice is currently being research by EU funded 
projects such as PRISMA (http://www.rri-prisma.eu/) which is examining how responsible 
innovation can be better integrated into different industry innovation practices; COMPASS 
(https://innovation-compass.eu/) which is researching a RRI self-check tool for SMEs, and 
SMART MAP (https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/203167/factsheet/en) which  developed  
open and collaborative dialogues between industry and societal actors (Industrial 
Dialogues). 
Interviewee 53 addressed this point regarding the importance of recognising differing 
industry sector contexts for RRI by  commenting:    
‘RRI can be different in different forms in different industrial settings.  Very often 
topics need a case specific approach, but with general principles applying’ 
(Interview 53. 8th March 2016).   
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There are both  strength and a weakness in resolving this conundrum. The strength is that it 
would apply across the range of differing industry settings; the weakness that it may bring 
inefficiencies due to different interpretations and applications of its principles. Nevertheless, 
I think this is a risk worth taking. After all, embedding other relatively new principles into 
business practice, such as ‘Environmental Management Systems’ and ‘Sustainability’ have 
taken time for their value to be recognised in the commercial world. With this in mind, the 
temptation  might be to make RRI a means to an end – just one more set of standardized 
procedures.  As the same EC administrator considered the pitfalls of doing so: 
‘There is a risk it becomes instrumentalized and set within boundaries, and 
consequently loses its flexibility and currency’. (Interview 53. 8th June 2016) 
Stirling et al (2018. p15) describe ‘instrumentalization ‘ as the engineering in of our pre-
existing aims and by doing so constraining/limiting  potential outcomes’. Nevertheless, by 
reminding ourselves of the previous criticisms of the ‘looseness’ of policy guidance for RRI 
implementation, the instrumentalization of RRI, into a more formalized anticipatory 
governance process, may simply be needed at this stage to kickstart the process of industry 
adoption.  Without such a mechanism, RRI may continue to be a vague moral notion with no 
practical purpose or long-term  influence. Consequently, in the following sections I consider 
the potential for utilizing the Safety by Design (SbD) concept as a mechanism for the practical 
application of RRI within the nano innovation space.  
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 Synthesising anticipatory decision-making approaches: 
the Precautionary Principle, Responsible Research and 
Innovation, and Safety by Design  
SbD is an engineering process currently applied across disparate technological platforms 
such as construction, pharmaceuticals, computers, and aerospace industries (Kraegeloh et 
al 2018; Gottardo et al 2017). Its purpose is to provide an operational map for directing new 
nanoproduct projects from discovery/idea(s) to market launch as efficiently and effectively 
as possible. In its stage-gating form, it fits well with the modern manufacturing value chain 
pathway where, at each stage, progress is tested against selected parameters viz. 
occupational and consumer risks/safety; economic viability; product quality parameters, 
operational feasibility, and product marketability (Cooper 2001,2008). If any of these tests 
are failed, then the product may be deemed as a failure and a decision taken to discontinue 
development.  
The purpose of SbD is to identify risks in the early stages of technology development , and 
to identify solutions to mitigate or eliminate them (van de Poel and Robaey 2017). As 
previously mentioned, SbD is an engineering process now practised within a number of 
industries (Suarez-Marino et al. 2017; Gottardo et al. 2017). In the EU policy/regulatory 
context, SbD is now established as an important concept within EU funded research projects 
to achieve ‘Regulatory Preparedness’ and ‘Sustainable Innovation Assessment’( 
Katalagariniakis 2018; Gottardo et al. 2017). Previously discussed in Chapter 2, this is when 
the EU regulators are given early warning by industry of forthcoming nano innovations, the 
timeliness of which allows the checking that current  legislation serves the safety aspects or 
may need revisions (JRC 2018; NanoReG2 http://www.nanoreg.eu/; GRACIOUS 
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https://www.h2020gracious.eu/). This is in an analytical risk assessment role for SbD to act 
as a new pillar for REACH NM regulatory control (Gottardo et al. 2017). In this context, 
Gottardo et al (2017.p100) describes the role of SbD as a process that considers and 
incorporates safety considerations into product design and development, by addressing the 
functionality of a material and its toxicity in an integrated manner. The application of SbD is 
this format is principally driven by regulatory sciences and can be described as built on the 
single narrow normative value of ‘safety’ only ( van de Poel and Robaey 2017). There is a 
lack of evidence from the EC that this new decision-making process  will be inclusive of a 
broader deliberative engagement outside of nominated expert actors. Notwithstanding this 
current policy position, I suggest that now SbD is being  foregrounded by the EC for full 
engagement within the NM regulatory  compliance process, it provides an opportunity to 
address that deliberative deficit by acting as the mechanism to incorporate RRI into nano 
innovation processes for the following reasons. First is the strong cross-sectoral support by 
interviewees for the perceived benefits of incorporating a Safety by Design approach within 
nano-innovation. This is demonstrated by a précis of cross-sectoral interview comments: 
‘I believe 80% of the risk factors can be dealt with at the design stage’ (EC 
Administrator.  Interview 23. 1st March 2014)  
‘Applying Safety by Design is good business’ (Academic. Interview 43. 21st 
November 2014) 
‘(For defence) Safety by Design needs to be right at the beginning’ (Environmental 
Lawyer. Interview 17. 11th November 2014)  
‘Absolutely…. the checking of the materials in terms of their safety and their 
functionality would up the sense of development’ (EC Administrator. Interview 32. 
27th May  2014)  
‘Safety by Design makes sense’ (UK regulator. Interview 30. 20th May 2014)  
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These positive comments are representative of the broad-based cross-sectoral support for 
SbD, though industry respondents were more muted in their support. The lack of enthusiasm 
was not restricted just to SMEs, as might be expected, but shared by a respondent from an 
EU based major chemicals manufacturer. This is a global company with a public policy 
commitment to the International Council of Chemical  Associations initiative for ‘responsible 
care’ (see section 6.3). Yet the company interviewee was quite clear on their negative stance 
to SbD:    
‘All products undergo risk assessments before they are marketed, and we publish 
all our results on the risk assessment…we are trying to do this is a transparent way. 
This is a huge shift in the [company name] attitude. We do not specifically do safety 
by design. We do not use this for what we are doing’ (Interview 47. 3rd December 
2014) 
This response provides a window into the thinking of this international nano manufacturer 
on the subject of SbD. This viewpoint is held despite public virtue signalling for their own 
transparency through the process of scientific publications. The implication here is that the 
nano industry does not see adopting SbD as priority within their manufacturing process. 
What this mindset does imply is that adopting SbD for NM development is a strategic issue 
for the nano industry and not for one-off technology exercises, so that SbD is required to fit 
within its corporate business plans, product portfolios and marketing strategies or not at all.  
Such corporate positioning would allow it to have its greatest influence on innovation 
outcomes and be the right way to deploy SbD to achieve strategic impacts.  
Notwithstanding this somewhat contrarian view from industry respondents, I believe that 
the strong cross-sectoral support evidenced above for SbD within nano innovation 
encourages the exploration of new possibilities as to how it might be utilized outside of the 
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current narrow regulatory framing. So, as my second reason, I offer a conceptual argument 
for believing that RRI and SbD can be combined in a practical manner to deliver both 
analytical and deliberative outcomes. The foundation for this viewpoint is that RRI (Reber 
2018; Genus and Iskandarova 2018; Von Schomberg 2014) and SbD (Kraegeloh et al. 2018; 
Gottardo et al 207; Suarez-Marino et al 2017) are both posited as contemporary inheritors 
of the PP.  In that for all three conceptual approaches safety is the fundamental concern, but 
they do have a future-facing capability which can be founded on a deliberative mechanism. 
Thus, collectively, they have the potential to act in both precautionary and anticipatory 
modes and can be the focus for multi-level stakeholder deliberative participation. It is my 
proposal that PP, as identified as a precursor to SbD and RRI, acts as the sponsoring concept 
for linking both together (see Figure 6.2) and, in doing so, provides the conceptual 
foundations for enabling Proposition 3. 
 
Figure 6.2. The Precautionary Principle as sponsor for combining Safety by Design and Responsible 
Research and Innovation. 
As discussed in detail in Chapters 2 & 3, PP plays a critical policy and regulatory role for 
promoting high levels of public health environmental protection within the EU. PP is 
paramount within EU treaties and risk policies by its explicit responsibility for delivering on 
EU health and environmental protection obligations. It is also  foregrounded within REACH 
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as a fundamental component in the application of those chemical safety regulations [REACH 
Article 1 (3)].  As a consequence, its tenets, as set out in [COM2000], are central to EU risk 
policy making and regulatory action for protecting its communities. Its tenets design it to be 
applied proportionally in both a precautionary and deliberative manner (COM2000).  
Consequently, as an identified precursor of both SbD and RRI (see literatures above), PP 
provides both justification and legitimacy for bringing together RRI and SbD into a new policy 
configuration (see Figure 6.3 below). By harnessing these concepts, it provides for a 
precautionary and anticipatory hybrid governance framing described earlier in the Chapter 
by Hemphill (2017). I believe this new conceptual approach offers an enhanced capability to 
resolve safety and responsible design issues for NM, with its emphasis on the co-production 
and shared responsibility for nano-enable products. By inviting others to share in the shaping 
of this emerging technology, they may bring novel contributions that result in a more 
effective process for achieving safety (van de Poel and Robaey 2017).  
The outcome from the blending of the three extant concepts is to generates a novel 
conceptual approach which I term ‘Safety by Social Design’ (SbSD) in Figure 6.3 below. 
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Figure 6.3. Safety by Social Design – a composite of the Precautionary Principle , Safety by Design, 
and Responsible Research and Innovation concepts 
 
 
I provide a more detailed justification for this novel approach as follows: 
The three policy and regulatory principles being applied here are all approved and adopted 
by the EU. Of the three, the PP is the most important in its role as a ‘ First Order’ principle as 
it is the foundational principle within three EU treaties and within REACH [Article 1 (1)] for 
promoting ‘a high level of human and environmental protection’.   It is applied when there 
is ‘reasonable grounds for concern’ (COM2000.p2). Its policy and regulatory positioning 
provides for a high level of legitimacy as it sits  the politico-economic, technoscientific and 
socio-ethical intersect. In its guidance document (COM2000), it is meant to be deployed  in 
both a precautionary and anticipatory role, when there is scientific evidence that identifies  
reasonable grounds for concern for adverse effects from a chemical process, activity or 
product. As a consequence, it has two limbs, firstly as a ‘Precautionary’ limb( COM2000.p2) 
in which it acts as a ’holding’ position  on the innovation process until further optional 
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analysis is undertaken; secondly, as an  ‘Anticipatory’ limb (COM 2000.p6) which requires 
the involvement of relevant stakeholders in a deliberative engagement for shared decision-
making in selecting  the most appropriate option. 
I identified in Chapter 2, that there continues to be significant criticism of the PP for its 
precautionary limb being applied within a ‘hazard-centric’ scenarios which make it difficult 
to make any accurate assessment or measure of the probabilities of risk occurrence( van de 
Poel and Robaey 2017).  With its ‘Anticipatory’ limb, its role is  more likely to be observed in 
the breach for problem resolution. So that this central policy and regulatory principle is not 
being correctly applied.  
My proposal is to utilize SbD and RRI to activate the Precautionary-Anticipatory limbs of PP 
for NM within the  contemporary construct of SbSD. Firstly, SbD can be applied as both a 
principle, for upstream modifications ( Gottardo et al 2017 ) within a stage-gating 
engineering process to resolve complex techno-scientific risks ( Cooper 2001).  Currently, 
SbD is adopted by the EC  for application within regulatory sciences as a new pillar for REACH 
( Gottardo et al 2017; NanoREG 2) but with networking confined within expert groupings. 
So, SbD I propose that the role of SbD can be to activate the expert driven techno-scientific 
component for the precautionary limb.  
Secondly, I am proposing that RRI be the bridging mechanism to activate the Anticipatory 
limb of PP,  thereby facilitating the deliberative engagement of non-expert /civil actors in a 
manner to influence the outcomes of the nano innovation. This democratic engagement will 
then provide a platform for a further list of socio-technical feasible options to be tabled as 
solutions to the identified problems. 
Collectively, the interlinking and interaction of the three principles provides for the new 
construct of SbSD. Within this construct, the  precautionary and anticipatory debates are 
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hardwired together for shared decision-making and outcomes on a range of issues including 
potential risks, regulatory compliance , social utility. 
I will explain in the next section why I believe that SbSD can enhance the current EU risk 
governance framework and, in doing so, enable the fulfilment of EC Objective 3.   
 Evaluating the benefits of Safety by Social Design    
‘Democratization’ of the current risk governance framework requires its adaptation to 
facilitate debates with the potential for multiple value-led outcomes (van de Poel and 
Robaey 2017). To achieve this goal means amending this framework so that it is 
deliberatively as well as analytically constructed. To do so, my proposal is that SbD is 
conceptually linked with RRI and PP to promote a culture of co-creation/shared 
responsibility for the safe and responsible outcomes for novel innovation products (EC 
Horizon 2020 .16. EC2016).  This new construct I have identified as SbSD.  
Kahneman (2003) highlights a drawback in standard innovation practices in that technical 
actors can be constrained by bounded rationality, and seldom grasp the socio-ethical 
considerations within their complex projects. RRI is judged to have the capability for 
deliberative intervention into innovation processes (Von Schomberg 2013; Stilgoe et al 2013; 
Owen et al 2013), and offers opportunities for incorporating civil actors norms, values and 
concerns into R&D processes. In other words, the technical actors (scientists, technologists) 
can interact responsively and reflexively with non-expert and civil actors to modulate nano 
innovation trajectories (Flipse and van de Loo 2018; Lukovics and Fisher 2017; Flipse et al 
2013; Fisher et al 2006).  A jurisprudence academic outlines why this form of governance is 
favoured above the current criticized single probabilistic regulatory testing regimes: 
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‘That is why I (would) use governance more that regulation as more solutions may 
be found there. What I mean by governance is the producers building in some sort 
of foresight into what they do and led by soft law… that the soft law supplement is 
the way forward until we resolve the regulatory issues for NM’.  (Interview 39. 5th 
November 2014). 
In contrast to conventional risk management, the new risk governance methodologies will 
run alongside traditional comparative assessment methods. Thus, quantitative multi-criteria 
evaluations can be used to identify alternative options in respect of EHS, techno-economic 
costs, product viability and social utility (Linkov et al 2018; Malloy et al 2016), and then 
incorporated into deliberative discussion with civil actors. Nevertheless, Nordmann (2018) 
highlights a critical issue with regard to implementing deliberation: when is it the right 
moment for those interventions? Too early, and the intervention could stifle or lose all the 
anticipated benefits; but too late, and the late recognition of technology driven problems 
can meet the resistance of technological lock-in and pathway dependency (Owen et al 2009). 
Nordmann (2018) suggests that the ’right’ moment lies on a continuous innovation scale 
which triggers action when societal concerns are identified or arise in advance of 
technological lock-in occurring. 
Whilst helpful this advice is somewhat vague and, as such, may be this concern points 
towards adopting a more resource and process efficient stage-gating approach (Cooper 
2001), based on a commonly accepted modular engineering process which will integrate 
easily within existing nano R&D practices. It provides for a step by step methodology for 
multiple stakeholder engagement at pre-determined stages in the innovation process (e.g. 
pre-manufacture).  Flipse and van de Loo (2018) believe that, by such experiences, critical 
outsiders can bring unexpected insights, whilst developing technological and interactional 
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expertise for future RRI collaborations. Ribeiro et al (2018) suggests that this can be in the 
form of a graduated process of ‘societal alignment’ of innovation with societal needs and 
values.  Nordmann (2018.p335) contrasts that ‘societal alignment’ does not mean  ‘societal 
control’. Instead proposing that ‘control suggests that science, technology and innovation 
can be steered via top down mechanisms based on technical rationality; whilst alignment 
moves the focus to more horizontal relationships and constant negotiation over the needs 
and concerns of diverse actors. This means less controlling and more of an influencing action. 
An academic respondent provides examples of potential contributions from civil actors: 
‘…they could (learn to) reframe the questions that they ask, such as can I make it 
more biocompatible, or more recyclable?  Is there a place for a cleaner, more 
renewable way of doing this?  There is always a possibility that someone will use 
the NP for some use for which it was not intended’ (interview 29. 5th May 2014). 
In conclusion, my proposal for the re-configuration of SbD and RRI together offers the 
prospect for enhanced democratization of the nano innovation process, and the 
incorporation of a process for multi-value led outcomes. This is achieved by operationalizing  
RRI within the modified SbD process, which I identify as SbSD,  and which  offers the prospect 
of fulfilling Proposition 3.  In Figure 6.4 below, I provide a schematic for RRI acting as the 
democratic bridging mechanism for socio-ethical considerations into the SbSD process and 
acting as a  social learning model. 
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Figure 6.4. Responsible Research and Innovation concept acting as a bridge for socio-ethical 
considerations into the Safety by Social Design process as a social learning model 
 
I contend that utilizing RRI as a bridge for socio-ethical criteria into the SbSD process meets 
Genus and Stirling’s (2018.p62) definition of ‘anticipatory’ i.e. ‘in the sense of exploring 
possibilities (not making predictions) and analysing intended and potentially unintended 
impacts that might arise’. It offers a practical means of exploring the socio-ethical values-led 
positions of stakeholders which can then influence the innovation trajectory. It also can 
assist in addressing an important issue, highlighted by van de Poel and Robaey (2017), of 
reducing the indeterminacy of future unintended consequences and impacts by this shared 
responsibility for safe design. RRI’s ‘deliberative’ values-led consultations can be described 
as participative and inclusive to wider societal perspectives, with the expectation that expert 
actors respond reflexively and positively to these deliberative interventions.  
Appropriately implemented, this proposal for deliberative value-led interventions amounts 
to a significant change to the proposed EC  modus operandi for SbD. By this I mean, SbD 
would no longer focus only on analytical-led ‘regulatory preparedness‘ but transforming its 
role into a dual conceptual approach that is simultaneously analytical and deliberative.  This 
construct is founded on both the practical development and adoption of ‘Risk’ and ‘Design’ 
profiles for the NM (see Figure 6.5 below).  
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The inputs for the ‘Safety ‘Profile are derived from the tiered quantitative and qualitative 
analytical risk assessment processes for NM identified in Chapter 5. Hansson (2009.p1069) 
advocates safety as the inverse of risk, that is when the risk is high then safety is low with 
the converse to be true. So that within the processes of the ‘Risk’ Profile, when probabilities 
for harm are identified risk management actions are devised to mitigate them. The testing 
of the risk assessment data against approved scientific/legal standards, allows the 
identification of essential risk management implications, and the actions necessary to 
determine risk tolerability, risk management actions and to achieve regulatory compliance. 
The ‘Design’ Profile is a more broadly-based matrix accommodating diverse information and 
product utility scenarios that can influence the shaping of the nano-enabled product.  
Examples are given in Figure 6.5 below, including industry sectoral applications (food, 
computers etc), industry best practices (approved codes of practice), techno-economics 
(cost-benefits of scaling up for manufacture) mixed with the civil actor value-led concerns. 
This matrix can then produce design parameters for the NM or its product to achieve.  
 These can be both eclectic and narrowly product dependent, and inclusive of the range of 
value-led concerns expressed in the civil consultation process. Possible examples of concerns 
could include not misusing rare natural resources, avoiding adverse manufacturing practices 
and emissions, and evaluating the product social utility. Collectively, the Safety and Design 
Profiles provide for the critical inputs to the SbSD decision-making. With the two profiles 
then simultaneously available for debate and decision by business actors and their relevant 
stakeholders in trusted consultation fora.  
The participants in this consultative forum need not be restricted only to those involved in 
the data collection and developing the profile presentations. The debates will weigh the 
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relative merits/deficiencies of the constituent data and decisions within the ‘Risk’ and 
‘Design’ profiles.   
 
Figure 6.5. Safety by Social Design model – With ‘Safety and Design’ profiles provide for the  
analytical and deliberative inputs and outputs 
 These profiles will influence co-decisions regarding nanoproduct safety, feasibility, 
marketability and social utility.  Taking all these above factors into account, I define Safety 
by Social Design as “the process that assesses safe product design and social utility by 
evaluating its functionality, potential (eco)toxicity, predicted consumer applications and its 
societal alignment in an adaptive and integrative manner’.  
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These SbSD outputs will influence both regulatory readiness and nano-enabled product 
development, manufacturing and marketing. In this novel format, I believe that SbSD will 
enable the fulfilment of Proposition 3 which states that RRI can act as an anticipatory 
governance mechanism for embedding socio-ethical values for safe design within  nano-
innovation’. The strategic consequence is that by this mechanism EC objective 3 could be 
fully enabled.   
However, my research is founded on the prospects for the enablement all three EC nano 
strategy objectives within the ambition of a single holistic model.  I discussed in Chapter 3 
the  prospects for an adaptive and integrative risk governance model (Klinke and Renn 2012) 
encompassed within an analytical -deliberative framing ( Rosa, McCright and Renn 2013) to 
enable this ambition. Van de Poel et al ( 2017)  suggest that adaptive risk management can 
be a useful tool for realising the benefits of RRI within a social learning process as to the risks 
and their future management.  What I am proposing  next is that such a model is possible 
and can be developed within an adaptive and integrative risk governance framework. This 
will be a whole system approach which addresses the critical discussions in Chapters 5 & 6.  
I discuss these possibilities in the next section.  
 Safety by Social Design as a facilitating mechanism for 
an adaptive and integrative EU Risk Governance Framework 
for Nanomaterials 
The intentions of the model in Figure 6.6 below is to provide an adaptive and integrative risk 
governance approach that goes beyond basic legal compliance responsibilities, with the 
societal  alignment of the nano innovation process as a critical outcome. The model has a 
modular framework that combines the processes for risk characterization with socio-ethical 
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concerns. Firstly, the model is based on the discussions in Chapter 5 regarding the novel 
scientific tools and risk assessment paradigms. The analytical data would be sourced from 
curated nanoinformatics libraries to inform the tiered design approach for any necessary 
experimental risk assessments discussed in Chapter 5. These multiple data sources provide 
the essential ‘weight of evidence’ for risk management and regulatory preparedness 
decision-making (see Figure 5.2, Chapter 5). Secondly, I foreground the role of RRI as the 
democratizing influence for the participatory involvement of non-experts/civil actors in the 
nano innovation processes. Their purpose is generating any relevant socio-ethical concerns, 
arising from the proposed nano innovation trajectory, to facilitate its societal alignment (see 
figures 6.4& 6.5 above). By capturing Figure 5.2 ,Chapter 5, within Figure 6.5 above, I propose 
in Figure 6.6 below, an Analytical -Deliberative model that is both precautionary and 
anticipatory in its actions, and with the prospect for enabling and fulfilling the three EU 
NanoStrategy Objectives.  
Critically, this model needs to work in ‘real time’ within a reciprocating social learning 
environment in order to secure greatest impact (interview 50). By this I mean that there will 
be a continuous updating of current science ,technology and societal attitudes into the 
system essential for the open-ended character of responsible innovation (Genus and Stirling 
2018). The updating mechanisms will incorporate information/data/protocols from many 
different sources. Examples will include curated informatics held in scientific observatories, 
libraries, online databases etc, published experimental science and technology protocols, 
new regulatory guidance and updated approved industry codes of practices. All these 
sources can update and inform each of the activities occurring in the different modular 
components, which are inclusive of the reflexivity learning by those involved in the 
processes.  
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By harnessing both the analytical and deliberative processes, foresight can be built into the 
innovation process (interview 39), helping facilitate a cognitive shift from narrow 
technological exploitation to societal alignment of nano innovation (interview 53). This 
approach can be considered ‘strong’ RRI (Coenen and Grunwald 2017), because its 
participation is broader that an ‘expert’ grouping and more representative of civil society 
participation.  
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Figure 6.6. An adaptive and integrative EU risk governance framework for NM facilitated by Safety by Social Design 
Note: The colour sections  identify separate processes and/or  sub-systems within the model 
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Yet, whilst this proposal is progressive, I recognise several limitations at this time. First is the 
fact that it is Hazard-centric rather than Exposure-centric, as the novel methodologies and 
tools discussed in Chapter 5  do not yet have the capability to confirm exposure assessments 
and their toxicological impacts. These are predicted to come online in due course 
Secondly, it is still lacking the full identification of practical and beneficial outcomes for 
business engagement that might seize the imaginations of SME managers (see interview 31). 
The principal factors are that the persistent daily pressures that business, particularly SMEs 
face (interview 53). I, therefore, propose the answer lies inter alia with governments offering 
financial funding and advisory incentives with basic payments (or tax breaks) to help fund the 
additional costs of the civil consultations. There would not necessarily be a need for new 
regime, but it could be incorporated into existing innovation grant funding mechanism as 
appropriate.  By this means, I believe it would attract the interest of the nano industry and 
their investors to utilize SbSD process, with higher payments and advisory top-ups to 
companies that are willing to take RRI beyond a minimum requirement. Von Schomberg 
(2013) and Bush (2010) believe that such state initiatives could enhance industry self-
regulation and motivation. In addition, I propose the development of a portfolio of other 
incentives for adopting SbSD/RRI (previously discussed in section 6.7 above). These included 
a ‘Responsible Innovation’ product charter mark/trademark,  as a bold statement of company 
commitment and a visible branding badge to encourage others to be involved.  Such actions 
would contribute to more effective industry self-regulation identified in the Taxonomy of 
Regulation (CEPS 2014) and the proposed private governance approach by Hemphill( 2017). 
Reviewing Figure 6.6 conceptually, I argue that it offers a plausible means of enabling 
Proposition 3 and fulfilling EC Objective 3. It does so by achieving the criteria for incorporating 
responsible innovation and risk management within the same framing, and thus provides 
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shape and form for public- private risk governance. A critical output from this model is that 
RRI acts as a bridging mechanism to incorporate socio-ethical concerns in a structured manner 
into the nano-innovation process. This may be criticized as instrumentalizing this concept 
(interview 53), with Genus and Stirling (2018) also expressing their doubts regarding the  over-
attenuation of RRI. But I believe current circumstances dictate the need to make a start, and 
to overcome the current stalled progress, by providing a pragmatic opportunity to implement 
an opaquely perceived concept. By this means, it not only enables the production of safe NM, 
but allows an early risk assessment, NM modulation and product modification to influence 
their marketability and social utility prior to manufacture.  
Finally, I examine this proposition against the recently published criteria for adaptive and 
integrative risk governance for NM previously discussed in table 3.2, Chapter 3. In review, I 
selected key recent publications that have addressed in detail the critical research areas for 
this thesis. The domains are regulatory compliance requirements, scientific tools for risk 
analysis and characterization, and the social appraisal of nano innovation.  This analysis is 
given in Table 6-1 below.  
Table 6-1. Comparative analysis of published criteria for adaptive and integrative risk governance 
 
Domain 
EC Nano 
Strategy 
2004.[COM 
(2004) 338] 
Linkov et al 2018 
Environment 
Systems and 
Decisions 38. 
Stone et al 
2018 Risk 
Analysis. 38. 7 
 
Adaptive and 
Integrative 
model (Figure 
6.6) 
 
 
 
 
Regulatory 
compliance 
requirements 
EC Objective 1 
The strategy 
proposed the 
retro fitting of 
safety legislation 
for NM which is 
found not to 
provide the 
necessary 
assurances for 
nano-safety  
A broad 
evidence base is 
necessary for 
regulatory 
considerations 
in cataloguing 
potential risk 
outcomes 
Legal and 
other (nano-
specific and 
general) 
regulatory 
requirements 
are necessary 
to ensure 
compliance 
and to 
stimulate 
Identifies that 
updated nano 
specific 
legislation with 
a broad 
evidence base is 
necessary for 
accurate risk 
assessment to 
achieve safety 
levels and 
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Domain 
EC Nano 
Strategy 
2004.[COM 
(2004) 338] 
Linkov et al 2018 
Environment 
Systems and 
Decisions 38. 
Stone et al 
2018 Risk 
Analysis. 38. 7 
 
Adaptive and 
Integrative 
model (Figure 
6.6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
proactive 
approaches to 
safety 
 
regulatory 
compliance.  
 
 
 
Scientific Risk 
Analysis and 
characterization 
for NM  
EC Objective 2 
Requires the 
designing and 
adoption of new 
experimental 
tools and 
protocols for 
nano risk 
analysis and 
characterization 
 
The new risk 
analytical tools 
continue to give 
incomplete 
answers or 
outcomes to 
comprehensively 
catalogued risks 
from NM 
Identifies   
the 
continuing 
need for 
dynamic, 
advanced 
scientific 
tools and 
strategies for 
nano risk 
assessment, 
mitigation 
and transfer   
Incorporates the  
novel scientific   
and toxicological 
paradigms for 
faster, more 
economic 
methods, tools, 
and protocols 
for risk analysis 
and 
characterization. 
 
 
 
 
 
Social Appraisal 
of nano 
innovation  
 
EC Objective 3  
Proposes an 
expanded risk 
management 
paradigm to 
include socio-
ethical 
considerations 
Acknowledges 
the need for  
multi-
stakeholder 
insights to 
bridge gaps in 
experimental 
risk assessment 
data and 
outcomes 
Promotes the 
fostering of 
dialogue with 
civil society to 
determine 
societal 
concerns for  
nano 
innovation 
risks, their 
mitigation, 
and transfer  
Proposes a 
methodology 
based on RRI 
principles for 
civil actor 
consultation and 
incorporation of 
their value- led 
concerns into 
the SbSD 
process for 
safety and 
product 
development 
decision making 
     
 
From the above analysis, I believe that the modular framework I propose for an adaptive and 
integrative model in Figure 6.6 above, demonstrates its capability to meet the expectations of 
all three EC NanoStrategy  Objectives. In practical terms, I suggest that this novel approach 
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has the potential to facilitate more reliable and conformable R&D outcomes.  It could do this 
by encouraging the devising of new scientific risk analysis tools, alternative integrated safety 
testing strategies, and inspiring the exploration of new product ideas, when imagining 
different plausible futures for the nano applications.  
A final note is that the significance of the above findings are reflected in  three recently funded 
EU H2020 projects (all commencing 1st January 2019) which seek to address issues raised 
above. Their objectives include the development of a new policy framework for NM, to 
support a modular risk governance decision-making framework, addressing different aspects 
of NM governance, to be  overseen by a new EU Risk Governance Council comprising of EU 
Member States, public authorities, scientific experts, civil society and industry 
representatives. (RiskGone: https://riskgone.wp.nilu.no/home-riskgone-project/about-us/ ; 
NanoRigo:https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/220129/factsheet/en;Gov4Nano: 
https://www.gov4nano.eu/)  
 Conclusions 
In Chapter 5, I focused primarily on the ‘hard’ law options and identified gaps in the EU 
regulatory control (REACH) of NM, the inadequacies of current regulatory nano sciences and 
their emerging alternatives,  and a perceived over-reliance on the PP in its preventative rather 
than its deliberative mode.  In response, I have examined in detail in this Chapter the potential 
for ‘soft law’ options to fill the risk governance gaps (interview 39).  My focus has been on the 
analysis and evaluation of the respondents data sources in respect of the ‘soft law ‘options 
(Hemphill 2017; Petratos 2015; Lee and Petts 2013; Owen et al 2013; Bowman and Hodges 
2008). Specifically, the Chapter addresses the deliberative component of the analytical- 
deliberative model (Rosa, McCright and Renn 2013) for an evaluative pragmatic application 
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for  RRI, and the prospect of developing a deliberative mechanism for activating RRI within 
the SbD process. I examined the entwining of the PP with RRI and  SbD conceptual approaches 
to provide the justification and legitimacy for the genesis of a novel approach I label SbSD. I 
also propose that a further benefit is a contemporary application PP to progress it from its 
current perceived precautionary mode (as discussed in Chapter 5)towards a more 
anticipatory mode.   
I found significant cross-sectoral support for both RRI and SbD from respondents, with the 
exception of industry representatives. Those interviewees offered idiosyncratic opinions of 
what it means to innovate ‘responsibly’, lacked buy-in for the RRI concept, and were 
lukewarm towards SbD.  There are, however, some mitigating circumstances for these 
behaviours by SMEs ( though not for international companies), due to the  complexity of the 
financial, scientific, technological and market forces that innovating SMEs must work within 
(interviews 35, 13, 25, 8).  There is a possible explanation in that these demands result in 
‘responsible’ innovation being purposively interpreted as narrowly addressing EHS for their 
nano-enabled products (i.e. minimum legal compliance only). Nonetheless, this situation does 
not relegate the desirability for more overt mechanisms for socio-ethical considerations to be 
incorporated within their innovation processes. Current EU funded research projects such as 
COMPASS and PRISMA ( see Section 6.7 above) will contribute to a further understanding of 
these matters 
What this Chapter has sought to do is to identify an offering for industry that demonstrates 
that there can be a positive business value in engaging with RRI as promoted by the EU (Rome 
Declaration 2014). I consider that SbSD has that potential to add tangible value to business in 
respect of risk management, regulatory compliance, public product viability/ marketability, 
and social utility. To stimulate greater business engagement (especially SMEs), I propose 
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state-led and other business-related incentives as further motivation for RRI engagement. I 
believe that these proposals offer ‘soft law’ solutions with which to fill the current ’hard law’ 
gaps in EU nano risk governance. In doing so, it enables the terms of Proposition 3 to be 
fulfilled and EC Objective 3 to be enabled.   
Finally, I finished this Chapter by bringing together all the critical findings from Chapter 5 & 6 
from this study and merging them into a single holistic model which is adaptive and 
integrative for nano risk governance (Figure 6.6). This modular design provides for sub-
systems, pathways and processes for the responsible innovation of NM which incorporates 
all of the aspirations of the EC Nano Strategy. It can also contribute into current policy 
discussions and, in some instances exceed them, if based on the expectations of recently 
published criteria for a framework for adaptive and integrative risk governance for NM (Table 
6-1). In addition, it can make a contribution to EU intentions for the development of a new 
policy framework for NM, to support a modular risk governance decision-making framework 
addressing different aspects of NM governance, which will be overseen by a newly 
established  EU Risk Governance Council. 
 It is my proposition that this model (Figure 6.6) provides an option for a comprehensive risk 
governance framework that could address the  policy options for NM now being researched 
by the EU research projects. Through its social learning characteristics, it is receptive to 
legislative amendments; adaptive to new technological advances in nano innovation and so 
contributing to minimizing the ‘pacing’ problem; responsive to new scientific thinking and 
practices for risk analysis and characterization; with a mechanism for the incorporation of 
timely socio-ethical concerns within the nano innovation processes. I suggest that, by this 
means, the EC vision for the safe and responsible innovation of NM may be achieved.   
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 Introduction  
This Chapter offers conclusions from this study on the regulatory effectiveness of policies 
promoting  the safe and responsible development of NM. It does this by drawing together the 
findings from the evaluation of primary and secondary data, in the previous two Chapters, to 
assess progress towards achieving the EC NanoStrategy aim and objectives for this sector 
[COM (2004) 338]. The adoption of the NanoStrategy effectively created a new regulatory 
space and policy discourse for nanotechnologies, at national and international scales. The 
progression towards the realisation of the three key risk governance objectives from it have 
been the focus of my research.   
In brief, the thesis’s key findings are fourfold. Firstly, there continue to be EU legislative 
deficiencies due to: (a) the critical flaws in the REACH regulations due to its lack of specificity 
for NM safety testing, and (b) the scientifically contested EC definition for NM. Both of which 
fundamentally undermine legal authority for enforcing regulatory compliance. Secondly, 
there are critical scientific gaps that prevent comprehensive nano-risk analysis of the EHS 
implications of NM production and nano-enabled products. Thirdly, there are clear 
indications that the nano industry is seeking to avoid engaging with either product regulation 
(REACH) or social-ethical appraisal of NM production. Finally, to compound these deficiencies, 
the NanoStrategy does not provide a bespoke overarching EU risk governance framework to 
scrutinise either the EHS effects or the wider social implications of current and future nano-
innovation pathways.  I argue these policy shortcomings are aggravated by EU regulatory 
under-performance in failing to address what the EC has itself recognised as manifest 
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shortcomings in regulating NM via REACH, compromising further the effectiveness of the 
NanoStrategy. I discuss these findings in more detail below.  
 Summary of the main findings  
Perhaps the most surprising finding from the primary data analysis was evidence in Chapters 
5&6 of industry avoidance in engaging with REACH, Safety by Design(SbD) and Responsible 
Research and Innovation (RRI). It is a particular concern that respondents commented on legal 
loopholes in the REACH registration being exploited by NM companies through their 
manipulation of annual manufacturing outputs, so they fell below the REACH trigger tonnage 
levels (Chapter 5). The fact that only 29 nanoform dossiers were submitted for REACH 
registration in the period 2008-18 may be telling in that respect (Nanotechnology Industry 
Association 2018). This gives some credence to NGO respondents claims that there are NM 
within the consumer market currently that have not been through the REACH safety testing 
regime. In response, industry respondents cited the daily financial, technical and market-
driven barriers to their financial survival especially for SMEs involved in NM manufacture – 
with the prospect of having to comply with a burdensome regulatory regime (REACH) if they 
successfully grow their business. Chapters 5 and 6 offer a more complete understanding of 
the commercial factors driving this resistance to regulatory standards and reluctance to 
participate in deliberative engagement.   
Building on these findings, I proposed novel policy measures that might address these 
regulatory and deliberative shortcomings. On the deliberative side, I offered a novel way of 
implementing RRI by linking it with the existing industry design approach, Safety by Design  
(SbD). SbD has now a strong presence in some industries (as discussed in para 6.5) and has 
been  adopted by the EC as both a policy concept and engineering process for  achieving the 
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safe development of NM( Gottardo et al.2017).  I now propose to utilize it to also act as a 
platform for implementing RRI in manufacturing settings. By co-joining PP/SbD/RRI 
approaches together in one platform, I argue that SbD and RRI could facilitate new expert and 
civil society dialogues along the nano-innovation value chain, enabling NM innovation 
processes to be made more transparent and accountable to consumers.  In doing so, I suggest 
that they also provide a contemporary setting for the Precautionary Principle that enables it 
to meet both its precautionary and deliberative objectives for which it was originally 
devised(COM2000). I recommended the introduction of a new package of incentives to be 
made available to industry (Chapter 6) to help companies move away from the closed and 
opaque R&D practices that currently typify NM production. The resulting ‘Safety by Social 
Design’ conceptual approach and the mechanisms for its implementation, discussed in 
Chapter 6, are key outcomes from this study (see Figure 7.1 below). 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Safety by Social Design model – synthesising the Precautionary Principle, Safety by 
Design, and Responsible Research and Innovation concepts 
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Conceptually, this study provides a novel construct in SbSD, by  the  synthesis of  PP with SbD 
and RRI. In doing so, it thereby extends the current reach of each of these existing approaches 
For example, it allows the two limbs of PP to be activated in both their precautionary and 
anticipatory forms in response to identified uncertainties(Per Sandin 2002, von Schomberg 
2006, Stirling 2016 etc ). It promotes SbD beyond the single normative value of ‘safety’ to a 
position whereby it may have multiple normative values( van de Poel et al.2017,Gottardo et 
al.2017). Finally, it activates RRI in an industry context, so that deliberative action can be 
taken in resolving socio-ethical problems relevant to NM innovation( Owen et al.2013, Stilgoe 
et al.2013. etc) . The aim is the greater alignment of nano innovation with societal norms, 
values, needs and aspirations (Ribeiro et al.2018, Nordmann 2018). 
The SbSD conceptual approach then facilitates the proposed development of a novel adaptive 
and Integrative Risk Governance model for NM which does not currently exist. This proposes 
a holistic model  of risk governance to fill that current the gap. In doing so, my  intention that 
the Safety by Social Design (SbSD) concept offers an alternative for solutions to the regulatory 
and deliberative shortcomings identified in implementing the EC NanoStrategy, in that it may 
be a means of fulfilling its three risk governance objectives. In recap, these are summarised 
as: 
EC Objective 1-Maximum use would be made of existing regulation though adjustments may 
be necessary.  
EC Objective 2  - Existing parameters for EHS chemical safety testing may not be appropriate 
for the unique properties of NPs, requiring new methods and tools for risk assessment, and 
refinement of nano scale metrology and standardisation activities. 
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EC Objective 3- The Risk Management paradigm to be expanded to incorporate socio-ethical 
considerations into the R&D process with the creation of a culture of responsibility which is 
participatory and inclusive. 
The model is structured to compliment mandatory EU regulatory compliance outcomes with 
deliberatively framed socio-ethical alternatives. The main aim is societal alignment of the 
nano-innovation process more closely with society norms, needs and values as aspired to in 
the EU Rome Declaration (2014). The model is adaptive as it is driven by continuous social 
learning with opportunities for multiple expert and non-expert actor engagement. It is 
integrative by incorporating all the elements identified in Chapters 5 and 6 as essential 
contemporary and future facing factors for nano risk governance decisions. By this I mean 
that the framework acknowledges and incorporates not only evolving scientific risk analysis 
knowledge, techniques and protocols, but foregrounds Responsible Research and Innovation 
(RRI) within the SbSD process as the facilitating concept for an inclusive and participatory 
engagement of relevant expert and civil actors. 
I argue that the real value of this new SbSD approach is that it can address not only the EHS 
issues of ‘safety’ attached to NM, but also opens up new avenues for deliberative engagement 
with key stakeholders (van de Poel and Robaey 2017). Importantly, business engagement with 
socio-ethical issues of NM would be actively encouraged by adopting the principles of RRI 
(Reber 2018; Genus and Iskandarova 2018; Von Schomberg 2014; Owen et al 2013; Stilgoe et 
al 2013; Von Schomberg 2013). Civil society value-led concerns could then begin to inform 
industry and regulatory safety and design decision-making, at early product development 
stages, rather than arising in marketing focus groups at the end of the NM development 
process and/or release onto the market. Overall, I believe that SbSD could thus provide a new 
mechanism for instilling new dialogues and co-ordinating new collaborative activities among 
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stakeholders in a timely way. I believe that is approach will help avoid technological lock-in, 
build consumer trust and acceptance of nano-enabled products, as well as in the regulatory 
process itself.  
However, I recognise that this model in itself is not a panacea, and that there are barriers that 
need to be resolve. Here I address the significant underlying structural problems that need 
addressing through future EU policy action. Firstly, the need for adopting nano-specific 
regulatory processes, such as validated Test Guidelines and Guidance documents tailored for 
NM, in order to provide authorative and reproducible datasets needed for industry and 
regulatory safety decision-making. Secondly, there is the need for proof of concept for the 
new scientific concepts and tools that will support the new toxicological paradigms  to be 
utilized within the model.  Fadeel et al.(2018) makes the point that solutions to this problem  
are still  temporally someway off.  Thirdly,  the absence of policy mechanisms for meaningful 
industry engagement in respect of RRI and SbD is proving particularly problematic. I suggest 
possible solutions in terms of industry incentives in respect of future research and technology 
funding, taxation breaks, regulatory  passporting, and charter marks. There will also be a need 
for new structures( possibly within technology hubs) to place and develop the Trusted 
Environments where these industry and civil collaborations can take place.  
Notwithstanding the above, all of which could  be resolved in time, I propose that  SbSD could 
become the central processing component for both risk analytical (quantitative) and social-
ethical (qualitative) data (see Figure 7.2 below). These data sets would feed into separate ‘Risk’ 
or ‘Design’ profiles for evaluation by expert-civil society panels. These discussion outcomes 
would provide the foundation for a broad range of decisions in respect of nanoproduct risk 
management, regulatory compliance, product viability, marketability and its social utility.  I 
define ‘Safety by Social Design’ as “the process that assesses safe product design and social 
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utility by evaluating its functionality, potential (eco)toxicity, predicted consumer applications 
and societal alignment in an adaptive and integrated manner’.  
Having briefly outlined my main findings, I now turn to answering the three questions posed 
in the introduction to this thesis based on my analysis of the primary qualitative data. 
 Analysing the research propositions    
In Chapter 4, I describe how the three research propositions that underpin the research in 
this thesis were derived from the three EC NanoStrategy risk governance objectives [COM 
(2004) 338] to provide the fundamental analytical framing for this study. The structure for the 
thematic analytical framework to address these questions is discussed and set out in Table 4-2 
of that Chapter. As set out in Chapters 5 and 6, each proposition was validated through 
analysis of qualitative interview responses from the cross-sectoral sample of 55 respondents 
in this study. 
 However, an important point for research set in a post-normal context must be highlighted. 
It is that there were no lay members amongst the 55 respondents interviewed for the reasons 
discussed in para 4.3.5 above. Instead, I proposed that the NGO respondents could act as their 
proxies, and I believe that to an acceptable level that has occurred. Nevertheless, I do need 
to emphasise that the absence of lay members in the debates needs to be recognised as an 
important factor for this study and its subsequent findings. Though I do not consider it 
significant enough to skew the findings sufficiently to invalidate the study outcomes.  
Below I address each proposition and summarise the outcomes of the Chapter analysis.   
 198 
 
7.3.1 Research proposition 1: ‘Current EU regulation (REACH) does 
provide assurances for  public environmental health safety  
Proposition1 reflects on the question whether the EC NanoStrategy risk governance objective 
for the retro- fitting of existing legislation to include and cover NM has been effectively 
implemented. My analysis endorses that there is a  basic definitional problem at the heart of 
the EU NanoStrategy – namely that there is no scientific consensus currently as to what 
constitutes a NP. It follows that, without an accepted measurable scientific metrical 
definition, with legal authority to clarify what differentiates a NP from any other chemical 
substance, enforcement action under REACH is problematic and challengeable. A draft EC 
definition of NM was proposed in 2011 (2011/696/EU), but interviewees noted there was 
scientific disagreement over the validity of this draft leading to the EC’s Joint Research Centre 
(JRC) conducting further scientific reviews (JRC 2013, 2014,2015). Whilst supportive of the 
proposed EC definition, these reports have not yet brought this issue to an agreed conclusion, 
resulting in the EC proposing a further public consultation which may take place later in 2019 
(EUR 27240 EN). With Miernicki et al (2019) recently concluding that this situation means that 
nano innovation may be facing a pathway full of legal uncertainties. Without a legally 
authorative definition, enforcement of NM regulation via REACH becomes extremely 
problematic, undermining regulatory assurances for nano-safety. Notwithstanding the efforts 
of the EC in funding the EU FP7 NanoDEFINE project (http://www.nanodefine.eu/ ) to find a 
scientific solution to this critical issue. 
This problem is further complicated by the identification of the cross-sectoral disillusionment 
of respondents with the inadequate nano-specific provisions within REACH for addressing 
nano-safety. The original REACH regulations are silent on NM and treating them like any other 
chemical substance (Bowman 2017). However, advances in scientific understanding has 
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identified that their unique properties require nano specificity in the published REACH risk 
assessment protocols. This disillusionment is further exacerbated by a deep frustration 
caused by the perceived dilatory EC response to requests for policy action to resolve this 
critical safety issue. Thus, there are strongly expressed complaints from industry and other 
respondents that this regulatory deficit has resulted in an over-reliance on the application of 
the Precautionary Principle (PP) based on policy intention rather than evidence-based risk 
assessment (COM 2000). These frustrations may have been the trigger for some EU Member 
States to set up their own National Registers for NM and nano-enabled products e.g. France 
(2012), Belgium (2013), Denmark (2013), Norway ( 2014) and Sweden ( 2018). 
Notwithstanding the strength of these complaints there was, counter-intuitively, no demand 
from any respondents for new nano-specific EU safety regulations to supplant REACH. This is 
a surprising and unexpected finding, bearing in mind the strength of feeling expressed about 
the current legal loopholes in NM definition and REACH regulations. So, interviewees are not 
averse to REACH per se as the principal EU chemical safety regime. Instead, their preferences 
is for a revision of the REACH annexes to incorporate  nano-specific testing protocols. Since I 
drew these conclusions from the empirics, the EC have announced a REACH upgrade of 
exactly this sort, with the aim of providing nano-specific testing protocols from 1st January 
2020 (EC DO 56122/02). Amending REACH in this way offers the prospect of meeting EC 
Objective 1, and it is highly likely that a metrical solution will be found for the current 
scientifically contested EU nano definition in due course (EUR 27240 EN).     
However, these policy proposals offer no solution to nano manufacturers exploiting existing 
loopholes in REACH, so that they do not need to submit chemical registration dossiers for 
regulatory approval prior to bringing new NM to market (Jantunen et al 2018). Closing these 
loopholes, by significantly reducing annual manufacturing tonnage trigger levels for NM for 
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example, is unlikely in the foreseeable future as recent history has demonstrated laggard 
response by the EC in NM matters. Consequently, I believe this unsatisfactory situation flags 
up an urgent need for different perspectives to be incorporated into how the EU policy can 
achieve nano-safety outcomes. One approach suggested by interviewees is greater emphasis 
on industry self-regulation. Though not ideal this proposal does suggest a foundation for a 
more formalised approach that could draw upon aspects of a self-regulative approach based 
around principles of responsible innovation.  This matter will be discussed in more detail in 
section 7.3.2.  
Thus, Proposition 1 cannot be accepted as REACH manifestly does not provide acceptable  
public assurances for nano-safety at this time, though it is recognised that efforts have been 
made in this direction (ECHA 2017(a),(b),(c)). The explanation lies partly in the flawed EU 
policy to retrospectively apply REACH without nano-specific amendments. It is compounded 
by the dilatory (ten-year) lag in the EC approving new nano-specific REACH amendments, and 
the still unresolved nano definition issue. This EC laxity may have contributed to resistant 
behaviours by NM companies, with evasion of REACH registration protocols meaning 
products may be on the market containing untested NM. This is particularly important when 
the NM is included in a product because it exhibits a very specific functionality which may 
influence its reactivity and thus its untested potential toxicity. So, any evasion tactics reflect 
poorly on both the nano industry and the EC policymakers, who have not yet signalled that 
they are aware of this issue and have not attempted to close that loophole.  
 Notwithstanding these regulatory gaps, there also continue to be sizeable knowledge deficits 
in epistemic nanoscience, risk assessment testing protocols, risk characterization, and 
accurately derived EHS safety standards which also undermine the capability for regulatory 
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action. I discuss opportunities to provide new solutions to these long-standing dilemmas in 
the next section.  
7.3.2 Research proposition 2: ‘That novel scientific tools and 
predictive paradigm(s) can provide future confidence for industry and 
regulators in nano-safety decision-making’ 
The second research proposition addresses the current lack of scientific knowledge 
underpinning the enforcement of REACH and other EU nano regulation. It is derived from the 
EC NanoStrategy second objective that ‘Recognises that existing parameters for EHS chemical 
safety testing may not be appropriate for the unique properties of NPs, requiring new methods 
and tools for risk assessment, and refinement of nano scale metrology and standardisation 
activities’.   
Testimony to this lack of nano-specific scientific protocols was an industry interviewee who 
summarized for me the widely-held opinion that the current toxicological testing methods for 
NM were “not fit for purpose” (Interview 24, Chapter 5). There is increasingly compelling 
evidence that current single probabilistic toxicological tests, that use vertebrates and other 
organisms for regulatory evaluation, provide flawed results e.g. false positives/false negatives 
(Stirling 2016a, Jahnel 2015b). I therefore canvassed opinions among interviewees on the 
novel toxicological techniques that are now emerging for NM evaluation, which utilize multi-
cellular testing assays rather than animal tests, and which employ multiple primary and 
secondary data sources (cf. ECHA 2017; Stone et al 2017; Hjorth et al 2016; Jahnel 2015a, 
2015b; Oomen 2013; Stone et al 2013; Nel et al 2013). Importantly, these techniques derived 
from emerging Systems Biology work offer the prospect of moving from single probabilistic 
testing to a ‘weight of evidence’ approach for nano-risk characterization (Gottardo et al 2017; 
Jahnel 2015b; Hristozov et al 2014; SCHENIR 2012). Research projects are now being 
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extensively funded by the EC for the development of future predictive toxicological profiling 
for tiered hazard and risk-ranking of NM (NanoSafetyClusterhttps://www.nano-
safetycluster.eu/).  
Analysis in Chapter 5 concluded that these novel cellular based methodologies have the 
potential to lead to faster, flexible and more economic risk analysis as demanded by industry 
and could offer them a number of important potential benefits. These include accelerating 
nano risk characterization processes, reducing regulatory compliance timescales, hastening 
nanoproduct discovery to market, and the deontic effect of minimizing animal testing. With 
other economic outcomes such as reducing nano entrepreneurial costs, earlier payback on 
investments, and promoting investor interest. However, much experimental work needs to 
be conducted to develop the necessary scientific methods, tools and protocols for these 
techniques (Fadeel et al. 2018), and to ensure they are predictive of in-vivo outcomes to 
protect general public health and that of consumers.  Proof of concept is still outstanding and 
until there is, current animal testing for regulatory purposes will continue. These outstanding 
issues suggest a regulatory approach based around multi-cellular testing and Systems Biology 
still lie some way off (Hjorth et al. 2016). Consequently, I have to conclude that whilst these 
innovative scientific solutions hold much promise and are greeted with optimism amongst all 
respondent groups they cannot, as yet, provide the assurances for nano safety decision-
making that allows Proposition 2 to be accepted with confidence. 
Reflecting on the uncertain timescales for implementing these new solutions, I conclude that 
current and proposed scientific methods for risk assessment do not yet provide for a 
competent risk analysis for NM. This conclusion, combined with current deficits for NM in the 
REACH regulations (section 7.3.1), identified for me that novel approaches to EHS risk analysis 
and socio-ethical challenges deserve their opportunity to be critically evaluated as 
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mechanisms to fully realise the risk governance objectives in the EC NanoStrategy 2004[COM 
(2004) 338]. I discuss these possibilities next.  
7.3.3 Research Proposition 3 - RRI can act as an anticipatory 
governance mechanism for embedding socio-ethical values for safe 
design within nano-innovation  
This third research proposition asks whether RRI can be the mechanism to enable the 
intention of EC Objective 3 which is ‘the risk management paradigm to be expanded to 
incorporate socio-ethical considerations into the R&D process with the creation of a culture 
of responsibility which is participatory and inclusive’ [COMM(2004)338]. 
Reflecting on the substance and tenor of industry respondent interviews, it is clear that many 
believe they already have a culture of responsibility within their manufacturing and design 
processes. Within their narrow framing this may be true, in that none believed they 
manufactured nano enabled products that were not safe or fit for the purpose for which they 
are designed. Perhaps this partly explains interviewees conservatism for engaging with 
formalised structures for responsible innovation outside of minimum legal compliance 
requirements. Whilst this reflects their minimum ethical stance of not doing any ‘harm’, it 
does not necessarily imply a position of progressively doing societal ‘good’ (van de Poel et al 
2017). Certainly, the daily technical, financial and market pressures, discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6, also provided perceived and real barriers to industry participation with EU 
responsible innovation policy. In their quest for business survival, RRI and other policy 
initiatives seem of little concern to most industry respondents or were simply ignored.  
In stark contrast, other respondents including EC administrators, nanoscientists, social 
scientists and NGOs support and promote the principle of RRI application to nano innovation. 
However, the absence of any regulatory recognition ,or  formal mechanism to insert RRI into 
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NM production, nor incentives for its adoption, have clearly undermined its implementation. 
Crucially, none of the respondents in this study offered a delivery platform which could 
achieve this goal. It is widely recognised the absence of such a platform is a critical barrier for 
nano industry adoption and implementation of RRI (Burget et al. 2017; Goujon 2016, Antelo 
2016; Blok and Lemmens 2015; Wickson and Carew 2014). As discussed in Chapter 6, it is 
important to note here that the significance of the above findings are reflected by the fact 
that there are three further recently funded EU H2020 projects (all commencing 1st January 
2018) which seek to address the issues raised above. Their objectives include the 
development of a new policy framework for NM, to support a modular risk governance 
decision-making framework addressing different aspects of  NM governance, and to be 
overseen by the establishment of an EU Risk Governance Council comprising of EU Member 
States, public authorities, scientific experts, civil society and industry representatives. 
RiskGone: https://riskgone.wp.nilu.no/home-riskgone-project/about-us/ 
NanoRigo: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/220129/factsheet/en  
Gov4Nano: https://www.gov4nano.eu/ 
I argue in Chapter 6, for repurposing SbD to act as the platform for inserting RRI into the nano-
innovation process. I outlined recent work justifying RRI (Reber 2018; Genus and Iskandarova 
2018; Von Schomberg 2014) and SbD (Kraegeloh et al 2018; Gottardo et al 2017; Suarez-
Marino et al 2017) as directly compatible with the EU’s longstanding Precautionary Principle. 
On this basis, I propose that the hybrid combination of PP, SbD, and RRI offers a novel 
approach that I label as ‘Safety by Social Design’ (Figure 7.1 above). Through this mechanism, 
expert and civil actors could participate in a pre-planned manner, in trusted environments, in 
debates over both ‘risk’ and ‘design’ elements to shape NM decision-making. By 
foregrounding SbSD in this way, I suggest that it can offer the potential for a prospective 
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deliberative model to meet the intentions of EC Objective 3. Nevertheless, I acknowledge the 
current resistance to this approach amongst industry representatives, which I would hope to 
counter by proposing financial and other initiatives to be introduced as a portfolio of new 
business incentives. These might include government funding, charter marking, regulatory 
passporting, and branding recognition (Stone et al. 2017; Wiek et al. 2016).   
In summary, my analysis and evaluation of research Proposition 3 shows an RRI driven 
deliberative model could  be constructed and pragmatically implemented for nano innovation 
with SbSD at its heart (see Figure 7.2 below). However, its successful implementation will 
require a pro-active governmental strategy to promote its benefits, with financial and other 
incentives to motivate the nano industry to overcome their innate prejudices. 
 Though I do not underestimate the difficulties in terms of the barriers to be overcome and 
possible limitations of my proposals themselves. These can be separated into five distinct 
areas. Firstly, the EU policy approval still needed for the adoption of the new toxicological 
paradigms for scientific and regulatory testing of NM. Secondly, the continuing need for EU 
funding of NM related research, for epistemic advances to provide the scientific underpinning 
for these new paradigms and provide the essential proof of concept before they will be 
accepted for regulatory purposes. The third issue is of a socio-cultural nature with some 
evidence that  industry is undertaking avoidance tactics to NM registration under REACH. 
Neither does industry fully accept that need to engage with either SbD or RRI as they believe 
they already develop their products safely and responsibly and can see little value in these 
new approaches. Fourthly, there is the lack of an active ‘infrastructure’ where industry can 
engage collaboratively with stakeholders within in trusted environments. Finally, there will 
be a need for further  policy action supported by financial investment to provide the proposed 
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incentives for industry engagement which is currently absent.  So, these barriers / limitations 
are not insignificant will need resolution before all my proposals can be  fully activated.   
As a consequence, my overall reflection on the three research propositions is that currently 
none can be upheld, because none of the corresponding EC nano risk governance objectives 
have been implemented successfully (despite being extant since 2004). However, my analysis 
indicates that there are a range of policy, regulatory, scientific structures and other EU funded 
initiatives that are beginning to emerge that could have important roles to play in enabling 
these objectives in the short-medium future ( 5-10 years). As identified in Chapter 4, the three 
EC risk governance objectives are interdependent in their actions and their outputs (see 
Chapter 4. figure 4.3). This requires them to be collectively attained, by synchronizing their 
relevant mechanisms for implementation, if they are to achieve the overall EC goal for the 
safe and responsible innovation of NM. Consequently, in the next section I synthesize my 
conclusions and reflections from this study to offer a future perspective for EU nano risk 
governance that may deliver on the EC NanoStrategy’s key aim. 
 Adaptive and Integrative EU Risk Governance 
Framework for NM  
Jahnel (2015b) postulates substantive risk governance gaps due to uncertainties and 
variabilities in current science and technological practice when evaluating risks from NM. As 
a consequence, Jahnel suggests that a new paradigm for NM risk policy is necessary which is 
exposure driven, as opposed to the current hazard- based approach. It will require a flexible 
tiered methodology that is continually informed by technoscientific advances in our 
biophysicochemical understandings of the NM release, fate, bio-behaviours and (eco)toxicity. 
In figure 7.2 below, I propose a novel adaptive and integrative social learning framework for 
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EU risk governance that I argue could  meet this criteria. However, in this figure I go further 
than Jahnel through incorporating the novel conceptual approach of SbSD with the intention 
of capturing within the nano innovation process the values-led contributions from non-expert 
and civil actors. The purpose is to allow these contributions the opportunity to influence NM 
commercial applications and manufacturing decisions. The SbSD mechanisms provide 
sequential inputs and outputs to and from the ‘Risk ‘and ‘Design’ profiles, that produce 
options and answers to questions relating to risk management, regulatory compliance, 
product feasibility, viability & marketability, and its overall social utility.  By doing so, I argue 
the proposed model would provide a means of tackling the full range of goals contained in 
the three EC risk governance strategy objectives. Here I outline briefly how the model would 
work in practice. 
7.4.1 Development of ‘Risk’ profiles for Safety by Social Design 
decisions  
The Tier testing approach has been discussed in detail in Chapter 5, but I summarise the 
reasoning for its incorporation into this model as follows. The nanoinformatics libraries are 
the first line of the testing regime. (i.e. Tier 1). The libraries are continuously updating curated 
repositories where current technoscientific knowledge and practice can be sourced for 
specific NM. This in itself may provide sufficient curated scientific evidence for confirmation 
of a lack of concerning risk related issues ( e.g. within the nano production process, use phase, 
pathways for environmental  release, end of life releases, and any hazards relating from NM 
consumer useage and /or environmental releases). Such scientific confirmation will then 
avoid the need for further safety testing. If that information/data is incomplete, then a 
systematic process of hazard, exposure  and risk assessment occurs in Tiers 2,3, & 4.   
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The nanoinformatic tools  will assist in the design of that risk assessment testing strategy for 
the characterisation of potential risk(s). This risk characterization may trigger further 
precautionary technoscientific measures to modify NM biophysicochemical properties, 
functionality or even require chemical substitution. Any redesign may necessitate further re-
testing. This characterization will include testing the data against approved scientific /legal 
standards, risk tolerability, the identification of essential risk management steps, and the 
actions needed to achieve regulatory compliance. At this stage, it establishes a ’Risk ‘Profile 
for the NM detailing biophysicochemical properties, its functionality, (eco)toxicology 
implications, related risk factors, and their collective influences on the projected nanoproduct 
application(s), manufacture, and safe use. This ‘Risk’ profile is then incorporated within the 
SbSD matrix with recommendations for a ‘go/no go’ decision based on the expected purpose 
for which the NM is to be used.  Remembering that some known NM currently have multiple 
uses e.g. titanium dioxide is widely and diversely used in sunscreens, paints ,food colourants 
for example. 
7.4.2 Development of ‘Design’ profiles for Safety by Social Design 
decisions  
In parallel, I am proposing there is the dynamic process for the development of the NM 
‘Design ‘parameters. With RRI as the conceptual bridging mechanism, the design parameters 
are informed inter alia by value-led concerns from invited non-expert and civil actors. Within 
trusted environments, this normative data can be collected honestly and timely with the 
purpose of informing the nano innovators on a portfolio of community driven concerns. These 
could include misuse of natural resources, adverse manufacturing practices/emissions, EHS 
impacts, product social utility and consumer marketability. How these novel collaborative 
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mechanisms might look in practice is currently being explored by EU funded research projects 
such as: 
 COMPASS (https://innovation-compass.eu/)  
 PRISMA ( http://www.rri-prisma.eu/).  
These collaborative discussions can be wide ranging and include detailed consideration of  the 
industry sector ( e.g. food, computers, environmental remediation), current relevant 
approved industry codes of practice (ACOP), techno-scientific data relating to production 
design, costs and controls, and the value-led concerns that might have been generated by 
previous consultations. All this data will be relevant to and incorporated within the ‘Design’ 
profile for the NM and its nano-enabled products.  
The ‘Risk’ and the ‘Design’ profiles can be made simultaneously available for debate and 
decision by business actors and their civil stakeholders in consultation fora. Participation need 
not be restricted only to those involved in the prior data collection and profile preparation, 
with new actors invited at this time. The debates will weigh the relative merits/deficiencies 
of the constituent data and any proposed recommendations/decisions offered within the 
‘Risk’ and ‘Design’ profiles. These profiles will influence co-decisions regarding risk 
management, regulatory compliance, product feasibility, marketability, social utility and 
societal alignment. 
7.4.3 Benefits arising from the Adaptive and Integrative EU Risk 
Governance Framework  
The new framework I have outlined here has clear benefits for policymakers, scientists, 
regulators, societal interests and business over existing approaches. First is that it provides a 
whole system model from NM discovery, to manufacture, through to product marketability. 
Secondly, with its analytical and deliberative structure, it recognises that innovation does not 
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occur in isolation, that it is not independent of society, but is instead a dynamic multi-staged 
process that is fundamentally dependent on companies interacting with business partners, 
regulatory organisations, and civil communities (Ruggui 2015, UK Government Chief Scientific 
Adviser 2014; European Science Foundation 2013; von Schomberg 2013; Rip 2012; Deuten 
and Rip 1997). For policy makers and scientists, the framework prioritises the need for 
evidenced and reproduceable scientific knowledge to underpin novel developments in NM 
risk governance strategy and its design; in doing so it offers guidance on modes for effective 
interaction of science and risk decision-making (Jahnel 2015b). I would argue that the 
framework could encourage NM businesses to interact early with regulators to develop 
mutual awareness, as is the aspiration for the evolving EC policy for a new era of industry 
/regulator relationships to develop ‘Regulatory Preparedness’ and ‘Sustainable Innovation 
Assessment’ (Katalagariniakis 2018). This novel framework can identify and address 
upstream, early issues of concern, promote mid-stream modulation, and minimise 
foreseeable delays which may help ease the passage for industry in achieving nanoproduct 
regulatory compliance. For regulators, it emphasises and assists in their need for technology 
foresight, including constant horizon scanning and trend watching, to maintain their 
regulatory preparedness in an ever-changing innovation space. This helps mitigate known 
risks and encourages the engineering-out of poorly quantified risks, for new nano products 
coming to market, and supports the other emerging EC policy for a ‘Sustainable Innovation 
Approach’ for NM (Katalagariniakis 2018).  
This integrative framework foregrounds the need for open dialogues between NM businesses 
and civil actors. Such early dialogues with prospective consumers may yield unexpected 
insights for industry which enhance nano product utility, branding and its marketability. 
Finally, for societal interests it is an opportunity for contributing to the development of 
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nanoproducts which are of value to society. If trust is episodic in nature (Baumann and Le 
Meunier-Fitzhugh 2014), then over time such a co-creation process can generate a greater 
trust and confidence in the nanotechnology sector, their enterprises, and the safety and utility 
of nano products that come to the market.    
Finally, as can be seen in section 7.3.3 above, the EU is making a considerable investment in 
its funding of three recently commenced major research projects that are addressing the  
topics of a risk governance framework for NM, and the establishment of a new European Risk 
Governance Council to oversee its operation. I believe that the findings from my research and 
this proposal for an adaptive and integrative risk governance framework can make a 
contribution to those debates. 
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Figure 7.2. An Adaptive and Integrative EU Risk Governance Framework  for NM  facilitated by Safety by Social Design 
Note: The coloured sections represent separate processes and/or sub-systems 
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My intention is that this novel  framework provokes new dialogues between hitherto-siloed 
actors, triggering social learning processes that not only promote the circulation of 
information to continuously inform and update stakeholders (see Chapter 6), but also makes 
these stakeholders more aware of differing attitudes, opinions and interests in relation to NM 
development and production. I discuss in detail in Chapter 6 (Table 6-1) how this model meets, 
in some cases exceeds, the tests set for an adaptive and integrative risk governance 
framework for nanotechnologies recently proposed separately by Linkov et al (2018) and 
Stone et al (2018). I also contend that their test criteria fit within the ambit of the three EC 
strategic risk governance objectives which are the genesis for this study. With the above 
model (figure 7.2), also illustrating its future facing capability by a continuous iteration of EU 
risk governance policy, nanoscience risk analysis, regulatory sciences, and socio-ethical 
engagement with civil actors. In the next section, I will briefly consider how my proposals have 
addressed limitations in the main conceptual frameworks which I have applied in my empirical 
analysis for this study.   
 Novel conceptual contributions from this study 
Based on the analysis of cross-sectoral qualitative data using codes derived from the 
theoretical literatures (discussed in Chapter 4), I have been able to develop fresh perspectives 
on the current regulatory landscape for EU NM development and production. I have also been 
able to offer solutions to some of the more intractable conceptual problems which have so 
far beset regulatory progress towards ensuring safe NM and acceptable risks they might pose. 
I summarise these contributions in the Table 7-1 below, with each contribution having been 
devised for the discussions in Chapters 5 and 6.   
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Table 7-1. Contributions to existing conceptual limitations identified in this study 
Current conceptual limitation Thesis contribution 
In the Taxonomy of Regulation (CEPS 2014) 
(Chapter 3, figure 3.1), the ‘hard and soft’ 
law stages, within the hierarchy of 
regulation, can and are being applied 
independently of each other without 
necessarily referencing to the outcomes of 
the other stages  
 
This model provides a structured approach 
that systematically synchronizes hard/soft 
law elements together in a whole system 
approach. By doing so, the outcomes from 
each stage readily informs the risk and 
design profiles which can be collectively 
evaluated for SbSD outcomes. 
The Analytical-Deliberative model (Rosa, 
McCright and Renn 2013) does not offer a 
detail process mapping for its application 
within nano R&D practices.   
Figure 7.2 maps the principal stages that 
generate and process both analytical and 
deliberative data for risk, regulatory, social 
utility and product decision-making 
 
Responsible Research and Innovation (Rome 
Declaration 2014; Horizon 2020) has been 
criticized for its lack of an effective 
implementation platform to engage non-
expert/civil actors with the nano industry in 
a meaningful dialogue for nano innovation. 
 
 
Anchoring RRI within the established ‘Safety 
by Design’ process provides for the 
conceptual evolution of ‘Safety by Social 
Design ‘to foster deliberative engagement 
by civil participation. Consequently, RRI is 
activated as an anticipatory bridging 
mechanism for deliberatively generated 
concerns to be inculcated within nano 
innovation .  
 
The current EC application of ‘Safety by 
Design’ for regulatory preparedness is  
predicated on only one normative outcome 
which is ‘safety’.  
 
 
 
The evolution of ‘Safety by Design’ to ‘Safety 
by Social Design’ facilitates the potential for 
multiple normative outcomes within the 
innovation process. The purpose then is not 
only to provide safer NM, but socially 
relevant, marketable and ultimately less 
contested nanoproducts. 
 
Precautionary Principle (COM2000) has 
been designed to be both precautionary and 
deliberative in action. Yet it has been  much 
criticized for being applied within the EU in  
a solely preventative manner.  
 The compatibility of RRI and SbD with PP  
legitimizes their linkage to formulate SbSD. 
Within this contemporary setting, the 
precautionary and deliberative roles for  
which PP was originally designed can now be 
properly exercised. 
 
This table illustrates that the risk governance framework proposed here are, primarily, 
offering an extension of current boundaries for the main conceptual framings in terms of 
current policy debates. There are also contributions from this study in terms of extending  our 
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understanding of academic literatures with chief amongst these is the new concept I label 
‘Safety by Social Design’. It offers a novel conceptual approach for the societal alignment of 
NM innovation within its analytical-deliberative framing which foregrounds the co-creation 
and shared responsibility for safe and responsible nano innovation. It is a construct built from 
the combined features from established concepts .i.e. PP/SbD/RRI, that provides for both 
precautionary and future facing anticipatory responses. By exploring current and future 
possibilities (Genus and Stirling 2018), it  has the potential to contribute to meeting the 
challenge set by Guston ( 2014.p225), ‘ for a broad-based capacity extended through society 
that can act on a variety of inputs to manage emerging knowledge-based technologies while 
such management is still possible’. It has the possibilities as a conceptual hub for managing 
and interpreting those analytical and deliberative inputs within the proposed adaptive and 
integrative model in figure 7.2. By doing so, it may facilitate a holistic approach to risk 
determination, nano safety decision making, and product evaluation for social utility.   
In respect of its trio of forming concepts, SbSD could extend their conceptual reach within the 
innovation process. It activates RRI for purposeful anticipatory exploration of future facing 
socio-ethical positions (Guston 2014 and others), provides for ‘strong’ RRI  by broad-based  
stakeholder engagement (Coenen and Grunwald 2016), emphasises the need for continuous 
social learning (Murashov and Howard 2014) and promotes the democratization of the 
innovation process as a key feature for social alignment ( van de Poel et al 2017). Within the 
proposed model in figure 7.2, there is  an understandable framework for activating RRI within 
a broadly-based holistic framework for nanosafety (Winickoff 2016), and an outline of the 
proposed process steps that are needed ( Burget et al. 2017; Blok and Lemmens 2015). Finally, 
the lack of industry traction for RRI ( van de Poel et al.2017; Auer and Jamia 2017) is 
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considered with the proposals for a portfolio of incentives to attract the nano industry 
attention to RRI and encourage its adoption.   
 There are continually evolving debates within the literatures of the role, value, purposes and 
application of PP (cf. Sandin 1999 and others). In particular, the criticism on the over emphasis 
on its hazard -centric precautionary role and its lack of deliberative application. However, von 
Schomberg (2012.p147) is explicit in describing PP as a ‘deliberative principle….that  involves 
deliberation on a range of normative dimensions’. SbSD provides for a novel contemporary  
setting in which this deliberative feature can be foregrounded, so that both the PP 
precautionary and anticipatory limbs are more equitably balanced in their contributions to 
the risk problem-solving process (COM2000; Per Sandin 2002, von Schomberg 2006, Stirling 
2016).  
Finally, SbSD provides the conceptual setting  for SbD to progress beyond its single normative 
feature of evaluating ‘safety’ (van de Poel and Robaey 2017; Gottardo et al. 2017; NANoREG2 
D6.03 http://www.nanoreg.eu/). By adopting a ‘mid-stream modulation’ approach ( Fisher et 
al. 2006), societal concerns can be connected with the innovation processes upstream of 
regulatory controls and market selection. Therefore, it offers the opportunities to 
pragmatically influence the safety -related decisions upstream in the innovation process 
(Flipse and van de Loo 2018 and others) by  minimising the potential for pathway dependency 
(Nordmann 2018) and technological lock-in( Owen et al. 2009). With the prospect of reducing 
future indeterminacy of innovation socio-politico-economic-environmental impacts as  
proposed by van de Poel and Robaey (2017). 
Collectively, these three core principles are embedded together in forming  SbSD, which is at 
the heart of the novel bespoke adaptive and integrative risk governance framework proposed 
by this study( figure 7.2). Such an overarching risk governance framework does not currently 
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exist  to provide governance of nanotechnologies, scrutinise their EHS effects, identify their 
potential socio-environmental implications for future nano-innovation pathways, and 
possible contributions to sustainable futures. Klinke and Renn (2012) and others believe that 
integrating analytic reasoning with stakeholder deliberation provides for a more valid co-
interpretation of risks and safety issues that can enhance the competence of risk decision-
making and assign a fairer share of that responsibility for their management. Stone et al 
(2018) and  Linkov et al (2018) regard such an adaptive and integrative framework as critical  
for the safe and responsible development of NMs now and into the future.  I propose that the 
framework in figure 7.2 can make a prospective contribution to meeting these aspirations.  
Now that I have reviewed the conceptual contributions of this study, in the next section I 
reflect on how this research impacts on the future outlooks for nanotechnologies. 
 Safety by Social Design and Nanotechnology futures 
I have illustrated in Chapters 5 and 6 that my research identifies the broader policy, scientific, 
regulatory, and societal debates for future risks and benefits that may accrue from NM and 
nano-enabled products. These debates address unresolved concerns arising from the broad 
palette of uncertainties relating to nanotechnologies future development, their technology 
applications, and the safety of consumer products. These uncertainties relate to NM 
functionality, technological applications, risk assessments, safe use, social utility and 
marketability.  
In terms of functionality and applications, this study identifies that there are continuing 
critical deficits in scientific knowledge and expertise in identifying and understanding NM 
environmental fate, behaviour and toxicological effects. Fadeel et al (2018) provide clarity 
that these outstanding problems are significant and are not readily surmountable. These 
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environmental nanoscience deficiencies underscore a multiplicity of continuing regulatory 
nanoscience problems which may take decades to resolve. Whilst RRI is promoted as a 
general policy tool for innovation practices within the EU, the EC has yet to accept that the 
socio-ethical concerns of European civil society should be incorporated within its ‘regulatory 
preparedness ‘policy for NM. Rather, such discussions are still restricted within the confines 
of expert actor groupings (Gottardo et al 2017; NANoREG2 http://www.nanoreg.eu/)  
I argue that the proposed risk governance framework in Figure 7.2 offers a novel methodology 
to collect and collate experimental scientific and normative data from more diverse sources 
into a single decision framework. It builds on current EC scientific policy, experimental and 
regulatory foundations and practice but, additionally, offers a conceptual based mechanism 
for civil society to have a purposeful role within the nano innovation process. By identifying 
the SbSD concept as the coordinating mechanism of the model, it enables socio-ethical 
considerations to be firmly grounded into the nano innovation process. There are of course 
substantive challenges here – for example, successful implementation of the framework will 
require the development and sustenance of horizontal relationships across networks of 
diverse expert and civil society actors, and the engendering of trust and reciprocity between 
them. Nonetheless, the potential benefits could be considerable, not least that my approach 
could stimulate the transitioning from traditional closed expert driven innovation to a more 
open and transparent nano innovation culture. It has the potential capability to realise the 
ambitions articulated in  the EC NanoStrategy for the safe and responsible development of 
NM. 
Finally, all the major issues debated in this study have wider applicability and transferability.  
I believe that this model offers instructive guidance on how an international charter for 
societal alignment with nanotechnologies might be brought about. I also consider that its 
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broad principles are technology neutral and have the potential to be adaptive to other 
emerging technologies. It combines the analytical with the deliberative and so is both 
precautionary and anticipatory in its application and outcomes.  It thus has possibilities as the 
basis for a risk governance roadmap for other emerging technologies.   
 Future Research Directions 
My research has identified that there continue to be considerable knowledge and conceptual 
gaps in EU nanoscience and technology knowledge and practice. A critical starting point in 
addressing these gaps is to resolve outstanding issues over nano definition specifications and 
metrical measurement tools. Additionally, this research identifies that emerging NM safety 
techniques for understanding NM biophysicochemical properties, cellular toxicology, and risk 
characterization still lack essential proof of concept necessary for regulatory acceptance. 
Moreover, further research is needed into whether lack of compliance by industry with 
REACH (particularly over compilation of registration dossiers on new NM) is widespread, and 
whether this practice is putting workers and consumers at any measurable risk. There will 
need to be a continued powerful policy, financial and research push from EU governments, 
regulators, academia and industry to resolve these issues.  
In terms of nanoscience and technology in society, there is still a need for the development 
of a detailed roadmap to incorporate RRI and SbSD within industry practices. The engagement 
with civil actors sounds straightforward but setting up the infrastructure for trusted networks 
and making them function effectively over long periods for mutual win-win scenarios, is far 
more difficult in practice. Further research is needed into building and promoting consultative 
fora so that they become a prominent part not only for innovation, but for business planning, 
organisational practices, Corporate Social Responsibility  strategies, and product branding. 
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This will require ongoing research funding to develop relevant case studies/scenarios to 
inform industry implementation practices and the ongoing business benefits that can accrue. 
To complement these developments, there will be a need for research into new training 
packages for organisational learning, competencies development, in tandem with new 
internal/external communication strategies.  
Another important issue emerging from this study is the need to undertake further research 
for a menu of options containing business orientated incentives, to encourage and fund 
industry practical engagement with RRI and SbSD. It is imperative that the research includes 
objectives that offer firm evidence of the business benefits for adopting  RRI and SbSD into 
business strategy and practice. That research must examine whether co-produced 
nanoproducts can add genuine value to the business nanoproduct portfolio and its financial 
bottom line.  
I made the point at the beginning of this Chapter ( section7.1), that there is a lack of a  bespoke 
overarching EU risk governance framework to scrutinise either the EHS effects or the wider 
social implications of current and future nano-innovation pathways. So, the recent EU funding 
to research this matter and for the proposal for the establishment of an EU  Risk Governance 
Council is applauded and I anticipate important developments and benefits in this 
technological sector. 
My final observation is that the emergent NM industry sector must begin to take more 
seriously the need for product development to be aligned within socially acceptable 
boundaries, as espoused by Jasanoff (2016). The design of the model in Figure 7.2 above is 
readily adaptable to nano future trajectories and is aimed at achieving this aspiration. By 
doing so, it can support the delivery of the EU strategic goal for the safe and responsible 
development of NM.  
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 Research schedule of questions 
Question 
Number 
Question Topic Research 
Objective 
1 What are your views on the commercial potential and societal 
benefits of nanomaterials? 
N/A 
2 What is your opinion on the current definition for nanomaterials RO1 
3 Do you have any  concerns  regarding regulatory safety testing of 
nanomaterials with specific reference to REACH? 
RO1 
4 With continuing  uncertainties for the safe use of NMs, is there an 
over- emphasis on undefined hazard rather than evidence-based 
risk 
RO1 
5 Can  emergent  scientific risk analysis techniques  and novel  
cellular predictive toxicological models3 replace current 
regulatory testing regimes including animal testing 
RO2 
6 What are  the prospects for Safety by Design approaches to 
significantly influence upstream risk/safety decisions during the 
nano innovation process? 
RO2 
7 Can RRI  be the EU policy  instrument for  embedding socio-ethical 
concerns for safe design into the nano innovation process? 
RO3 
8 How do you consider RRI can be implemented  within the nano 
innovation processes? 
RO3 
9 How can the benefits of adopting RRI be promoted to  industry RO3 
10 Is the future for EU risk governance for nanotechnologies a 
combination of statutory and industry self- regulation? 
RO3 
11 Are there any other relevant issues you wish to raise N/A 
 
3 A Diagram is attached to aid discussion –‘The Implementation of Toxicological profiling using a Tiered approach 
for risk identification and characterization’ ( Nel et al  2013) 
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 Date listing of interviews per stakeholder category 
(n=55) 
Stakeholder Category Date Interviewed 
(dd.mm.yyyy) 
Reference 
Regulator 7.3.2013 RG01 
Industry 13.6.2013 IND01 
Government 18.6.2013 Govt 01 
Regulator 10.7.2013 RG02 
Academic 11.7.2013 AC01 
Academic 12.7.13 AC02 
Academic 13.7.2013 AC03 
Industry 22.7.2013 IND02 
Academic 13.8.2013 AC04 
Industry 22.8.2013 IND03 
Industry 23.8.2013 IND04 
Industry 2.10.2013 IND05 
Industry 14.10.2013 IND06 
Industry 12.11.2013 IND07 
Academic 4.12.2013 AC05 
Industry 23.3.2014 IND08 
Jurisprudence 11.2.2014 JP01 
Jurisprudence 20.2.2014 JP02 
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Stakeholder Category Date Interviewed 
(dd.mm.yyyy) 
Reference 
Government 21.2.2014 Govt 02 
Government 28.2.2014 Govt 03 
Government 6.3.2014 Govt 04 
Government 25.3.2014 Govt 05 
Government 1.4.2014 Govt 06 
Industry 3.4.2014 IND09 
Industry 7.4.2014 IND10 
Industry 8.4.2014 IND11 
Government 10.4.2014 Govt 07 
Academic 1.5.2014 AC06 
Academic 5.5.2014 AC07 
Regulator 20.5.2014 RG03 
Academic 22.5.2014 AC 08 
Government 27.5 2014 Govt 08 
Non-Governmental 
Organisation (NGO) 
30.5 .2014 NGO01 
Government 1.7.2014 Govt 09 
Industry 16.8.2014 IND12 
Academic 6.9.2014 AC09 
Academic 8.9.2014 AC10 
Academic 24.10.2014 AC 11 
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Stakeholder Category Date Interviewed 
(dd.mm.yyyy) 
Reference 
Jurisprudence 5.11.2014 JP03 
Industry 13.11.2014 IND13 
Government 14.11.2014 Govt 10 
Academic 21.11.2014 AC 12 
Academic 21.11.2014 AC13 
Academic 24.11.2014 AC14 
Government 25.11.2014 Govt 11 
Academic 3.12.2014 AC15 
Industry 3.12.2014 IND14 
Academic 5.12.2014 AC16 
NGO 5.5.2015 NGO 02 
Academic 21.6.2015 AC17 
Academic 25.1.2016 AC18 
Academic 22.2.2016 AC19 
Government 8.3.2016 Govt 12 
Academic 20.5.2016 AC20 
NGO 7.4.2017 NGO 03 
 
Coding 
Each interviewee was allocated a code for their sector and the interview date sequence  
AC- Academic 
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Govt- Government 
IND-Industry 
JP-Jurisprudence 
NGO-Non-Governmental Organisations 
RG- Regulator 
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 NVIVO database screen showing the Analytical Themes and Codes  
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 Table of International Conferences at which 
presentations were given 2014-18 
Title of Presentation Conference Date 
Risk Regulation and Responsible 
Innovation of Nanomaterials: 
Developing an Adaptive Risk 
Governance Framework 
9th International Conference of the 
Society for the Study of New and 
Emerging Technologies University 
of Maastricht , Netherlands 
26th June 
2018 
Risk, Regulation and Responsible 
Innovation of Nanomaterials 
Nano-safety in Europe Conference 
Leibnitz Institute, Saarbrucken, 
Germany 
11th 
October 
2017 
Risk Governance and the Responsible 
Innovation of Nanomaterials within 
the European Union 
 
12th International Conference on 
the Environmental Exposure of 
Nanomaterials. University of 
Birmingham. UK.  
6th 
September 
2017 
What is the future role of risk 
governance in the responsible 
innovation of nanomaterials in the 
European Union? 
7th International Conference of the 
Society for the Study of New and 
Emerging Technologies, University 
of Bergen, Norway 
14th 
October 
2016 
Risk Governance, Regulation and 
Responsible Innovation of 
Nanomaterials 
 
9th International Conference on 
Environmental Exposure of 
Nanomaterials, University of South 
Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, 
USA  
11th 
September 
2014 
Implications of Nanotechnology for 
Food Safety futures 
 Joint Conference of the 
International Federation of 
Environmental Health and the USA 
National Environmental Health 
Association Conference, Las Vegas, 
USA,  
 
9th July 
2014 
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 Consent Form 
  
 
 
 
Environmental Nanoscience Research Group 
School of Geography, Earth and Environmental 
Sciences 
College of Life and Environmental Sciences 
University of Birmingham 
Birmingham  
B15 2TT 
 
Tel:   
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of the Research Project: Evaluating Progress for the European Union Nanotechnology 
Strategies for the Safe Design and Responsible Innovation of Nanomaterials  
 
 
Name of principal researcher: Maurice Brennan 
 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information 
sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to 
ask questions 
 
 
2.  I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I 
am free to withdraw at any time, without giving any 
reason, without my or my organisation’s involvement in 
the project being affected in any way 
 
Please tick or initial the box if you 
agree with the statement 
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3. I consent to being interviewed. 
 
I consent to the interview being recorded. 
 
I consent to the interview being transcribed 
 
 
4. I agree to the use of anonymised quotations from 
interviews being reported in research reports, journal 
articles and presentations. 
 
 
5.  I understand that data collected during the study may be 
looked at by individuals from the University of Birmingham 
and from regulatory authorities where it is relevant to my 
taking part in this research. I give permission for these 
individuals to have access to my records. 
 
 
6.  I would like to request a copy of the typed transcript when 
it is available 
 
 
7.  I agree to taking part in this study              
                                                                                                                          
 
 
 
  
Signature:   Date: 
 
 
 
Maurice Brennan                      
Researcher                Date received:                         
 
Please complete a copy of the Consent Form (for your own records) 
Return to signed Form to : M.E.Brennan.1@bham.ac.uk 
